HOT TOPIC BRIEF HTB-ACIC-01

ACIC Budget Position

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

2021-22 estimated actual

1. The ACIC estimated operating result for 2021-22 is a surplus of **$37.529 million**.
2. Excluding unfunded depreciation ($6.477 million), the impact of the lease accounting standard ($0.066 million), and capital funding income ($11.990 million), the ACIC adjusted result is a surplus of **$31.950 million** for the FY.
3. The original budget estimated an adjusted operating loss of $17.539 million excluding depreciation, lease impact and capital funding income. The approved loss was expected due to the National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS) Tranche 1 program accessing cash reserves. The improvement of $49.489 million in the adjusted operating result is primarily due to:
    a. $18.008 million growth in National Police Checking Service (NPCS) revenue,
    b. underspend in the NCIS program of $16.950 million,
    c. resources received free of charge provided by the Department of Home Affairs for NCIS operating cost of $8.203 million, and
    d. reduction in employee leave provision and benefits of $3.412 million due to change in the government bond rate.

2022-23 outlook

4. The updated budget reflects an operating loss of **$6.760 million**, or an adjusted loss of **$2.963 million** excluding unfunded depreciation, $1.824 million revenue from capital investments and the impact of the Lease Accounting Standard.
5. The **$2.963 million** loss is due to the decision to support the NCIS from Special Account reserves.

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6. 2022-23 appropriation is **$149.860 million** (increase of $22.529 million from the previous year of $127.331 million). The increase from 2021-22 mainly relates to:

    a. $61.9 million increase from the new measure in Table 1.2 of the March 2022 PBS, which included the Baseline NPP and the continuation of the NCIS Mid-late Adopters measure;

    b. $1.2 million increase from the new measure in Table 1.2 of the October 2022 PBS for the ACIC component of the Fraud Fusion Taskforce.

    c. $1.6 million increase from changes in funding profile for existing measures;

    These two items are offset by:

    d. $4.1 million decrease from whole-of-government savings measures in the October 2022 PBS;

    e. $22.1 million decrease from measures terminating in 2021-22 including classified measure (High End Surveillance); and

    f. $15.9 million decrease from NCIS Mid-late Adopters initial 2021-22 funding.

7. The new funding over two years, approved by government in the March budget consists of:

    a. Releasing $40 5 million from Contingency Reserve for NCIS Mid-late Adopters

    b. $76.3 million for Baseline funding NPP.

8. The measure terminating in June 2024, is the primary reason for the drop in 2024-25 appropriation.

9. The funding available for the ACIC's operating costs are summarised at the table 1 below.

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Table 1: Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission funding summary table

ACIC Funding Summary	2021-22 Updated Budget $m	2022-23 Budget $m	2023-24 Budget $m	2024-25 Budget $m	2025-26 Budget $m
Total Appropriation	**127.331**	**149.860**	**154.001**	**99.476**	**103.674**
Fee for Service Revenue	11.879	6.887	2.146	2.178	2.211
POCA Revenue	2.274	1.824	-	-	-
Special Account Revenue	127.547	132.156	134.766	137.428	140.143
Rental Income from Subleasing	1.647	-	-	-	-
Resource Received Free of Charge	22.668	2.899	2.899	2.899	2.899
Total Own-Source Revenue	**166.015**	**143.766**	**139.811**	**142.505**	**145.253**
Total Funding	**293.346**	**293.626**	**293.812**	**241.981**	**248.927**

Changes in appropriation, own source revenue and ASL

10. Changes to appropriation, breakdown of own source revenue and changes to ASL are detailed in the following three tables:

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Table 2: ACIC appropriation changes from 2021-22 FY

In $'m	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25	2025-26
Total 2021-22 Funding	**127.331**	**127.331**	**127.331**	**127.331**	**127.331**
Changes from 2021-22 funding:					
Efficiency Dividends		(0.892)	(1.780)	(2.703)	(3.673)
WCI Indexation		1.848	6.881	7.452	9.401
HA Portfolio Efficiency		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Increase due to FE3 creation		-	6.593	6.593	6.593
Election Commitment savings		(4.065)	-	-	-
APS Reform offsets		(0.054)	(0.152)	(0.117)	-
Australian Anti-Gang Intelligence Coordination Centre		(0.112)	(1.641)	(1.641)	(1.641)
Criminal Intelligence Checking		0.752	(1.267)	(1.267)	(1.267)
JCF -classified		(1.099)	(1.099)	(1.099)	(1.099)
National Waste Water		0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
National Register of Child Sex Offenders		-	-	0.680	3.776
Federal Family Violence Orders		(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.247)	(0.252)
Child Exploitation Intelligence Team		1.250	1.254	1.259	1.259
CLOUD Act Implementation		0.12	0.126	0.123	0.123
Electronic Surveillance		(0.013)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)
NCIS Mid-late Adopters		7.962	0.703	(15.917)	(15.917)
Criminal Intelligence Operational Capability		(11.017)	(11.017)	(11.017)	(11.017)
High end surveillance capability		(11.089)	(11.089)	(11.089)	(11.089)
Baseline funding NPP		38.017	38.286	-	-
Fraud Fusion Taskforce		1.180	1.319	1.329	1.341
Total Change from 2021-22		**22.529**	**26.670**	**(27.856)**	**(23.657)**
Appropriation	**127.331**	**149.860**	**154.001**	**99.476**	**103.674**

11. At each year's MYEFO estimates update agencies need to create the new appropriation base for the Forward Estimates Year 3 (FE3). The new year is based on the prior year and then adjusted for items such as known variations to NPP funding and reprofiling required from legislative delays. The baseline increase of $6.593 in 2023-24 and onwards is the net impact of these process in prior years.

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Table 3: ACIC own source revenue breakdown

In $'m	2021-22 Updated Budget	2022-23 Budget	2023-24 Budget	2024-25 Budget	2025-26 Budget
Sports Integrity Australia MOU - Australian Sports Intelligence Unit	1.819	2.200	-	-	-
Illicit Tobacco Taskforce (incl. capital)	4.691	-	-	-	-
Other S74 revenue	0.881	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540
AIC Corporate Charge	1.589	1.579	1.606	1.638	1.671
CMC/QPOL	0.253	-	-	-	-
ATO - Serious Financial Crime Taskforce	2.646	2.568	-	-	-
Total Service Revenue	**11.879**	**6.887**	**2.146**	**2.178**	**2.211**
Addressing Professional Facilitator of Illicit Drugs	0.159	-	-	-	-
Domestic Ice Manufacture	0.320	-	-	-	-
Following the money to prevent livestreaming of child sexual abuse	0.736	-	-	-	-
Modernising the ACIC's unique examination capability	1.059	1.824	-	-	-
POCA Revenue	**2.274**	**1.824**	**-**	**-**	**-**
Operating lease	1.647	-	-	-	-
Rental Income from Subleasing	**1.647**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**
Jurisdiction funded resources - Secondees	2.478	2.734	2.734	2.734	2.734
Resources free of charge ANAO (Audit)	0.165	0.165	0.165	0.165	0.165
Resources free of charge NCIS costs	19.994	-	-	-	-
Donated assets	0.031	-	-	-	-
Total Resource received free of charge	**22.668**	**2.899**	**2.899**	**2.899**	**2.899**
National Police Checking Service (NPCS)	125.875	130.476	133.086	135.748	138.463
National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS)	1.325	1.250	1.250	1.250	1.250
Other NPI Revenue	0.347	0.430	0.430	0.430	0.430
Total Revenue - special account	**127.547**	**132.156**	**134.766**	**137.428**	**140.143**
Total Own Source Revenue	**166.015**	**143.766**	**139.811**	**142.505**	**145.253**

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Table 4: ACIC ASL

	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25	2025-26
ASL Cap @ 2022-23 PBS	**850**	**848**	**840**	**840**	**840**
Changes:					
2021-22 adjustment for actual	(159)				
Cost of Legislation Delay - National Register of Child Sex Offenders		(2)	(4)	(2)	(0)
Fraud Fusion Taskforce NPP		6	6	6	6
ASL @ October 2022-23 PBS	**691**	**852**	**842**	**844**	**846**

	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25	2025-26
Movements from 2021-22 ASL:		**161**	**151**	**153**	**155**
Due to:					
reversal of 2021-22 adjustment for estimated actual		**159**	159	159	159
AGICC extension		**(1)**	(1)	(1)	(1)
National Register of Child Sex Offenders		**-**	-	2	4
Introduction and Criminal Enforcement of New Federal Family Vi		**(0)**	(0)	(0)	0)
Child Exploitation Intelligence Team		**5**	5	5	5
CLOUD Act Implementation		**1**	1	1	1
Electronic Surveillance		**-**	(1)	(1)	(1)
NCIS mid-late adopters		**28**	19	19	19
Criminal Intelligence Operational Capability		**(25)**	(25)	(25)	(25)
High end surveillance capability		**(2)**	(12)	(12)	(12)
Fraud Fusion Taskforce		**6**	6	6	6
Total movements		**161**	**151**	**153**	**155**

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Current at: 07/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

HOT TOPIC BRIEF HTB-ACIC-02

ACIC Staffing Position

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- *Australian Criminal Intelligence headcount (excluding AIC) as at 30 September 2022:*

Staffing Categories	31 March 2021	31 August 2021	31 December 2021	31 January 2022	30 September 2022
Casual	0	0	0	0	0
Examiners	3	3	3	5	6
Non-ongoing	13	15	16	16	36
Ongoing	730	719	699	695	699
Total	746	737	718	716	741
Higher Duties Arrangements	77	115	108	101	125

- *Staffing figures (excluding AIC) as at 30 September 2022:*

Measure	Total
Headcount	741
FTE	708.55
ASL	702.16
Secondees* paid by ACIC (standard)	12
Secondees* funded by partner agency	37
Secondees* Taskforce	107
Male	365
Female	368
Indeterminate	8
Full Time (includes SES and Shift Workers)	671
Part Time	70
SES**	17
Shift Workers	15

*Secondees/Paid Secondees/Taskforce do not count towards headcount, ASL & FTE.

** This only includes substantively filled positions and does not include long term higher duties.

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Location

The ACIC works out of eight locations in Australia (at 30 September 2022

ACT	NSW	NT	QLD	SA	TAS	VIC	WA	Overseas
381	126	3	66	31	2	96	33	3

Taskforces and secondees as at 30 September 2022

- The ACIC coordinates and participates in taskforces and joint analyst groups with partner agencies. The ACIC also supplements staffing with secondees from other agencies
- The ACIC has **107** taskforce members working on joint taskforces to support ACIC priorities. Taskforce members are provided and funded by partner agencies.
- **49** staff are seconded to the ACIC from partner agencies (12 standard/37 funded by partner agencies), including state police jurisdictions in addition to the aforementioned 107 taskforce members.

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HOT TOPIC BRIEF HTB-ACIC-03

National Criminal Intelligence System

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

The National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS) provides Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies with secure access to a national view of criminal intelligence and information, improving information sharing across state, territory and federal jurisdictions.

NCIS contributes to a safer Australia by arming agencies with the cross-border information they need, when they need it, to address and prevent criminal activity. NCIS is valued and supported by jurisdictions and users, and underpinned by a strong budget and stable workforce. Delivery and sustainment of NCIS as system of national significance, is in the national interest.

Key Points

- The NCIS system is live, combining and sharing extensive near real time policing data from 3 of the 4 early adopter agencies nationally for the first time. To help maximise the value of shared data, NCIS has delivered an advanced user interface and features including powerful search capabilities, correlated views of cross-border data, subscription and notification (deconfliction) functions, and bulk search.
- NCIS users now have access to extensive data from Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia as well as other national police datasets. Shortly, NCIS will also share New South Wales police data
- NCIS data is available for operational use, with the necessary legal frameworks in place to support this, including that all police partners have opted in to an NCIS Partner Agency Information Sharing Agreement. These arrangements are supported by partner agencies undertaking due diligence to ensure lawful information sharing.
- Feedback from users is that the modern search capabilities in NCIS combined with access to data that was previously unavailable is proving to be highly valuable in a range of policing scenarios.
- NCIS is currently going through a significant increase in adoption by police agencies. All police agencies are using the system, s 47E(d) [redacted]

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s 47E(d) [redacted]

- Work has commenced in the Australian Federal Police/ACT Policing, South Australian Police and Tasmania Police on projects to share policing information with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies via NCIS. Commencement of the Northern Territory Police NCIS Project is pending completion s 47E(d) [redacted]
- Additionally, the NCIS Program is currently working on sharing additional high-value law enforcement data from ACIC and the Department of Home Affairs including:
    - the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID)
    - s 47E(d) [redacted]
    - [redacted]
    - [redacted]
- As NCIS delivery is dependent on the participation of multiple independently funded and governed agencies at the federal, state and territory levels, NCIS Program governance arrangements include Partner Agencies in reporting, oversight and decision making. This includes:
    - a monthly Partner Adoption Projects Board which oversees partner projects and day to day matters
    - a Steering Committee comprised of senior representatives of partner agencies which meets every two months
    - regular reporting to the ACIC Board which provides the mandate for the Program.
- The NCIS Program is subject to independent assurance s 47E(d) [redacted]

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- The NCIS Program is also subject to independent assessment under Department of Finance Gateway reviews. s 47E(d) [redacted]

- The ACIC is the lead agency accountable and responsible for delivering NCIS, while the Department of Home Affairs has a key role in delivering the system's technical capability. The changes in portfolio responsibilities with the ACIC now in the Attorney General's portfolio will have no impact on NCIS Program delivery.

NCIS Budget

- As at 30 September 2022, the National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS) Program has spent $137.415 million. There is $110.379 million remaining which is sufficient to complete the current Tranche, the Mid-Late Adopters program and sustainment through to 2024-25.
- Total funding for Tranche 1 of NCIS is $150 3m. This is comprised of:
- $118.1m for Tranche 1, with
    - $59.0m from the Commonwealth Government, and
    - $59.1m from the National Policing Systems and Services Special Account.
- A $32.2m additional contribution from Home Affairs for technical delivery.
- Total funding for Mid-Late Adopters and sustainment is $97.5m to onboard the final policing agencies to NCIS and for the ongoing uplift and sustainment of the capability. This funding consists of:
    - $73.0m from the Commonwealth for program enablement ($16.4m) and sustainment cost ($56.6m)
    - $24.5m partner integration cost to be funded from the National Policing Systems and Services Special Account.
- The September financial year-to-date Program spend is $12.3m.

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- Available budget for the rest of the financial year is $40.328m, comprised of $30.427m for Program (totalling $40.089m for FY 22-23) and $9.901m for sustainment (totalling $12.572m for FY 22-23). This is sufficient to complete Tranche 1 agreed scope and commence the Mid-Late adopters.

Actual spend and available budget

	FY18–19	FY19–20	FY20–21	FY21–22	FY22–23	FY23-24
Program	$ 7.523	$ 21.094	$ 36.782	$ 48.868	$ 40.089	$ 33.298
Sustainment	$ -	$ -	$ 1.799	$ 8.987	$ 12.572	$ 16.620

*Actual for 18-19, 19-20 20-21 and 21-22 Financial Years. 22-23 and beyond Financial Years is available budget

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Version: 1	Cleared by: s 22(1)(a)(ii) , Principal Advisor NCIS Program	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Current at: 07/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Document 4

BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-07
NCA bombing

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

At 9:15 am on Wednesday 2 March 1994, a bomb exploded at the National Crime Authority (NCA) office in the CPS Credit Union Building on Waymouth Street Adelaide, killing Detective Sergeant Geoffrey Leigh Bowen and causing injuries to Peter Wallis, a lawyer employed by the NCA.

On Friday 7 October 2022, sentencing was handed down and Domenic Perre received a life sentence for the NCA bombing murder in Adelaide with a non-parole period of 37 years 5 months.

Key Points

- This outcome has ended a significant and long-running investigation. We acknowledge the ongoing impact on the Bowen and Wallis families. We hope it helps provide some closure and our thoughts are with Detective Sergeant Geoffrey Bowen's and Peter Wallis's family, friends and colleagues.
- The ACIC also thanks the South Australia Police for the ongoing dedication and persistence of its officers that has led to the outcome. The ACIC would also like to acknowledge the dedication and persistence of ACIC staff involved in the investigation as well as the support of former ACIC Chief Executive Officer Chris Dawson APM.
- Our thoughts are also with current and former staff of the NCA/ACIC that were affected by this event.

BACKGROUND

- The National Crime Authority (NCA) was a predecessor to the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC).
- Domenic Perre was first charged with murder soon after the blast but the case against him was dropped six months later because of a lack of evidence.
- In 2016, Taskforce Cornus commenced investigations with 15 full time independent investigators and additional resources as required. It was the largest and most comprehensive cold case review and investigation ever undertaken by South Australia Police (SAPol).

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- The two-and-a-half-year investigation was led by SAPol, the ACIC and Forensic Science SA, along with a review of the evidence gathered by the Director of Public Prosecutions.
- In 2018, SAPol arrested Domenic Perre and charged him with murder and attempted murder following a review and additional investigation of the bombing.
- On 18 January 2021, the trial commenced with no jury after Perre elected to be tried by judge alone. Prosecution case consisted of approximately 170 prosecution witnesses and 372 exhibits were tendered. No defence witnesses were called.
- On 30 June 2022, after more than six months of deliberations, Justice Kevin Nicholson found Perre guilty on both charges.
- Perre has lodged an appeal against his convictions.
- Some elements of the case have been kept secret with the court issuing more than 30 suppression orders.

Version: 1	Cleared by: s 22(1)(a)(i), A/g National Manager Executive	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii) , Advisor, Ministerial and Executive Support
Current at: 12/10/22	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-08

Financial Crimes

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Brief on Arrest of Cheok Wa Chau in Macau, Money Laundering through Poker Machines in NSW, Casino Junkets, interaction with China, recent events and inquires (CROWN), and Star City allegations.

Key Points

Arrest of Cheok Wa CHAU in Macau

- On 29 November 2021 Chinese authorities arrested Cheok Wa CHAU (@Alvin CHAU) in Macau along with 10 staff members of junket operator Sun City Gaming Promotion Company Limited (Suncity).
- The charges relate to cross border on-line gambling and underground banking activities. Gaming rooms operated by Suncity have now closed in Macau.
- Suncity closed its Australian operations in late 2019 as a result of public inquiries into its operations at Crown Casino and adverse media reporting.
- ACIC had extensive intelligence reporting on the vulnerabilities of the Suncity junket to criminal exploitation.

Money Laundering Through Poker Machines - NSW

- In November 2021, 60 Minutes and associated print media raised a number of instances of money laundering through poker machines in clubs and hotels. The NSW Crime Commission subsequently announced an inquiry into alleged money laundering through NSW Poker Machines.
- The ACIC works closely with the NSW Crime Commission and is currently assisting with its inquiry to determine the nature and extent of money laundering through gaming machines in pubs and clubs.

Casino Junkets

- Australia is becoming increasingly hostile to international casino junket operators due to ongoing money laundering concerns.

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- Star Entertainment Group and Sky City Entertainment Group has announced its intention to cease dealing with junket operators.
- Crown Resorts has announced its intention to cease dealing with unlicensed junket operators. As of April 2021, Crown Melbourne is prohibited by the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation from recommencing junkets.
- A casino junket includes:
    - a promoter introducing a person or group to a casino and receiving a commission based on a percentage of their gambling during a defined period.
    - the promotion of a casino to a person or group (usually involving transportation, accommodation, food, drink, entertainment, etc).
- Junkets are not specifically covered under the AML/CTF Act –compliance is the responsibility of AUSTRAC.
- Targeting Criminal Wealth Special Investigation - insights into the vulnerabilities of junket operations in Australian casinos:
    - Junket operations are vulnerable to criminal exploitation due to their lack of transparency, the concealment of ownership and distribution of funds and the anonymity of participants.
- **The majority of junket operators and participants are non-Australian residents.** Access to overseas probity information for operators and participants is limited.
- Junket tour representatives (JTR) are not considered the customer of the casino under AML/CTF rules and so are not subject to 'know your customer' requirements by the casino. Consequently, JTRs do not undergo the same level of background checking as junket tour operators (JTO) providing opportunities for criminal infiltration or exploitation of JTRs.
- Junket funds are attributed to the JTO despite the money being sourced from multiple participants.

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Interaction with China

- Junkets were used to circumvent Chinese currency controls. The Chinese Government regulates cross border investments and has imposed strict currency regulations aimed at curbing capital flight.
    - The maximum amount that can be transferred offshore from China is USD$50,000 / yr / person, and USD$5,000 cash is the maximum that can be carried out of China.
- In an effort to evade these controls, underground banking systems (or alternative remittance services) have been established to facilitate the movement of billions of Chinese Yuan Renminbi.
- China has strong gambling restrictions. Outside of state-sanctioned lotteries, gambling is illegal.
- JTRs attract high-wealth Chinese gamblers who are eager to transfer their wealth and avoid detection by local authorities
- A recently discovered practice by Crown, of issuing cash advances via a customer's China Union Pay credit card, bypasses currency controls and AML/CTF requirements. Crown would charge hotel charges to the credit card to cover the cash advances despite no services being provided. This practice occurred between 2012 and 2016 for Chinese nationals.

Recent events and inquiries (CROWN)

- Following increased law enforcement and adverse media attention (from mid-2019) on money laundering, Suncity scaled back its Australian operations and closed its high-roller room at Crown Melbourne. Suncity has now withdrawn from Australia completely.

s 47C, s 47E(d) [redacted]

- s 47C, s 47E(d) [redacted]

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- The ACIC continues to work in close cooperation with partner agencies s 47E(d) [redacted]
- August 2020: Crown Board suspended its operations regarding Junkets.
- September 2020: Crown Board extended that suspension to 30 June 2021 to conduct a proper assessment of the situation.
- 9 February 2021: report of the NSW Independent Liquor and Gaming inquiry was tabled in the NSW Parliament.
- 22 February 2021: Victorian Government announced a Royal Commission into the Casino Operator and Licence (in response to the findings of the NSW inquiry which ruled Crown unfit to hold a casino licence at the Barangaroo complex). The report was tabled in October 2021 and found that Crown Melbourne was not suitable to hold a casino licence. The report also recommended that a 'Special Manager' be appointed to oversee the affairs of the casino operator.
- 5 March 2021: WA Government announced the Perth Royal Commission to inquire into, and report on, the affairs of the Crown Casino Perth and related matters.
- 3 August 2021: Perth Royal Commission interim report by tabled in WA Parliament. Final report was tabled in State Parliament on 24 March 2022. – see para 28.
- 14 September 2021: the New South Wales Independent Liquor and Gaming Authority (ILGA) Board commenced its inquiry under section 31 of the C*asino Control Act 1992 (NSW)* into whether the operator of the Star Casino, Sydney (The Star Pty Ltd) is suitable to continue to give effect to the casino licence and whether it is in the public interest that the licence should continue. The final report was delivered on 31 August 2022 and made publ c 13 September 2022.
- 2 March 2022: AUSTRAC announced compliance activity on Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth. AUSTRAC's allegations are extensive and include:

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- Failed to appropriately assess the money laundering and terrorism financing risks they faced, including the likelihood and impact of those risks, and to identify and respond to changes in risk over time.
- Did not include in their AML/CTF programs appropriate risk-based systems and controls to mitigate and manage the risks to which Crown were reasonably exposed.
- Failed to establish an appropriate framework for Board and senior management oversight of the AML/CTF programs.
- Did not have a transaction monitoring program to monitor transactions and identify suspicious activity that was appropriately risk-based or appropriate to the nature, size and complexity of Crown.
- Did not have an appropriate enhanced customer due diligence program to carry out additional checks on higher risk customers.
- Did not conduct appropriate ongoing customer.
- Due diligence on a range of customers who presented higher money laundering risks.

Other

- Following Recommendation 5 of the Royal Commission (Finkelstein Report) the ACIC has begun establishing formal links with CROWN s 47E(d) [redacted].

Star City Allegations

- On 10 October 2021, 60 Minutes and associated media broadcast a number of allegations in relation to the operation of The Star Casino which operates at the following locations:
  - Treasury Casino (Brisbane)
  - The Star Gold Coast
  - The Star Sydney

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- These allegations related to money laundering by serious and organised crime entities, the laundering of funds by junkets, in particular the Suncity Junket, and the use of casino accounts to transfer funds by persons suspected of being involved in foreign interference. In addition, Star Casino allowed patrons to withdraw cash from China Union Pay credit cards bypassing reporting requirements under the AML/CTF Act.
- In 2017 the ACIC disclosed intelligence relating to the use of China Union Pay cards at the Star Casino to s 47E(d) [redacted]
- s 47E(d) [redacted]

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Version: 1	Cleared by: Chris Davey, NM Intelligence Insights	Action officer: Chris Davey, NM Intelligence Insights
Current at: 14/10/22	Phone number:	Action officer number:

BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-09

Firearms, including AFIN

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- A number of serious and organised crime groups are involved in trafficking illicit firearms – no one group dominates and most activity is at a relatively low level.
- A conservative estimate is ~ 260,000 firearms are in the domestic illicit market. This position has not changed for some years.
- Data from the National Firearm Trace Program (2021–22) showed the 'grey' market is the primary method of diversion of long-arms to the illicit market and theft is the primary method for handguns, followed by domestic manufacture and illegal importation.
- Note these figures do not reflect the total number of firearms diverted, but only those sent to the ACIC for tracing on an ad-hoc basis

3D printed firearms

- 3D printing (also known as additive manufacturing) became an issue worth monitoring by law enforcement when instructions for assembling a firearm from 3D manufactured components combined with commercially available parts were published online in 2013.
- Commercially available 3D printing technology is improving rapidly, with new material in use and commercially available.
- 3D printing technology includes hybrid designs of printed parts in otherwise legitimate firearms.
- Despite recent press reporting, the possibility of manufacturing reliable functioning firearms through 3D printing is yet to manifest. Attempts at 3D firearm manufacturing are limited and the best advice from firearms experts indicates that 3D firearms are in most cases unsafe to the user.

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- s 47E(d) [redacted]
- It is important to keep perspective on the scope of this topic. Since 2004, ACIC has traced thousands of commercially manufactured handguns (2,403) – but there have been only seven 3D traces in this time.
- At this time the threat posed by 3D-printed firearms and firearm parts is assessed as low and, in the short term, this production method is unlikely to be a significant source of reliable illicit firearms in Australia.

National Firearms Identification Database (NFID)

- NFID is a catalogue of firearm information which is available to police and international law enforcement partners, to accurately and consistently **identify firearms** (including make, model, calibre, capacity, images, etc.).
- ACIC hosts the NFID public website that allows access by owners and dealers to assist with the identification of firearms for registration and destruction.

Australian Ballistic Information Network (ABIN)

- ABIN enables police agencies to electronically **capture and associate ballistic information** to firearms, crimes and suspects.

National Firearm Trace Program (NFTB)

- The ACIC National Firearm Trace Program allows our law enforcement partners to submit web-based illicit firearm trace requests. The ACIC consolidates the information and creates a national view of firearms located in the Australian illicit firearm market and their history.
- Firearm trace requests are increasing due to a number of possible indicators:
    - Agencies are requesting firearm tracing for all of their seizures instead of a selected few (i.e. homicide etc.).

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- Post COVID-19, more law enforcement resources have been directed to the submission of trace requests to the ACIC.

- Trace data is provided at **Table 1**.

Australian Firearms Information Network (AFIN)

- AFIN **provides a life-cycle (cradle to grave) view of registered firearms**, from import and manufacture through to legal export or destruction around Australia.

- All jurisdictions are now provisioning information into the AFIN.

Table 1: Key Statistics – National Firearm Trace Program (NFTP)

Trace Requests					
Jurisdiction	***2018–19***	***2019–20***	***2020–21***	***2021–22***	**2022–23** ***1/7/2022 to 17/10/2022***
ACIC	6	0	0	0	0
ACT	6	0	0	0	0
AFP	58	44	57	23	6
Home Affairs	36	3	1	1	0
NSW	436	119	135	274	41
NT	2	2	0	0	0
Qld	224	171	109	199	47
SA	13	273	54	29	0
Tas	18	74	99	37	3
Vic	117	318	335	539	46
WA	114	155	81	110	8
EUROPOL	4	1	0	0	0
INTERPOL	12	96	32	121	24
New Zealand	6	0	2	0	0
Samoa	5	0	0	0	0
USA - BATF	10	1	0	0	0

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TOTAL	**1,067**	**1,257**	**905**	**1,333**	**175**

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Document 7

BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-10

Drugs

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- Much of the harm Australians suffer at the hands of organised crime is due to illicit drugs.
- In 2020, there were 1,842 drug induced deaths in Australia – equivalent to 5 drug-induced deaths per day or 7.2 deaths per 100,000 people.
- Almost 16 tonnes of methylamphetamine (meth), cocaine, 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (MDMA) and heroin was consumed at the height of COVID-19.
- This shows the resilience of Australia's illicit drug markets and the agility of serious and organised crime groups to overcome significant obstacles to supply major drugs to local markets.

ACIC drug priorities

- The meth market, particularly in regional areas of Australia.
- Domestic drug manufacture and the illicit use of precursors, pre-precursors and other chemicals.
- Non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids and other pharmaceuticals.

National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program 17th report (to be released 26 October 2022)

- **Report 17 was released on 26 October 2022. Highlights include:**
    - Of the drugs measured by the Program, alcohol and nicotine were the most consumed substances, and meth the most consumed illicit drug.
    - Consumption of meth increased in both capital city and regional sites in April 2022, while capital city heroin consumption remained relatively stable and regional consumption increased. Capital city and regional consumption of all other drugs monitored by the Program decreased.
    - Record low MDMA, MDA, oxycodone and fentanyl consumption was recorded in both capital city and regional sites in April 2022.
    - The ACIC judges these changes were brought about by a range of factors. Law enforcement interventions do impact illicit drug markets. Recent analysis by the ACIC suggests that law enforcement activities can result in short-term

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decreases in drug consumption, creating windows of opportunity for law enforcement and health interventions aimed at reducing demand. There are also factors such as normal shifts in supply and demand and of course the responses and adjustments of serious and organised crime groups.

Illicit Drug Data Report 2019–20

- In 2019–20 cannabis continued to account for the greatest proportion of the number of national drug seizures and arrests.
- In 2019–20 amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) accounted for the greatest proportion of the weight of illicit drugs seized.[1]
- In 2019-20 there were a **record 121,274** national illicit **drug seizures,** weighing a **record 38.5 tonnes**, with a record **166,321 arrests**. The drug seizure breakdown for the 5 major drugs is:
    - cannabis 10.6 tonnes (62,454 seizures)
    - amphetamines (predominantly meth) 9.4 tonnes (34,133 seizures)
    - MDMA 3.2 tonnes (4,981 seizures)
    - cocaine 1.5 tonnes (5,750 seizures)
    - heroin 0.2 tonnes (2,230 seizures).
- The arrest breakdown for the same drugs is: cannabis 76,669; amphetamines (predominantly meth) 44,847; cocaine 5,393; MDMA 4,746; and heroin and other opioids 3,514.
- In 2019–20 this equated to:
    - 1 drug seizure every 4.5 mins
    - 1 kg seized every 14 mins
    - 1 arrest every 3.5 mins

Key statistics – High Risk and Emerging Drugs outcomes 2021–22

- Under the High Risk and Emerging Drugs Determination during 2021–22 there were:
    - 69 examinations
    - 61 notices

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[1] 'Other and unknown' drugs accounted for 34 per cent of the weight of drugs seized nationally, with ATS accounting for 33 percent. Given the wide and varied range of drugs included in the other drugs category, ATS has been used.

Seizures

The ACIC made a material contribution to drug seizures totalling:

Item Group	Estimated Value ($m)	Kilograms	Litres	Vials	Plants	Tablets
Drug	1,045.67	2,444.2469	357	1,134	19,108	1,100
Precursor	0.01*	0.587				
Total	**1,045.68**	**2,444.84**	**357**	**1,134**	**19,108**	**1,100**

* The estimated value of the precursor is $19,077.50

- Drugs included anabolic agents and other selected hormones, butanediol, cannabis, cocaine, heroin, ketamine, MDMA and methylamphetamine (oil, powder and crystal)
- Precursors included pseudoephedrine

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-11

Gangs

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) are our largest serious and organised crime (SOC) cohort. We estimate a quarter to a third of SOC groups in Australia are OMCG members, with another third being OMCG-linked criminals.
- Australian Priority Organisation Targets (APOTs): 1 OMCG, 2 Australian OMCG members.
- A further [redacted] APOTs are known to closely associate with Australian OMCG members to facilitate their criminal activities.
- OMCGs are well represented across Regional Priority Organisation Targets, particularly those gangs that pose a transnational serious and organised crime (TSOC) threat.
- Currently there are 38 OMCGs operating in Australia with approximately 5,500 members.
- s 47E(d) [redacted]

Australian Gangs Intelligence Coordination Centre (AGICC)

- Commenced December 2013 and is currently funded to 30 June 2023 ($1.65m/year).
- The AGICC and Monitoring Assessment Unit merged in February 2021 as National Operational Insights (NOI). NOI has a focus on providing strategic criminal insights and assessments regarding APOTs and OMCGs.

National Task Force Morpheus

- Joint law enforcement initiative approved by ACIC Board on 11 September 2014.
- s 47E(d) [redacted]

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s 47E(d) [redacted]

- ACIC has been using our specialist capabilities, especially examinations, to support and guide the strategy.

Comanchero disruptions since March 2021

- Since s 47E(d) [redacted] was established, 9 Comanchero key leaders have been disrupted, including International Commander Mark Buddle, National President Mick Murray, and National Sergeant-At-Arms Tarek Zahed.
- s 47E(d) [redacted]
- [redacted]
- s 47E(d) [redacted]

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-12

Australian Sports Integrity Unit (ASIU)

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- The ASIU is housed in the ACIC and supported by Sport Integrity Australia (SIA) with funding.

Role of the ASIU

- The ASIU conducts targeted collection and analysis to continually develop the strategic understanding of serious and organised crime (SOC) threats to Australian sport and works with SIA and other stakeholders to make sport more resilient to such threats.
- The ASIU is the operational arm of Australia's National Platform for the purpose of the *Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions* (Macolin).
- The ASIU collects and analyses information on irregular and suspicious betting activity and disseminates intelligence to relevant domestic and international law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies and sporting organisations
- A key focus of the ASIU is SOC manipulation of sporting competitions for betting purposes and includes SOC exploitation of betting markets for other criminal purposes, such as money laundering.

Partnership with SIA

- s 47E(d) [redacted]
- ASIU National Platform activities supports SIA's strategic engagement with the Council of Europe and strategic objectives under Macolin.
- s 47E(d) [redacted] are key components of the support provided to SIA.
- The partnership also includes ACIC staff embedded in SIA.

Funding arrangements

- Funding commenced through an MOU with the Department of Health – former National Integrity of Sport Unit (NISU) and transitioned to SIA when it was established in July 2020.

	2018–19	2019–20	2020–21	2021–22	2022–23
Health	$2.1 m	$2.2 m			
Sport Integrity Australia			$2.2 m	$2.2 m	$2.2 m

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Related backpocket: NIL

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-13

Australian Priority Organisation Target (APOT) Disruption Unit

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Key Points

- The APOT Disruption Unit (ADU) coordinates global to local law enforcement and national intelligence efforts to disrupt Australia's highest priority transnational serious and organised crime (TSOC) networks.
- s 47E(d) [redacted]
- The Joint Agency Operations (JAO) Team in the ADU is a s 47E(d) [redacted] JAO supports and drives the ACIC's international deployments which are designed to enhance our criminal intelligence collection, analysis and liaison outcomes.
- Current funding for the ADU will expire on 30 June 2023 s 47E(d) [redacted]



Funding

$5.8M / 1 yr

Expired 30 Jun 23



ACIC officers

21 FTE

(+3 police secondees)

15 APOTS

- **8** Transnational Australian Drug Trafficking Organisations
- **2** European Drug Trafficking Organisations
- **1** Asia-based Money Laundering Organisations
- **1** Asia-based Drug Trafficking Organisations

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- **1** Australia-based Outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG)
- **1** Middle Eastern Money Laundering Organisations
- **1** s 47E(d) Cybercrime syndicate.

ADU efforts in FY 2021–22 coordinating JAADS contributed to:

- s 47E(d) [redacted]
- s 47E(d) [redacted]
  - In FY 2021–22, our Australian law enforcement and offsho e partners disrupted [redacted] APOT networks to the point that they are no longer considered APOT-level threats.
  - Elements of a further [redacted] APOT networks were significantly disrupted, decreasing the overall threat of the criminal organisation but leaving it still able to operate at the APOT level.
  - s 47E(d) individuals designated as the head of an APOT organisation were arrested, compared to [redacted] in 2019–20 and [redacted] in 2018–19.
  - The JAADS concept has proven to be crime-agnostic and is being utilised in the context of broader TSOC networks, including cybercrime syndicates.

Case study 1: Sydney-based APOT drug network

- Coordination of [redacted] agencies – including ACIC, s 47E(d) [redacted]
- s 47E(d) [redacted] lines of effort, [redacted] of which have resulted in disruption activity.
- Result – degradation across multiple network capabilities, including the arrest of multiple key network enablers, a disrupted drug lab and over 3.2 tonnes of drugs seized.

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-14

Criminal Intelligence Assessments

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

ACIC intelligence picture

- The ACIC's Criminal Intelligence Assessment capability commenced on 22 June 2022.
- The ACIC has processed 41,238 criminal intelligence assessments, as at 20 October 2022. s 47E(d) [redacted]
- The ACIC's Criminal Intelligence Assessment capability aims to minimise exploitation of Australia's airports and seaports as channels for organised crime groups to transport and receive illicit goods, thereby minimising risk to the integrity of these sectors.

Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Act 2021

- The Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2020 (the Bill) was passed on 16 June 2021. Schedule 2 of the Bill—the section relevant to the ACIC—commenced on 22 June 2022.
- The intention of the Bill is to enhance the background checking requirements for Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC)/Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) holders to reduce the risk that security-controlled airports, seaports and offshore facilities are used in connection with serious crime. ASIC/MSIC schemes have been effective in protecting Australian airports and seaports from terrorism; however, they are vulnerable to exploitation by SOC groups.
- Schedule 2 of the Bill introduced the necessary changes to the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 (Aviation Act) and the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 (Maritime Act) to allow the ACIC to conduct Criminal Intelligence Assessments for the purpose of administrative decision making in the ACIC and MSIC schemes.
- As of 22 June 2022 the ACIC is conducting Criminal Intelligence Assessments (CIAs) as a

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part of AusCheck MSIC/ASIC background checks, when a person applies for an ASIC/MSIC (new card or renewal).

- ACIC cannot decide to conduct a CIA on its own initiative – it requires direction from Home Affairs and the applicant's consent.
- Schedule 1 of the Bill (commenced 23 August 2021) introduced new criteria for AusCheck to target serious criminal offences. Individuals who have an adverse criminal record are considered ineligible for an ASIC or MSIC.
- The applicant may appeal the ACIC's adverse CIA through the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).

Criminal intelligence checking capability and funding

- ACIC funding for the CIA capability is $18.7 million over 4 years and commenced in 2020–21.
- The CIA capability went live on 22 June 2022 and, to 20 October 2022, has processed 41,238 ASIC/MSIC applications through the CIA process.
- The CIA capability is comprised of:
    - Intelligence and Legal staff. Currently there is a team of [redacted] FTE with a further [redacted] positions available for recruitment/secondment in the 2022–23 period.
    - Policy procedures and work level instructions established to control and assure the quality of this work.
    - A PROTECTED application management, search/match and case management technical solution.
    - Short term technical resources (contractors and suppliers) supplementing the team to further build and refine the technical solution in the 2022–23 period.

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-15

Commonwealth Fraud

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

On 14 August 2022, Minister Shorten and ACIC CEO Michael Phelan were interviewed for 60 minutes program 'the Big Steal', focused on NDIS fraud. Mr Phelan reported SOC involved in drug trafficking, violence and money laundering are exploiting the NDIS on an unprecedented scale. Mr Phelan estimated as much as 15 to 20 per cent of the $30 billion scheme could be at risk and identified NDIS funds are likely funding other serious crime, including drug importation. Minister Shorten has reported in response the figure is in the tens of millions and not 'anyway here near what Mr Phelan was talking about'. Mr Phelan called for a new multi-agency taskforce to address the problem.

Key Points

Serious and organised criminals continue to target Commonwealth programs and schemes.

- ACIC has supported operations since 2019, including New South Wales Police Force Strikeforce Mercury (targeting a family day care syndicate resulting in over 50 arrests) and National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) Taskforce Operations Pegasus and Pyxis. These operations have highlighted how s 47E(d) syndicates, some with links to s 47E(d) Organised Crime, have been charged with defrauding multiple Commonwealth programs of millions of dolla s Funds are reported to have been used to purchase luxury cars, cryptocurrency and gold bullion.

Serious and organised crime (SOC) groups are increasingly being attracted to Commonwealth programs where they employ dangerous criminal tactics to commit fraud – enhancing risk to participants.

- ACIC CEO Mr Phelan, told 60 Minutes that SOC groups targeting the NDIS are also engaged in other serious crime, including drug importation and violent crime. On 14 August 2022, *The Age* Newspaper reported in article *''The scumbag scale': How organised crime has infiltrated the NDIS',* that Mr Phelan said (NDIS) money obtained fraudulently was being used "for the wholesale purchase of narcotics from overseas" and to "obtain seed funding for their [organised criminals'] broader illegal activity".
- Mr Phelan stated that (the ACIC) is seeing organised crime groups who have used violence, intimidating users of the NDIS, and in one matter, an allegation where an NDIS participant was threatened with being committed into a psychiatric ward.

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- The program introduced the Australian middle eastern organised crime family, the Hamzy family, who have been at the centre of the violent western Sydney gangland related crime. Mr Phelan confirmed ACIC intelligence indicated the Hamzy family group had associations with people alleged to have engaged in high value NDIS fraud, and was linked to the use of violent standover tactics. 60 Minutes interviewer Nick McKenzie stated that (in this matter) one disabled person was threatened with a knife, another family threatened with death by standover merchants trying to steal their NDIS entitlements.

SOC groups are using networks of professional facilitators to commit fraud.

- SOC groups engage the services of professional facilitators to enable SOC to establish and sustain 'successful' fraudulent business models. *The Age* newspaper reported Mr Phelan stated networks of professional facilitators, including doctors, pharmacists, training facilities, accountants and lawyers, help criminals exploit the (NDIS) scheme.

A lack of information sharing between government programs enhances their vulnerability to targeting by serious and organised criminals.

- SOC groups are targeting Commonwealth programs with similar vulnerabilities to generate diversified, consistent illic t revenue streams. s 47E(d) [redacted]

- In comments to ABC Radio National on 15 August 2022, Minister Shorten stated: "It's a mystery to me why different parts of government don't talk to each other better. We saw rorters go through the private VET schemes – that's the vocational education schemes; we saw in 2017 exposure, eventually, of family day care schemes where people were basically making up false services and then padding invoices and then sending them in to get paid. Yet I'm not satisfied there's sufficient communication between the National Disability Insurance Agency and the tax office, policing".

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The scale of fraud targeting Commonwealth schemes and programs is likely billions of dollars each year and increasing.

- Australian programs and schemes being targeted by SOC receive tens of billions of dollars each year in funding. The NDIS and Aged Care programs alone, collectively receive over $50 billion per year. A recent international report produced by Crowe (UK) and the University of Portsmouth: *The financial cost of fraud 2021* indicated fraud is estimated to have increased across the globe, particularly since COVID-19. In Australia, COVID-19 and significant recent disaster events, have led to multiple new support payments and grants being created. These initiatives are commonly designed with reduced compl ance processes to facilitate rapid delivery, significantly increasing the risk of fraud. The Australian Government is reported to have delivered over $300 billion in COVID-19 stimulus to date. While the exact figure of funding lost to fraud each year is unknown, even if using what is likely an outdated and conservative statistic of 5%, it is certain to be billions.

The ACIC will continue to target SOC defrauding Commonwealth programs

- The ACIC currently provide support to multiple Commonwealth partners, including the National Disability Insurance Agency. s 47E(d) [redacted]

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-16

Contempt matters

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- Coercive powers permit Examiners to compel witnesses to answer questions and produce documents or things in relation to special ACIC investigations and special ACIC operations.
- Failure to comply with an Examiner's requirement is potentially a criminal offence for which a witness can be prosecuted. The ACIC may refer certain matters to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to consider taking prosecution action in the criminal courts.
- Alternatively, failure to comply with an Examiner's requirement can lead to an application for a Court to deal with a witness for contempt of the ACIC.[1]
- The ACIC takes contempt seriously and will not hesitate to pursue contempt proceedings against persons who refuse or fail to do things as required by an Examiner.
- Where an Examiner makes an applica ion for a person to be dealt with for contempt of the ACIC, the Court can impose penalties including indeterminate terms of imprisonment. Where a person is imprisoned for an indeterminate term they will be held in prison until they purge their contempt (answer the Examiner's questions) or until the Court makes a further order. Such a penalty can stop the clock ticking on any criminal sentence and prevents a criminal sentence from commencing until the contempt has been purged.
- **Past 5 years – 13 contempt proceedings** (10 finalised).

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[1] Contempt can be to refuse or fail to take an oath or affirmation, refuse or fail to answer a question, refuse or fail to produce a document or thing under a notice or summons or refuse or fail to produce a document or thing to an Examiner during the course of an examination. This is not an exhaustive list.

- Eight witnesses[2] were declared guilty by the court, one proceeding was withdrawn when the witness complied and purged their contempt, another proceeding was discontinued by consent.
- Four witnesses were sentenced to an indefinite period of imprisonment[3].
    - The indefinite sentence for one witness commences in 2023 after the witness concludes serving a term of imprisonment for unrelated State offences.
    - One witness later applied for a fixed term which resulted in the imposition of a sentence of just over 15 months imprisonment for the contempt.
    - One witness later applied for a fixed term which resulted in the imposition of a sentence of 12 months imprisonment. The witness has now filed an appeal against the fixed sentence
    - One witness was released after serving approximately 10 months in custody following the purging of h s contempt.
- Three witnesses were sentenced to 8 months imprisonment, with two to be released after serving 4 months and the imposition of a good behaviour bond;
- One witness was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment;
- The ACIC is currently pursuing 3 further contempt matters in the Federal Court of Australia in relation to the witnesses' failure to answer questions which an examiner required them to answer. As these matters are currently before the courts no further information can be provided.

Anderson v EVA20[4]

- On 6 May 2021, EVA20 was sentenced in relation to 6 charges of contempt of the ACIC for refusing to answer questions that the Examiner required him to answer.

[2] A range of sentences have been imposed, ranging from an indeterminate sentence to fixed terms, fixed terms to be released after serving several months in custody, fixed terms then suspended for good behaviour.
[3] CFS22, CFT22, DTO21, EVA20 and DKH18, both sentenced before the Federal Court.
[4] Court-ordered pseudonym.

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- EVA20 was summonsed pursuant to the Special ACIC Operation Determination (High Risks and Emerging Drugs) 2020.
- EVA20 was sentenced to imprisonment until further order of the Court. This is an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment.
- On 19 August 2022, (upon application by EVA20) the Court fixed EVA20's sentence to 15 months and 14 days imprisonment.

Australian Crime Commission v DTO21[4]

- On 28 March 2022, DTO21 was sentenced in relation to 7 charges of contempt of the ACIC for refusing to answer questions the Examiner required him to answer.
- DTO21 was summonsed pursuant to the Special ACIC Operation Determination (High Risks and Emerging Drugs) 2020.
- On 12 August 2022, (upon application by DTO21) the Court fixed DTO21's sentence to 12 months imprisonment.
- On 8 September 2022, DTO21 filed an appeal against the fixed sentence. The appeal is set to be heard on 27 October 2022.

Sage v CFS22[4]

- On 5 September 2022, CFS22 was sentenced in relation to 2 charges of contempt of the ACIC for refusing to answer questions the Examiner required him to answer.
- CFS22 was summonsed pursuant to the Special ACIC Investigation Determination (Targeting Criminal Wealth) 2020.
- CFS22 was sentenced to 8 months imprisonment to be released after the expiry of 4 months on the condition that he be of good behaviour for the balance of his sentence.

Sage v CFT22[4]

- On 6 September 2022, CFT22 was sentenced in relation to one charge of contempt of the ACIC for refusing or failing to take an oath or affirmation when required to do so.

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- CFT22 was summonsed pursuant to the Special ACIC Investigation Determination (Targeting Criminal Wealth) 2020.
- CFT22 was sentenced to an indefinite term of imprisonment to commence on 20 May 2023 (after he finishes serving another term of imprisonment for unrelated offences).

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-17

National Policing Information Systems and Technical Support Costs

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

Technical National Policing Information (NPI) Support costs*

NPI Budget	**$41.690m**	Staff	**108**

- *The budget figure excludes Business Hubs and other overheads. The staffing effort associated with each individual NPI system is represented as a percentage of this figure.

National Police Reference System (NPRS)

- A national police reference capability that provides key information, such as:
  - names
  - identity information
  - criminal history (charges and convictions)
  - photographs
  - information on warnings, warrants, wanted persons and firearms
- It is accessible from handheld devices, in-car terminals and desktop computers.

Budget	**$8.338m**	Staff effort	**17%**		**All jurisdictions**

National Police Checking Service Support System (NSS)

- A national checking capability that enables accredited agencies to lodge applications for police checks on behalf of individuals so that decision makers can assess the suitability of applicants for an entitlement or position of trust.

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- It is used to perform a name-based check of an applicant by matching their personal details against people who have police history information. If a 'potential match' is found it will be automatically referred to the relevant police agency for further assessment.

Budget	**$2.166m**	Staff effort	**7%**		**All jurisdictions, NZ Pol and 200 accredited bodies**

National Vehicles of Interest System (NVOI)

- A national vehicle capability that enables police partner agencies to record and inquire about local and interstate vehicles of interest.
- It can search on stolen, suspect, wanted and recovered vehicles, including vehicle components that make up all or part of a vehicle.

Budget	**$2.084m**	Staff effort	**9%**		**All jurisdictions**

National Child Offender System (NCOS)

- A national child welfare capability that assists police to register, case manage and share information about registered child sex offenders as required by legislation. It enables alerts to be generated when registered persons notify that they are planning to travel interstate or overseas. NCOS includes the Australian National Child Offender Register and the Managed Person System.

Budget	**$1.750m**	Staff effort	**7%**		**All jurisdictions**

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Court/Approved External Agencies (AEA) Portal

- A national welfare capability that facilitates the sharing of domestic violence order information between Australian police and various courts through the National Police Reference System.

Budget	**$1.376m**	Staff effort	**4%**		**All jurisdictions, criminal and family courts**

Working with Children Checks (WWCC) – National Reference System

- A national child welfare capability that assists state and territory agencies to make better informed decisions when assessing applicants to work with children, by providing details of persons refused WWCCs to relevant stakeholders.

Budget	**$1.459m**	Staff effort	**6%**		**WWCC screening units**

National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS)

- A national fingerprint capability that enables the fingerprints of individuals to be checked and their identities confirmed within minutes.
- NAFIS also provides the capability to upload images of finger and / or palm prints recovered from crime scenes to search against the national fingerprint database and identify persons of interest.
- NAFIS enhancements are in train, which will ensure that fingerprint identification capability continues to be supported and deliver increased efficiencies for partner agency staff.
- The bulk of NAFIS services are provided through a strategic contract with IDEMIA, a leading international company experienced in biometric identification technologies.

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Budget	**$10.839m**	Staff effort	**8%**		**All jurisdictions**

National Portable Biometric Interface (NPBI)

- A national biometric capability that enables police to use mobile scanning devices to check fingerprints on NAFIS and confirm the identification of individuals.
- Through an automated interface with NPRS it can also provide police on the street with a photograph, latest address, information about outstanding warrants and the likelihood an individual is hostile or known to carry a weapon.

Budget	**$1.334m**	Staff effort	**4%**		**NSW, SA & NT**

Enhanced Biometrics at the Border (eBatB)

- A capability that enables Australian Border Force officials to use mobile biometric scanning devices to check the fingerprints of individuals of interest on NAFIS.

Budget	**$1.334m**	Staff effort	**4%**		**ABF**

National Integrated Forensic Analysis (NIFA)

- A national biometric capability that helps police solve crimes and identify victims by providing sophisticated kinship and familial DNA matching.

Budget	**$1.459m**	Staff effort	**7%**		**All jurisdictions**

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National Missing Persons and Victim System (NMPVS)

- A national capability that assists police to identify missing persons by accessing information on long-term missing persons, unidentified human remains and disaster victims.

Budget	**$1.584m**	Staff effort	**6%**		**All jurisdictions and NZ Pol**

National Criminal Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD)

- A national biometric capability that matches DNA profiles from crime scenes with persons of interest. It matches profiles of 2 or more unsolved crime scenes, linking previously unrelated investigations. Contains over 1.32 million DNA profiles from:
    - crime scenes
    - convicted offenders
    - suspects
    - items of missing persons and unknown deceased persons

Budget	**$1.750m**	Staff effort	**4%**		**All jurisdictions**

Australian Firearms Information Network (AFIN)

- Note: Additional information on the AFIN is provided via Brief 10.
- A firearms capability that contains information on every known firearm in Australia. It provides the ability for police and other law enforcement agencies to manage registration, licensing and movement of firearms into and around Australia.
- AFIN replaced the National Firearms Licensing and Registration System.

Budget	**$2.084m**	Staff effort	**8%**		**All jurisdictions**

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National Firearms Identification Database (NFID)

- A firearms capability that provides a catalogue of national firearm information, used by Australian police, firearms dealers and international law enforcement agencies, to accurately and consistently identify firearms (including make, model, images, etc).
- It assists police by ensuring firearms are recorded consistently during registration, importation / transfer of ownership and movement across state and territory borders.
- The NFID has been replicated as a public website to assist dealers to correctly identify firearms. The website went live on 27 August 2021 and is available at https://www.nfid.acic.gov.au/nfid/search

Budget	**$1.626m**	Staff effort	**5%**		**All jurisdictions & NZ Pol**

Australian Ballistic Information Network (ABIN)

- A firearms capability which enables police agencies to electronically capture and associate ballistic evidence to firearms (including firearm components).

Budget	**$2.501m**	Staff effort	**4%**		**All jurisdictions**

Version: 1.0	Cleared by: Sam Lewis and Laurent Berlioz-Nott	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Current at: 12/10/22	Phone number: Sam s 22(1)(a)(ii) Laurent s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-18

National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS)

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- The National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) is the current national capability that provides Australian law enforcement agencies with the critical fingerprint matching capability to support law enforcement operations at all levels.
- On 15 November 2021, the CEO signed an agreement with IDEMIA Australas a Pty Ltd for the enhancement and support of NAFIS up to 30 November 2034. Execution of these contracts was advised in AusTender as CN3834051, CN3834052 and CN3834053.
- IDEMIA will deliver a modern, supportable, secure fingerprint platform by upgrading the existing law enforcement fingerprint identification system with the implementation of new commercial-off-the-shelf software, Multi Biometric Identification System (MBIS), commonly referred to as NextGen. NextGen will be customised and configured to carry forward the functionality currently available to the forensics users in Australia and introduce additional capability to improve accessibility and efficiency.
- The support services include a responsive 24 x 7 user support ensuring a highly available and reliable service to partner agencies.
- IDEMIA will provide extensive documentation and deliverables s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted] and specialised services s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted] to deliver the following under the project:
    - s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]
    - s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]

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- s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]
- s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted].

- As of October 2022, the project is on schedule and has delivered Milestones 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 (see Table 2) which includes:
  - s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]
  - s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]
  - s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]
  - s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]
  - s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]

- Extensive engagement is occurring between the project team and partner agencies and will ensure that there is a close alignment of the new system with business needs and that transition to the new system will be achieved with minimal disruption to operations.

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Contract structure and budget

- The agreement consists of 3 Official Orders under a Head Agreement:

Table 1 – Cost breakdown of Project milestones to be delivered by IDEMIA.

	Period	**Service**	**Value (ex GST)**
Official Order 1 (CN3834053)	Nov 21- Oct 24	Project - Implementation and enhancement of NextGen including Cloud migration	$29,474,799
Official Order 2 (CN3834052)	Jun 23 – Nov 34	Support – Provision of licences, application and infrastructure support from initial NextGen implementation	$118,950,125
Official Order 3 (CN3834051)	Nov 21 – May 23	Support – Provision of licences, application and infrastructure support of current NAFIS until NextGen implementation	$13,495,044
		Total	**$161,919,968**

- A further breakdown of IDEMIA services and costs are shown in Tables 2 through 4 below.
- In addition to the IDEMIA costs above, the budget for ACIC related costs for the project over 5 financial years totals $7,919,091 (project management, oversight and support).
- s 47D, s 47(1)(b) [redacted]

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Procurement considerations

- NAFIS NextGen is a proprietary capability developed by IDEMIA France. s 47E(d) [redacted]
- IDEMIA has been a long-term partner with the ACIC through providing similar service for approximately 20 years. In December 2018 and in December 2019, ACIC executed contracts with IDEMIA for continuity of the NAFIS service. They both have the same AusTender reference P18/357.
- NAFIS is a critical service available 24 hours a day, seven days a week used extensively by law enforcement and border protection agencies in Australia. s 47E(d) [redacted]
- s 47D, s 47E(d) [redacted]

Table 2 – Cost breakdown of Project milestones to be delivered by IDEMIA.

Official Order 1	**Invoice value ($)**
s 47(1)(b), s 47D	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

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s 47(1)(b), s 47D	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
Total	**29,474,799**

Table 3 – Cost breakdown of NextGen Support Services to be delivered by IDEMIA.

Official Order 2	**Invoice value ($)**
s 47(1)(b), s 47D	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
Total	**118,950,125**

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Table 4 – Cost breakdown of Current NAFIS Support Services to be delivered by IDEMIA.

Official Order 3	**Invoice value** ($)
s 47(1)(b), s 47D [redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
Total	**13,495,044**

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Version: 2	Cleared by: Laurent Berlioz-Nott	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]
Current at: 11/10/22	Phone number s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]

BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-19

National Police Checking Service - Delays

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- Demand for police checks remain strong with check submissions 2.2% higher than the same time last year.
- The increased demand is reflective of the regular growth in the Service and support for events such as the Census, Federal Election and national sporting events such as the T20 Cricket World Cup.
- For the 21-22 FY our performance against the board agreed benchmarks for check processing were **89.00% of Urgent checks closed in 5 days business** and **94.45% of Standard checks closed in 10 business days.**
- The ACIC supported key national events and the response to the Covid-19 pandemic by including critical Covid-19 and event related roles in the urgent check framework. This resulted in an increase of 20% in urgent check submissions over the past two years.
- Strategies to improve processing times have seen over 95% of checks closed within agreed timeframes for both urgent and standard checks submitted in July and August 2022. Processing times in September fell due to a number of public holidays including the National Day of Mourning.

Revenue

- In 2020–21 the National Police Checking Service (NPCS) raised $114 million following a flatline in revenue at $100 million in 2019–20 due to COVID-19 impacts.
- In 2021–22, the NPCS conducted 6.7 million checks and raised in excess of $126 million for reinvestment into NPI systems.

NPCS processes

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- The ACIC works with Australian police agencies to deliver the NPCS.
- The NPCS facilitates more than 6 million checks per year.
- About 70% of all submitted checks are processed automatically, in real time and without any human intervention.
- The remaining 30% of submitted checks, which trigger potential matches in one or several police jurisdictions are referred for manual processing.
- Police checking in Australia is a partially manual, name-based process, which can involve many stakeholders.
- When an application is submitted, the check may need to be reviewed by police in more than one state/territory.
- A check cannot be finalised until each state/territory that has received a referral has completed their review.
- The service-level agreement (SLA) for processing of standard checks is ***95% within 10 business days*** and the SLA for urgent checks is ***95% within 5 business days***.

Version: 1	Cleared by: Director NPCS	Action officer: Director NPCS
Current at: 14/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-20

National Criminal Investigation DNA Database

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

An inquiry into forensic DNA testing is taking place in Queensland. The Commission of Inquiry into Forensic DNA Testing was established to ensure transparency, identify opportunities for improvement and ensure public confidence in the collection of DNA and the testing and analysis undertaken in Queensland, and in the criminal justice system more broadly. The Commission will provide its final report to the Queensland Government by 13 December 2022.

The National Criminal Investigation DNA Database has not been implicated in the Inquiry.

Key Points

- The ACIC has a Ministerial Arrangement with the Commonwealth, states and territories for the sharing of DNA profiles and related information.
- The Ministerial Arrangement allows DNA information to be placed onto the National Criminal Intelligence DNA Database (NCIDD) and matched with other DNA profiles in accordance to the operational matching tables provided by each jurisdiction.
- Police agencies and their forensic laboratories determine which DNA profiles are put on the NCIDD.
- When the NCIDD matches a DNA profile with another DNA profile, the ACIC notifies the relevant parties.
- The ACIC is not involved in decisions on policies or procedures within police agencies or forensic laboratories.
- The ACIC requires forensic laboratories that upload to NCIDD to be accredited by the National Assoc ation of Testing Authorities (NATA). NATA is an Australian national accreditation body recognised by government. It assesses organisations against a number of international standards for laboratories. NATA provides accreditation services that facilitate stakeholders having confidence in test, measurement and inspection data and thus enabling them to gain national and international acceptance of their products and services.

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BACKGROUND

- The National Criminal Investigation DNA Database has not been implicated in The Commission of Inquiry into Forensic DNA Testing. The issues being explored by the inquiry are to do with Queensland Government policy and procedures and do not involve NCIDD.
- Kirsty Wright is a freelance forensic biologist who is assisting *The Australian* newspaper with its "Shandee's Story" podcast. Kirsty, through the podcast, prompted the Queensland Government to undertake The Commission of Inquiry into Forensic DNA Testing in Queensland. Kirsty worked at CrimTrac in 2007 for about 12 months as the NCIDD Program Manager

Version: 1.	Cleared by: s 22(1)(a)(ii) , A/g National Manager Executive	Action officer s 22(1)(a)(ii) , Advisor, Ministerial and Executive Support
Current at: 13/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-27

COVID-19 – Impacts on the Agency

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- In 2020, the ACIC revised and implemented the Pandemic Management Plan and Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) for each ACIC location. The ACIC has also continued to update the agency's COVID-19 Safe Plan in light of changes to the COVID-19 environment and update staff accordingly.
- ACIC staff continue to be provided with regular COVID-19 updates and guidance via 'all staff' communications, the agency's intranet pages, frequently asked questions, and the agency's COVID-19 mailbox.
- The ACIC CEO issued a direction in October 2021 requiring all staff to have received their first COVID-19 vaccination by 1 November 2021 and to be fully vaccinated by 24 December 2021. This direction ensures a safe work environment, minimising the health and safety risks to our staff and the community we work to protect.
- In May 2022, following a review of the ACIC Risk Assessment, the CEO determined it was appropriate to maintain the direction and COVID-19 vaccination policy.
- ACIC staff have also been encouraged to receive COVID-19 booster shots to be considered "up-to-date" in line with the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation's (ATAGI's) advice.
- Staff unable to comply with this direction due to medical or extenuating circumstances have been able to apply for an exemption.
    - s 47F(1), s 47E(c) [redacted]

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- s 47E(c), s 47F(1) [redacted]

- All other ACIC staff, including new starters, have been able to comply with the direction.
- The ACIC has re-commenced usual public facing duties, such as examinations, physical surveillance and international deployments; offering Rapid Antigen Tests (RATs) and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to staff involved to minimise risk.
- The ACIC remains compliant with the reporting requirements under the *Work Health and Safety Act 2011* (WHS Act), of positive staff members.

Impact of COVID-19 and staff adjustment

- Overall ACIC staff continue to follow all ACIC COVID-19 directions and Government requirements.
- ACIC staff are currently working from the office or in line with approved flexible working arrangements. Noting ACIC's national footprint, executive directors and national managers have discretion to implement local arrangements based on individual circumstances, health advice or specific state/territory requirements.
- The ACIC has a Home Based Work Policy which provides options for staff to work flexibly outside the office, in accordance with strict security protocols. This allows the ACIC to respond quickly to public health orders or mandated work from home requirements.

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Version: 1	Cleared by: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]
Current at: 12/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]

BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-28

ACIC and AIC Executive Remuneration 2021-22

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- Executive Remuneration figures are not provided as part of the Portfolio Additional Estimate Statements. The most recently published figures are those provided in the 2021–22 annual report. Year to date figures for 2022–23 are not available due to the accrual nature of the disclosure requirements, and incomplete information on FBT and benefits provided to staff deployed oversees (classified as "other highly paid staff").

Basis for executive remuneration figures

- Base salary includes salary paid + any net annual leave (total annual accrual minus leave taken).
- Any other benefits and allowances if relevant, including value of the office car parking benefit and the related fringe benefits tax.
- Superannuation – contribution payments consistent with Commonwealth and public sector superannuation requirements.
- Long service leave (LSL) – entitlement which has accrued for the financial year.
- Any termination benefits if relevant.
- Total Key Management Personnel (KMP) remuneration has decreased from $2,387,742 to $1,394,721 for 2021-22 due to:
    - Organisational restructure. The KMP now revised to include CEO and 2 Deputy CEOs and removed all SES Band 2 positions from prior years.

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KMP for FY 2021–22 (page 151 & 152 ACIC annual report, page 72 AIC annual report)

Table D.2: Summary of remuneration for key management personnel

	2021–22 $	2020–21 $
Short-term benefits		
Base salary	1,177,213	1,680,696
Bonuses	0	0
Other benefits and allowances	4,758	8,690
Total short-term benefits	**1,181,971**	**1,689,386**
Superannuation	184,695	291,281
Total post-employment benefits	**184,695**	**291,281**
Other long-term benefits		
Long service leave	28,055	40,889
Total other long-term benefits	**28,055**	**40,889**
Termination benefits	0	366,185
Total key management personnel remuneration	**1,394,721**	**2,387,741**

Note: Final figures have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table D.3: Information about remuneration for key management personnel 2021–22

Name	Position title	Short-term benefits			Post-employment benefits	Other long-term benefits	Termination benefits	Total remuneration
		Base salary[a] $	Bonuses $	Other benefits and allowances $	Superannuation contributions[b] $	Long service leave[c] $	$	$
Michael Phelan	Chief Executive Officer[d]	501,139	0	1,586	79,594	12,155	0	594,474
Anne Brown	Deputy CEO Support	341,166	0	1,586	53,793	7,950	0	404,495
Matthew Rippon	Deputy CEO Intelligence	334,908	0	1,586	51,308	7,950	0	395,752
Total		**1,177,213**	**0**	**4,758**	**184,695**	**28,055**	**0**	**1,394,721**

a Base salary includes salary paid or due to the employee for the year; it includes net annual leave (total annual accrual minus leave taken in this financial year) and any applicable acting allowances.
b Superannuation is subject to Public Sector Superannuation Scheme, Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme and Public Sector Superannuation Accumulation Plan rules. Superannuation contributions are the 2021–22 contributions by the ACIC to the applicable superannuation fund. They do not include employee post-tax contributions or additional lump sum payments.
c Long service leave is the value of long service accrued during this financial year.
d CEO salary is subject to a 2022 full-time office holder Remuneration Tribunal determination. The ACIC CEO is also the Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology. The full cost of the ACIC CEO is included above.

Note: Final figures have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

Table 25: Remuneration of key management personnel, 2021–22

		Short-term benefits		Post-employment benefits	Other long-term benefits	Total remuneration
Name	Position title	Base salary	Other benefits and allowances	Superannuation contributions	Long service leave	
Dr Rick Brown	Deputy Director	$227,299	$1,586	$33,253	$5,568	$267,706

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- **ACIC: 3** – CEO, Deputy CEO Intelligence and Deputy CEO Support.
- **AIC: 2** - Director and Deputy Director. Since the ACIC CEO is also the Director of the AIC, only Deputy Director is reported in the Annual Report of the AIC.

SES personnel (page 153 ACIC annual report)

Table D.4: Information about remuneration for senior executives 2021–22

		Short-term benefits			Post-employment benefits	Other long-term benefits	Termination benefits	Total remuneration
Total remuneration bands $	Number of senior executives	Average base salary $	Average bonuses $	Average other benefits and allowances $	Average superannuation contributions $	Average long service leave $	Average termination benefits $	Average total remuneration $
0–220,000	7	89,169	0	854	14,470	2,295	0	106,788
220,001–245,000	6	199,997	0	1,514	27,470	4,517	0	233,498
245,001–270,000	2	216,469	0	1,586	34,438	5,326	0	257,819
270,001–295,000	4	231,962	0	9,558	39,279	6,007	0	286,806
320,001–345,000	1	273,439	0	1,586	30,486	6,662	0	312,173

Note: Final figures have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

- Averaged information on remuneration provided to SES personnel is presented for SES with total remuneration of up to $220,000 and in incremental bands of $25,000. (AIC: Nil SES)

Other highly paid staff (page 153 ACIC annual report)

Table D.5: Information about remuneration for other highly paid staff 2021–22

		Short-term benefits			Post-employment benefits	Other long-term benefits	Termination benefits	Total remuneration
Total remuneration bands $	Number of other highly paid staff	Average base salary $	Average bonuses $	Average other benefits and allowances $	Average superannuation contributions $	Average long service leave $	Average termination benefits $	Average total remuneration $
495,001–520,000	1	435,496	0	0	55,369	10,508	0	501,373

Note: Final figures have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

- Any staff provided with total remuneration of greater than $235,000 (not a KMP or SES).
- Staff with a period of overseas deployment due to benefits and other allowances (including any related fringe benefits), which increases these salaries above $235,000. (AIC: Nil)
- **One examiner** was also classified as other highly paid.
- **Examiner salary** is determined by the Remuneration Tribunal:
    - Full time – $471, 090 / year

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- Part-time – pro rata $1,499 / day

Version: 1	Cleared by: (a/g) NM, Finance, Property and Procurement, Chief Finance Officer	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Current at: 14/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-29

ACIC Security and Integrity

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- The ACIC continues to focus on security and integrity maturity and assurance.
- Continued focus on security and integrity policy development, communications and education and the development of enhanced detection and disruption initiatives
    - An agency Protective Security Risk Assessment will inform a forward work plan.
    - The ACIC continues to work closely with the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) in relation to joint integrity matters and corruption prevention.
- Corruption allegations (and other relevant matters) – referred to ACLEI.
    - s 47E(d), s 47F notifications to ACLEI since March 2022.
    - s 47E(d), s 47F ongoing ACLEI only or joint ACLEI/ACIC investigations.
    - s 47E(d), s 47F ACIC only matter finalised via a s66 Final Report.
    - s 47E(d), s 47F ACIC only matter ongoing with associated reporting to ACLEI.
- Citizenship waiver:
    - s 47E(c), s 47F granted this reporting period; issued s 47E(c), s 47F(1).
- ACIC security maturity:
    - Protective Security Policy Framework assessment completed and remediation actions are continuing.
    - ACIC Protective Security framework approved Feb 2021.
    - Security and Integrity Policy Suite endorsed by the Chief Operating Officer are currently in place.
    - Agency Security Plan completed to be further informed by an agency Protective Security Risk Assessment (PSRA). PSRA close to finalisation.

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- ACIC security incidents:
    - Majority of reported incidents were lower-level and within secure ACIC premises; e.g. s 47E(d) [redacted].
    - The data below is for each financial year.

Potential Security Incidents Identified	2019–20	2020–21	2021–	2022–23
Low	s 47E(d) [redacted]			
Medium				
High				
Significant				

Security and data breaches media article – Background and issue

- In response to a Question on Notice (QoN) from Senate Estimates in December 2021, the ACIC provided statistical data on security breaches for the past 3 financial years.
- On 30 December 2021, the Sydney Morning Herald published an article titled *Accidental data-sharing rises by half*.
- The statistics are recorded at the first point of collection, and include instances where electronic transmissions were successfu ly blocked or prevented from an actual data transfer.
- Every reported potential breach is assessed at the time of reporting, and escalated to investigation where necessary.
- s 47E(d) [redacted]
- As quoted by the Chief Operating Officer at the time, the decision was made to cease reporting in the annual report to avoid misinterpretation that can occur when security incident statistics are provided without context, consistent with our partner agencies.
- The ACIC has recently implemented revised internal security operating policies and procedures including (but not limited to):
    - ICT Security
    - Information Security
    - Data Transfer Security
    - Clear Desk Instructions

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- The Security and Integrity teams have increased their capacity and capability with additional resources and detection capabilities.
- It was also noted in the article that the Department of Home Affairs, ASIO, and the AFP all downgraded their reporting of internal breaches.

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Version: 1	Cleared by: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii)
Current at: 12/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-30

Senate Budget Estimates Questions on Notice

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- The AIC and ACIC took 3 Questions on Notice from 22 May 2022 (due to change of government) to 30 September 2022.

Questions on Notice

- Senator Paul Scarr
    - Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee: Inquiry into missing and murdered First Nations women and children. Received by AIC Director via email on 1 September 2022 by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs – **Attachment A**
- Senator Michaelia Cash
    - SQoNs 695 – Contract notice CN3902322 – PQ22-900016 – **Attachment B**
    - SQoNs 609 – Contract notice CN3882397 – PQ22-900015 – **Attachment C**

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Version: 1	Cleared by: s 22(1)(a)(ii) , A/g National Manager Executive	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii) , Ministerial Officer
Current at: 12/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

Introduction

The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) is Australia's national research and knowledge centre on crime and justice, compiling trend data and disseminating research and policy advice. The AIC informs crime and justice policy and practice in Australia by undertaking, funding and disseminating policy-relevant research of national significance.

This submission refers to written Questions on Notice (dated 1 September 2022) from the Chair of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Reference Committee, Senator Paul Scarr, in relation to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee's Inquiry into missing and murdered First Nations women and children.

The Questions on Notice requested information on:

- Murdered women and children – number and rates for Australian women and children, First Nations women and children, non-First Nations women and children and all Australian victims of murder disaggregated by state/territory and year.
- Hospitalised women and children due to assault – number and rates for Australian women and children, First Nations women and children, non-First Nations women and children and all Australians who have been hospitalised due to assault disaggregated by state/territory and year.
- Assaulted women and children – number and rates for Australian women and children, First Nations women and children, non-First Nations women and children and all Australians who have been assaulted disaggregated by state/territory and year.
- Missing women and children – number and rates for Australian women and child, First Nations women and children, non-First Nations women and children and all Australians who have been reported as missing disaggregated by state/territory and year.

The AIC welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee Inquiry into missing and murdered First Nations women and children. The information presented in this submission responds to Questions on Notice pertaining to only murdered women and children. Other information requested by the Committee is not held by the AIC.

AIC homicide research – National Homicide Monitoring Program

The AIC has played a central role in the compilation of data and dissemination of research on homicide through its administration of the National Homicide Monitoring Program (NHMP). The NHMP was established by the AIC in 1990, upon recommendation of the National Committee on Violence, that there be systematic monitoring of homicide in Australia.

The NHMP compiles data on all incidents, victims and offenders of homicide recorded by Australian state and territory police. Homicide is defined by the NHMP as including murder, manslaughter and infanticide and collates information on:

- all cases of homicide resulting in a person or persons charged with murder or manslaughter (including incidents of driving causing death where a murder or manslaughter or equivalent charge is laid);
- all murder-suicides classed as murder by police; and
- all other deaths classed by the police as a homicide (including infanticide) even if an offender has not been apprehended.

The NHMP draws on two key sources of data:

- offence records obtained from each Australian state and territory police service; and
- state coronial records (autopsy, toxicology and coronial findings) from the National Coronial Information System.

NHMP data is cross-referenced between these two sources and supplemented with additional material from court documents (e.g. sentencing remarks) where publicly available, and media reports.

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The NHMP holds data on homicide incidents, victims and offenders from 1989–90 to 2019–20. It collates information on the following:

- Incident – state/territory, date (day-month-year), day of week, time, suburb/town, postcode, location, number of victims, number of offenders, charge type, clearance status, number of victims, number of offenders, circumstances immediately preceding homicide, preceding crime;
- Victim – sex, age, suburb/town, postcode of residence, Indigenous status, country of birth, residency status, criminal history, relationship with offender(s), cause of death, presence of alcohol and/or drugs preceding the homicide, use of weapon and type of weapon against the victim, location of death; and
- Offender – sex, age, suburb/town, postcode of residence, Indigenous status, country of birth, use of alcohol and/or drugs preceding the homicide, criminal history, legal status, intellectual disability, cognitive impairment and/or mental health condition, history of family and domestic violence (perpetrator, victim or both).

Murdered women and children

The following information on murdered women and children in Australia is drawn from NHMP data for the period 1989–90 to 2019–20. In reviewing the response please note:

- Data refer to victims of murder only (i.e. it excludes victims of manslaughter and infantic de)
- Data are presented as victim counts.
- Women are defined as female victims aged 18 years and over. The terms adult female and women are used interchangeably in the text to describe this population group
- Children are defined as victims aged 0 to 17 years.
- Numbers of victims are presented for each state and territory and nationally for each year between 1989–90 to 2019–20.
- Total victims include victims where Indigenous status was not confirmed at the time of reporting. Thus, numbers of First Nations and non-Indigenous women and child victims of murder may not total the overall numbers of women and child victims of murder.
- Rates are calculated using population data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics' *National, state and territory population* (ABS 2022) and *Estimates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians* (ABS 2019) series. Published First Nations population data for the two age groups specified in the Questions on Notice (i.e. women (18 years and ove) and children
(0–17 years) are only available from 2005–06 and hence rates are provided for the period 2005–06 to 2019–20.

1(a) Number and rates of Australian women and children who have been murdered, disaggregated by state/territory and by year

Australian women


Between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020 there were 2,579 female victims of murder aged 18 years and over (see Table A1) comprising 32 percent of all victims of murder in Australia during this period. The number of adult female victims of murder in Australia each year ranged from 53 to 117, with an average 83 adult female victims each year.

The highest number of adult female victims during the reference period was in New South Wales (31%, *n*=789; range: 12–44), followed by Victoria (21%, *n*=537; range: 10–30) and Queensland (20%, *n*=512; range: 7–30) (see Table A1). The smallest number of adult female victims was recorded in the Australian Capital Territory (9%, *n*=23; range: 0–4). Forty percent (*n*=23) of all victims of murder in the Australian Capital Territory were adult females, the highest proportion of any jurisdiction, while the smallest proportion was recorded in New South Wales (29%, *n*=789).

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The murder rate of Australian women ranged between 0.54 and 1.82 per 100,000 between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020 (see Table A2). During this period, the victimisation rate for women has generally shown a steady decline, from 1.48 per 100,000 in 1989–90 to 0.67 per 100,000 in 2019–20 (see Figure 1). This reflects an overall 55 percent decrease in the victimisation rate and parallels an overall decrease in murder victimisation rates for all Australians since the early 1990s (see below). Australian women have consistently experienced a murder victimisation rate of less than one per 100,000 since 2008–09.

Figure 1: Female victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)



Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Table A2

There has been a general decrease in victimisation rates in the larger populated states of New South Wales (1.33 per 100,000 in 1989–90 to 0.75 per 100,000 in 2019–20), Victoria (1.58 to 0.45 per 100,000) and Queensland (1.71 to 0.64 per 100,000) whereas rates were more variable in the smaller states and territories (see Table A2). Some of this latter variability is due to small numbers of victims, fewer than five victims a year in most of the years considered.

Australian children

During the same period, there were a total of 910 victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years (see Table A3), with an average of 29 victims each year. Child victims of murder comprised 11 percent of all victims of murder between 1989–90 to 2019–20. The number of child victims also varied from year to year (range 11–42).

The state or territory which saw the highest number of child victims of murder during this period was New South Wales (35%, *n*=316; range: 2–27), followed by Queensland (24%, *n*=222; range=1–15) and Victoria (16%, *n*=146; range: 1–12) (see Table A3). The lowest numbers were recorded in Tasmania (2%, *n*=21; range: 0–4) and the Northern Territory (2%, *n*=21; range: 0–3), and the Australian Capital Territory (<1%, *n*=3; range: 0–1).

Fourteen percent (*n*=222) of all victims of murder in Queensland were children, followed by 13 percent (*n*=109) in Western Australia. The Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory each had the lowest percentage of child victims of murder as a percentage of the total number of victims in each respective territory (5% each).


From 1 July 1989 to 30 June 2020, the child victimisation rate ranged between 0.20 and 0.90 per 100,000 nationally (see Table A4). The victimisation rate decreased from 0.83 per 100,000 in 1989–90, to 0.35 per

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100,000 in 2019–20 (see Figure 2), representing an overall decline of 58 percent. The victimisation rate has consistently been below 0.5 per 100,000 since 2011–12.

State and territory child victimisation rates for murder are highly variable, even in the larger states (see Table A4). Child victims of murder in Victoria experienced the smallest range in the rate of victimisation (range 0.07–1.06 per 100,000) over this same period. The largest ranges in the rate of child victimisation were recorded in Tasmania (0.00–3.15 per 100,000), and the Northern Territory (0.00–4.97 per 100,000).

Figure 2: Victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)



Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Table A4

1(b) Number of First Nations women and children who have been murdered, disaggregated by state/territory and by year

First Nations women

Between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020, there were 390 First Nations women who were victims of murder in Australia (see Table A5). This represents five percent of the total number of victims, and 15 percent of the total number of adult female victims of murder during this 31-year period, despite First Nations women comprising between two to three percent of the adult female population over this time-period (ABS 2019, 2022). There was an average of 13 adult female First Nations victims each year. The number of victims ranged from four to 22.

The largest number of adult female First Nations victims of murder was recorded in the Northern Territory (30%, *n*=116; range: 0–9), followed by Queensland (26%, *n*=101; range: 1–8), and Western Australia (25%, *n*=97; range: 0–7) (see Table A5). The Northern Territory recorded an average of four victims each year, the highest of any jurisdiction for this period, followed by an average of three victims each year in both Queensland and Western Australia. There were no First Nations women who were victims of murder in either Tasmania or the Australian Capital Territory during this period.

Eighty-four percent (*n*=116) of adult female victims of murder between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020 in the Northern Territory were First Nations women, the highest percentage of any jurisdiction. In Western Australia, First Nations women comprised 31 percent (*n*=97) of adult female victims and 20 percent (*n*=101) of adult female victims in Queensland. As a proportion of the total number of recorded victims of murder in each state and territory, the Northern Territory also recorded the highest percentage of First Nations women as victims (30%), followed by Western Australia (11%), Queensland (6%) and South Australia (4%).

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As noted earlier, relevant age-specific population data for First Nations peoples are not published for the period preceding 2005–06 and hence rates of murder are provided for the years 2005–06 to 2019–20 only. The rate of murder of First Nations women ranged between 1.53 and 9.80 per 100,000 nationally between 1 July 2005 and 30 June 2020 (see Figure 3 and Table A6).

Figure 3: Female First Nations victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)



Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Table A6

Over this 15-year period the rate of victimisation of First Nations women varied year to year in each state and territory. The Northern Territory showed the largest fluctuations in victimisation rate (range .00 per 100,000 in 2015–16 to 45.85 per 100,000 in 2006–07) yet rates have been consistently lower in this jurisdiction in the more recent five-year period (see Table A6).

First Nations children

Between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020, there were 113 First Nations child victims of murder in Australia (see Table A7). This represents 12 percent of all child victims of murder, and one percent of the total victims of murder during this period. The number of First Nations child victims also varied year to year (range 0–9) with an average four victims each year nationally.


Queensland recorded the largest number of First Nations child victims of murder (39%, *n*=44; range: 0–8) during this same period (see Table A7). This was followed by New South Wales (24%, *n*=27; range: 0–4), Western Australia (18%, *n*=20; range: 0–3), the Northern Territory (14%, *n*=16; range: 0–3) and South Australia (5%, *n*=6; range: 0–2). There were no First Nations child victims of murder in Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory over the reference period.

Seventy-six percent (*n*=16) of all child victims of murder in the Northern Territory between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020 were First Nations children. This was the largest proportion of any jurisdiction. Twenty percent of child victims of murder in Queensland were First Nations children (*n*=44), 18 percent in Western Australia (*n*=20), nine percent in New South Wales (*n*=27) and eight percent in South Australia (*n*=6).

Relevant population data for First Nations children are not available prior to 2005–06 and hence rates of murder are provided for the years 2005–06 to 2019–20 only. With an overall low number of First Nations child victims of murder, the rate of victimisation varied markedly from year to year (see Table A8). Between 1 July 2005 and 30 June 2020, First Nations children experienced a murder victimisation rate of between .00 and 2.80 per 100,000 nationally (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: First Nations victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

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Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Table A8

Rates of murder are also highly variable within and across states and territories without any distinct pattern of victimisation (see Table A8). This is affected by the small numbers of First Nations child victims in each state and territory across the reference period.

1(c) Number of non-First Nations women and children who have been murdered, disaggregated by state/territory and by year

Non-Indigenous women

Between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020 there were 2,187 non-Indigenous adult female victims of murder (see Table A9), representing 85 percent of all female victims of murder and 27 percent of all victims of murder in this period. The number of non-Indigenous adult female victims of murder has fluctuated each year during this period (range 45–98), with an average of 71 victims each year.


The state or territory which recorded the largest number of non-Indigenous adult female victims of murder for the period 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020 was New South Wales (34%, *n*=743; range: 10–42), followed by Victoria (24%, *n*=530; range: 10–30) and Queensland (19%, *n*=411; range: 5–23)
(see Table A9). In the smaller jurisdictions, the number of victims ranged from 0 to five from year to year, the one exception being Tasmania in 1995–96 (*n*=17) due to the Port Arthur mass shooting.

Between 25 and 32 percent of all victims of murder in most jurisdictions between 1989–90 and 2019–20 were non-Indigenous women. The Australian Capital Territory recorded the highest proportion of non-Indigenous female victims (40%, *n*=23), while the Northern Territory recorded the lowest proportion (6%, *n*=22).

The rate of murder among non-Indigenous adult women between 1 July 2005 and 30 June 2020 ranged between 0.47 per 100,000 to 0.99 per 100,000 (see Table A10). The victimisation rate has followed a general decrease over this 15-year period (see Figure 5), with an overall decrease of
48 percent over this time. The decrease in murder victimisation of Australian women shown in Figure 1 is driven by a decrease in victimisation among non-Indigenous women.

Figure 5: Female non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

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Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Table A10

There is a variable pattern of victimisation from murder among non-Indigenous women across the states and territories (see Table A10). Rates of murder for non-Indigenous women in Queensland largely declined between 2005–06 and 2019–20, remained relatively stable in Victoria and fluctuated in New South Wales and Western Australia.

Non-Indigenous children

There were 796 non-Indigenous child victims of murder in Australia between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020 (see Table A11), with an average 26 victims each year. Non-Indigenous children comprised 87 percent of child victims of murder and 10 percent of the total number of victims of murder in Australia during this time. The number of non-Indigenous child victims of murder ranged from 11 to 38.

New South Wales recorded the largest number of non-Indigenous child victims of murder in this 31-year period (36%, *n*=289; range: 1–25), followed by Queensland (22%, *n*=177; range: 1–13), Victoria (18%, *n*=146; range: 1–12) and Western Australia (11%, *n*=89; range: 0–11) (see Table A11). The lowest number of victims over this time were in the Australian Capital Territory (<0.5%, *n*=3; range: 0–1) and the Northern Territory (<1%, *n*=5; range: 0–2).

The victimisation rate for non-Indigenous children has also varied year to year. From 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2020 the victimisation rate ranged from 0.20 to 0.68 per 100,000 nationally (see Table A12). The rate of victimisation has generally decreased over this 15-year period, from 0.68 per 100,000 in 2005–06 to 0.23 per 100,000 in 2019–20 (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

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
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Table A12

1(d) information on the rate of all Australians who have been murdered by state/territory and by year

Between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 2020, there were 8,136 victims of murder in Australia (see Table A13), with an average 263 victims each year over this time. Of these, 68 percent (*n*=5,557) were male, and 32 percent (*n*=2,579) were female. This reflects historical data which has consistently shown that males and females comprise about two-thirds and one-third respectively of all homicide victims in Australia. The number of victims of murder each year ranged from 175 to 340.

The overall murder victimisation rate has halved from 1.78 per 100,000 in 1998–90 to 0.89 per 100,000 in 2019–20 (see Figure 7). The highest rate of murder nationally during this 31-year period was 1.90 per 100,000 in 1990–91, while the lowest rate was 0.70 per 100,000 in 2017–18 (see Table A14). The rate of victimisation has been below 1.00 per 100,000 each year since 2010–11.

Figure 7: Victims of murder in Australia, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)



Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Table A14


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Rates of murder are consistently higher for First Nations women and children

Rates of murder for First Nations and non-Indigenous women between 2005–06 and 2019–20 are shown in Figure 8. This shows that First Nations women consistently experienced higher rates of murder compared with non-Indigenous women over the 15-year period. The murder rate for First Nations women ranged from three to 12 times the rate compared with non-Indigenous women, with an average rate eight times higher than non-Indigenous women.


Similarly, rates of murder were higher among First Nations children compared with non-Indigenous children (see Figure 9). Between 2005–06 and 2019–20 the murder rate was on average three times higher than non-Indigenous children, with higher rates experienced in thirteen of the fifteen-year reference period.

Figure 8: Female First Nations and non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)



Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Tables A6 and A10

Figure 9: First Nations and non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 0–17 years, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)



Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]; see Tables A8 and A12

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Appendix tables

Table A1: Female victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)

Table A2: Female victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

Table A3: Victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)

Table A4: Victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

Table A5: Female First Nations victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)

Table A6: Female First Nations victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

Table A7: First Nations victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)

Table A8: First Nations victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

Table A9: Female non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)

Table A10: Female non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

Table A11: Non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)

Table A12: Non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

Table A13: Victims of murder, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)

Table A14: Victims of murder, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

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Table A1: Female victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	29	26	18	11	4	2	0	4	94
1990–91	41	30	16	6	11	2	0	11	117
1991–92	35	20	17	11	10	2	0	5	100
1992–93	38	15	29	13	10	4	0	5	114
1993–94	44	15	9	5	8	1	2	8	92
1994–95	30	24	16	14	12	0	2	6	104
1995–96	28	16	19	12	2	17	0	6	100
1996–97	34	16	23	5	5	1	1	3	88
1997–98	25	17	25	10	12	0	0	5	94
1998–99	25	24	16	14	7	2	0	7	95
1999–2000	31	20	30	14	6	2	2	2	107
2000–01	38	21	18	9	9	1	0	5	101
2001–02	30	24	17	16	11	3	3	8	112
2002–03	22	17	15	9	9	3	2	6	83
2003–04	21	23	13	15	6	1	1	3	83
2004–05	20	12	14	10	8	3	1	3	71
2005–06	23	23	20	6	9	0	1	3	85
2006–07	14	16	13	3	2	4	0	9	61
2007–08	26	15	17	15	4	1	0	7	85
2008–09	18	11	15	8	8	1	2	6	69
2009–10	23	15	17	7	6	0	0	3	71
2010–11	13	10	24	5	7	1	0	3	63
2011–12	29	12	9	9	4	1	2	4	70
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	20	13	17	13	4	4	0	2	73
2013–14	27	18	13	10	4	3	0	5	80
2014–15	19	11	13	7	6	1	4	2	63
2015–16	12	15	14	9	5	2	0	1	58

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Table A1: Female victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
2016–17	15	12	15	10	5	2	0	2	61
2017–18	16	17	7	10	2	0	0	1	53
2018–19	19	17	10	14	3	0	0	1	64
2019–20	24	12	13	14	2	1	0	2	68
Total	789	537	512	314	201	65	23	138	2,579

a: Includes Norfolk Island

Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A2: Female victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	1.33	1.58	1.71	1.89	0.73	1.18	0.00	7.71	1.48
1990–91	1.85	1.79	1.48	1.01	1.99	1.16	0.00	20.83	1.82
1991–92	1.56	1.18	1.53	1.83	1.79	1.15	0.00	9.31	1.53
1992–93	1.68	0.88	2.54	2.12	1.78	2.28	0.00	9.14	1.72
1993–94	1.92	0.88	0.77	0.80	1.42	0.57	1.79	14.31	1.37
1994–95	1.30	1.39	1.34	2.20	2.12	0.00	1.76	10.41	1.53
1995–96	1.19	0.92	1.55	1.85	0.35	9.52	0.00	10.11	1.45
1996–97	1.43	0.91	1.84	0.75	0.87	0.56	0.86	4.89	1.26
1997–98	1.04	0.95	1.97	1.48	2.08	0.00	0.00	8.01	1.33
1998–99	1.02	1.33	1.24	2.03	1.21	1.11	0.00	10.96	1.32
1999–2000	1.25	1.09	2.27	2.00	1.03	1.11	1.65	3.06	1.47
2000–01	1.52	1.13	1.33	1.26	1.53	0.55	0.00	7.51	1.37
2001–02	1.18	1.28	1.23	2.21	1.85	1.64	2.39	11.95	1.49
2002–03	0.86	0.89	1.06	1.22	1.50	1.62	1.57	8.92	1.09
2003–04	0.81	1.19	0.89	2.00	0.99	0.53	0.78	4.40	1.08
2004–05	0.77	0.61	0.94	1.31	1.31	1.58	0.77	4.30	0.91
2005–06	0.88	1.16	1.31	0.77	1.46	0.00	0.76	4.21	1.07
2006–07	0.52	0.79	0.83	0.38	0.32	2.07	0.00	12.33	0.75
2007–08	0.96	0.72	1.06	1.82	0.63	0.51	0.00	9.30	1.03
2008–09	0.65	0.52	0.91	0.94	1.25	0.51	1.43	7.73	0.82
2009–10	0.82	0.69	1.01	0.80	0.92	0.00	0.00	3.79	0.83
2010–11	0.46	0.45	1.39	0.55	1.07	0.50	0.00	3.75	0.72
2011–12	1.01	0.53	0.51	0.97	0.60	0.50	1.34	4.86	0.79
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	0.69	0.57	0.95	1.36	0.60	1.98	0.00	2.36	0.80
2013–14	0.91	0.77	0.71	1.03	0.59	1.47	0.00	5.84	0.87
2014–15	0.63	0.46	0.70	0.72	0.88	0.49	2.55	2.31	0.67
2015–16	0.39	0.61	0.74	0.91	0.73	0.97	0.00	1.14	0.61

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Table A2: Female victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
2016–17	0.48	0.48	0.78	1.00	0.72	0.94	0.00	2.25	0.63
2017–18	0.51	0.66	0.36	0.99	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.12	0.54
2018–19	0.60	0.65	0.50	1.35	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.11	0.64
2019–20	0.75	0.45	0.64	1.32	0.28	0.44	0.00	2.18	0.67

a: Includes Norfolk Island

Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

Released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Table A3: Victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	15	7	8	6	1	1	0	0	38
1990–91	27	4	2	4	3	1	0	0	41
1991–92	11	4	6	8	3	0	0	0	32
1992–93	15	6	6	7	1	2	0	0	37
1993–94	17	6	7	2	2	2	0	0	36
1994–95	8	6	4	7	1	1	0	2	29
1995–96	12	5	15	2	2	4	0	0	40
1996–97	7	12	7	2	3	3	0	2	36
1997–98	12	7	10	2	5	2	0	0	38
1998–99	16	2	6	5	5	0	1	2	37
1999–2000	13	4	9	11	4	0	0	1	42
2000–01	11	3	8	1	1	0	0	1	25
2001–02	12	5	14	2	5	1	0	1	40
2002–03	9	11	14	3	1	0	0	3	41
2003–04	11	5	9	4	5	0	0	0	34
2004–05	11	1	7	3	2	0	0	0	24
2005–06	10	9	6	4	5	1	1	1	37
2006–07	11	2	7	6	1	0	0	0	27
2007–08	16	4	10	1	2	1	0	1	35
2008–09	2	2	3	2	4	1	0	0	14
2009–10	7	4	7	1	3	0	0	1	23
2010–11	16	3	5	3	1	0	0	0	28
2011–12	6	5	6	2	2	0	0	3	24
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	3	3	4	3	1	0	0	1	15
2013–14	4	4	6	2	1	1	0	2	20
2014–15	8	5	11	0	1	0	0	0	25
2015–16	4	5	8	2	4	0	1	0	24

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Table A3: Victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
2016–17	5	6	3	3	2	0	0	0	19
2017–18	3	2	1	5	0	0	0	0	11
2018–19	9	1	2	5	1	0	0	0	18
2019–20	5	3	11	1	0	0	0	0	20
Total	316	146	222	109	72	21	3	21	910

a: Includes Norfolk Island

Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A4: Victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	0.98	0.61	0.99	1.33	0.28	0.77	0.00	0.00	0.83
1990–91	1.76	0.35	0.25	0.88	0.83	0.77	0.00	0.00	0.90
1991–92	0.72	0.35	0.73	1.75	0.83	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.70
1992–93	0.98	0.53	0.72	1.53	0.28	1.56	0.00	0.00	0.81
1993–94	1.10	0.53	0.83	0.43	0.56	1.56	0.00	0.00	0.78
1994–95	0.52	0.53	0.47	1.50	0.28	0.78	0.00	3.50	0.63
1995–96	0.77	0.44	1.72	0.43	0.56	3.15	0.00	0.00	0.86
1996–97	0.45	1.06	0.80	0.42	0.84	2.39	0.00	3.37	0.77
1997–98	0.76	0.62	1.13	0.42	1.41	1.62	0.00	0.00	0.81
1998–99	1.01	0.18	0.67	1.04	1.41	0.00	1.24	3.32	0.78
1999–2000	0.82	0.35	0.99	2.27	1.13	0.00	0.00	1.65	0.89
2000–01	0.69	0.26	0.87	0.21	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.63	0.52
2001–02	0.75	0.43	1.51	0.41	1.43	0.84	0.00	1.65	0.84
2002–03	0.56	0.95	1.49	0.62	0.29	0.00	0.00	4.97	0.86
2003–04	0.69	0.43	0.94	0.82	1.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.71
2004–05	0.69	0.09	0.72	0.61	0.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50
2005–06	0.63	0.77	0.61	0.81	1.44	0.85	1.30	1.65	0.76
2006–07	0.69	0.17	0.69	1.19	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.55
2007–08	0.99	0.34	0.97	0.19	0.57	0.85	0.00	1.62	0.71
2008–09	0.12	0.17	0.29	0.38	1.14	0.85	0.00	0.00	0.28
2009–10	0.43	0.33	0.66	0.19	0.85	0.00	0.00	1.60	0.45
2010–11	0.97	0.25	0.47	0.55	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.55
2011–12	0.36	0.40	0.55	0.36	0.56	0.00	0.00	4.80	0.46
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	0.18	0.24	0.36	0.53	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.59	0.29
2013–14	0.24	0.31	0.54	0.35	0.28	0.88	0.00	3.20	0.38
2014–15	0.47	0.38	0.98	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.47
2015–16	0.23	0.37	0.70	0.34	1.09	0.00	1.12	0.00	0.44

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Table A4: Victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
2016–17	0.29	0.44	0.26	0.50	0.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.36
2017–18	0.17	0.14	0.09	0.83	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20
2018–19	0.51	0.07	0.17	0.82	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.32
2019–20	0.28	0.21	0.93	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.35

a: Includes Norfolk Island

Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

Table A5: Female First Nations victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	1	0	5	3	0	0	0	4	13
1990–91	3	0	3	3	4	0	0	6	19
1991–92	1	0	3	4	2	0	0	5	15
1992–93	0	0	7	4	0	0	0	5	16
1993–94	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	8	13
1994–95	2	1	3	4	0	0	0	6	16
1995–96	0	1	3	2	0	0	0	1	7
1996–97	1	0	5	0	1	0	0	3	10
1997–98	0	0	5	3	3	0	0	4	15
1998–99	2	0	3	6	1	0	0	5	17
1999–2000	2	1	7	3	0	0	0	2	15

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Table A5: Female First Nations victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
2000–01	6	0	3	5	0	0	0	5	19
2001–02	1	0	6	6	1	0	0	8	22
2002–03	1	0	2	3	0	0	0	5	11
2003–04	2	0	3	3	0	0	0	1	9
2004–05	0	0	3	2	3	0	0	3	11
2005–06	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	3	8
2006–07	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	9	12
2007–08	1	1	3	6	2	0	0	6	19
2008–09	0	0	3	4	0	0	0	6	13
2009–10	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	7
2010–11	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	2	11
2011–12	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	6
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	1	0	3	5	2	0	0	2	13
2013–14	3	0	2	3	0	0	0	5	13
2014–15	2	0	2	3	1	0	0	1	9
2015–16	2	0	2	6	2	0	0	0	12
2016–17	3	0	3	1	1	0	0	2	10
2017–18	2	0	2	3	0	0	0	1	8
2018–19	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	4
2019–20	4	1	3	7	0	0	0	2	17
Total	46	6	101	97	24	0	0	116	390

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A6: Female First Nations victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2005–06	0.00	7.40	4.08	8.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.69	4.36
2006–07	0.00	0.00	1.98	4.03	9.82	0.00	0.00	45.85	6.36
2007–08	1.60	7.00	5.77	23.56	19.16	0.00	0.00	29.79	9.80
2008–09	0.00	0.00	5.61	15.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	28.98	6.51
2009–10	3.00	0.00	1.82	3.73	0.00	0.00	0.00	14.12	3.41
2010–11	1.46	0.00	14.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	9.19	5.21
2011–12	1.41	0.00	1.71	7.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.97	2.76
2012–13	1.37	0.00	5.00	17.33	16.83	0.00	0.00	8.76	5.82
2013–14	3.99	0.00	3.24	10.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	21.43	5.67
2014–15	2.58	0.00	3.15	9.97	7.97	0.00	0.00	4.20	3.83
2015–16	2.51	0.00	3.07	19.58	15.53	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.97
2016–17	3.66	0.00	4.46	3.19	7.57	0.00	0.00	8.13	4.04
2017–18	2.38	0.00	2.89	9.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.00	3.14
2018–19	0.00	0.00	2.80	3.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.93	1.53
2019–20	4.54	5.08	4.08	20.61	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.74	6.35

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A7: First Nations victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
1990–91	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	4
1991–92	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
1992–93	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
1993–94	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
1994–95	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	5
1995–96	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
1996–97	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	2	6
1997–98	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
1998–99	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	4
1999–2000	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
2000–01	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	3
2001–02	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	4
2002–03	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	2	8
2003–04	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	5
2004–05	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3
2005–06	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	4
2006–07	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
2007–08	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
2008–09	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
2009–10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2010–11	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	6
2011–12	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	5
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	4
2013–14	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
2014–15	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	9
2015–16	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3

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Table A7: First Nations victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
2016–17	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
2017–18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2018–19	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
2019–20	1	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	6
Total	27	0	44	20	6	0	0	16	113

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A8: First Nations victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2005–06	2.16	0.00	0.00	2.82	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.11	1.42
2006–07	0.00	0.00	1.21	5.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.04
2007–08	1.03	0.00	1.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.05	1.02
2008–09	1.01	0.00	1.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.67
2009–10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2010–11	2.92	0.00	3.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.95
2011–12	0.96	0.00	0.00	2.63	0.00	0.00	0.00	11.80	1.61
2012–13	0.00	0.00	1.10	7.82	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.27
2013–14	0.00	0.00	1.09	2.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.63
2014–15	0.92	0.00	8.59	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.80
2015–16	0.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	11.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.92
2016–17	0.00	0.00	1.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.31
2017–18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2018–19	3.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.21
2019–20	0.88	0.00	4.09	2.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.79

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A9: Female non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	28	26	13	8	4	2	0	0	81
1990–91	38	30	13	3	7	2	0	5	98
1991–92	34	20	14	7	8	2	0	0	85
1992–93	38	15	22	9	10	4	0	0	98
1993–94	42	15	7	4	8	1	2	0	79
1994–95	28	23	13	10	12	0	2	0	88
1995–96	28	15	16	10	2	17	0	5	93
1996–97	33	16	18	5	4	1	1	0	78
1997–98	25	17	20	7	9	0	0	1	79
1998–99	23	24	13	8	6	2	0	2	78
1999–2000	29	19	23	11	6	2	2	0	92
2000–01	32	21	15	4	9	1	0	0	82
2001–02	29	24	11	10	10	3	3	0	90
2002–03	21	17	13	6	9	3	2	1	72
2003–04	19	23	10	12	6	1	1	2	74
2004–05	20	12	11	8	5	3	1	0	60
2005–06	23	22	18	4	9	0	1	0	77
2006–07	14	16	12	2	1	4	0	0	49
2007–08	25	14	14	9	2	1	0	1	66
2008–09	18	11	12	4	8	1	2	0	56
2009–10	21	15	16	6	6	0	0	0	64
2010–11	12	10	16	5	7	1	0	1	52
2011–12	28	12	8	7	4	1	2	2	64
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	19	13	14	8	2	4	0	0	60
2013–14	24	18	11	7	4	3	0	0	67
2014–15	17	11	11	4	5	1	4	1	54
2015–16	10	15	12	3	3	2	0	1	46

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Table A9: Female non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
2016–17	12	12	12	9	4	2	0	0	51
2017–18	14	17	5	7	2	0	0	0	45
2018–19	19	16	8	12	3	0	0	0	58
2019–20	20	11	10	7	2	1	0	0	51
Total	743	530	411	216	177	65	23	22	2,187

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A10: Female non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 18 years and over, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)

	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2005–06	0.90	1.11	1.22	0.53	1.48	0.00	0.77	0.00	0.99
2006–07	0.54	0.79	0.79	0.26	0.16	2.15	0.00	0.00	0.62
2007–08	0.94	0.68	0.90	1.12	0.32	0.53	0.00	1.81	0.82
2008–09	0.67	0.52	0.75	0.48	1.27	0.53	1.45	0.00	0.68
2009–10	0.77	0.70	0.98	0.71	0.94	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.76
2010–11	0.43	0.46	0.96	0.57	1.09	0.52	0.00	1.72	0.61
2011–12	1.00	0.54	0.47	0.78	0.61	0.52	1.36	3.33	0.74
2012–13	0.67	0.57	0.81	0.87	0.30	2.06	0.00	0.00	0.68
2013–14	0.83	0.77	0.62	0.75	0.60	1.53	0.00	0.00	0.74
2014–15	0.58	0.46	0.61	0.42	0.75	0.51	2.59	1.59	0.59
2015–16	0.34	0.61	0.66	0.31	0.44	1.01	0.00	1.58	0.49
2016–17	0.40	0.48	0.65	0.93	0.59	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.54
2017–18	0.46	0.67	0.26	0.71	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.47
2018–19	0.61	0.62	0.41	1.20	0.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.59
2019–20	0.64	0.42	0.51	0.68	0.28	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.51

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A11: Non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	15	7	7	5	1	1	0	0	36
1990–91	25	4	2	2	3	1	0	0	37
1991–92	11	4	4	8	3	0	0	0	30
1992–93	15	6	5	7	0	2	0	0	35
1993–94	17	6	6	2	2	2	0	0	35
1994–95	7	6	4	5	1	1	0	0	24
1995–96	12	5	10	2	2	4	0	0	35
1996–97	6	12	5	1	3	3	0	0	30
1997–98	12	7	7	2	5	2	0	0	35
1998–99	15	2	6	4	5	0	1	0	33
1999–2000	10	4	9	11	4	0	0	0	38
2000–01	11	3	6	1	1	0	0	0	22
2001–02	11	5	13	2	4	1	0	0	36
2002–03	7	11	10	3	1	0	0	1	33
2003–04	11	5	8	2	3	0	0	0	29
2004–05	10	1	7	1	2	0	0	0	21
2005–06	8	9	6	3	5	1	1	0	33
2006–07	11	2	6	4	1	0	0	0	24
2007–08	15	4	9	1	2	1	0	0	32
2008–09	1	2	2	2	4	1	0	0	12
2009–10	7	4	7	1	3	0	0	1	23
2010–11	13	3	2	3	1	0	0	0	22
2011–12	5	5	6	1	2	0	0	0	19
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	3	3	3	0	1	0	0	1	11
2013–14	4	4	5	1	1	1	0	2	18
2014–15	7	5	3	0	1	0	0	0	16
2015–16	3	5	8	2	2	0	1	0	21

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Table A11: Non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
2016–17	5	6	2	3	2	0	0	0	18
2017–18	3	2	1	5	0	0	0	0	11
2018–19	5	1	2	5	1	0	0	0	14
2019–20	4	3	6	0	0	0	0	0	13
Total	289	146	177	89	66	21	3	5	796

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A12: Non-Indigenous victims of murder aged 0 to 17 years, 2005–06 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2005–06	0.53	0.79	0.66	0.65	1.51	0.93	1.35	0.00	0.68
2006–07	0.73	0.17	0.65	0.85	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.49
2007–08	0.99	0.34	0.95	0.21	0.60	0.93	0.00	0.00	0.65
2008–09	0.07	0.17	0.21	0.41	1.19	0.93	0.00	0.00	0.24
2009–10	0.46	0.34	0.72	0.20	0.89	0.00	0.00	2.66	0.45
2010–11	0.84	0.25	0.20	0.59	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.43
2011–12	0.32	0.41	0.60	0.19	0.59	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.37
2012–13	0.19	0.24	0.30	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.00	2.69	0.21
2013–14	0.25	0.31	0.49	0.19	0.29	0.98	0.00	5.46	0.34
2014–15	0.44	0.39	0.29	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.30
2015–16	0.19	0.38	0.77	0.36	0.57	0.00	1.16	0.00	0.39
2016–17	0.31	0.44	0.19	0.54	0.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.33
2017–18	0.18	0.15	0.09	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20
2018–19	0.30	0.07	0.19	0.88	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25
2019–20	0.24	0.22	0.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.23

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A13: Victims of murder, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	97	75	64	25	20	6	0	17	304
1990–91	135	72	44	23	25	5	0	24	328
1991–92	101	52	59	29	27	9	2	17	296
1992–93	113	49	69	35	27	7	1	16	317
1993–94	125	47	53	22	27	3	2	23	302
1994–95	84	71	50	44	30	5	2	18	304
1995–96	111	54	68	28	14	40	1	21	337
1996–97	107	52	71	18	22	6	1	14	291
1997–98	111	44	65	28	29	4	1	10	292
1998–99	116	55	60	35	38	6	2	16	328
1999–2000	105	57	71	40	24	8	2	7	314
2000–01	109	55	57	21	21	8	0	15	286
2001–02	101	84	60	30	33	9	3	20	340
2002–03	95	67	58	28	21	5	3	15	292
2003–04	79	66	56	29	28	2	3	10	273
2004–05	71	46	49	23	20	11	3	7	230
2005–06	87	71	54	22	22	2	2	12	272
2006–07	82	44	48	23	10	7	3	16	233
2007–08	91	41	51	27	16	3	1	16	246
2008–09	66	45	43	27	20	7	6	10	224
2009–10	67	61	48	21	19	5	1	9	231
2010–11	61	38	48	18	19	4	0	4	192
2011–12	75	47	42	23	15	5	3	15	225
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	71	39	44	35	16	10	1	12	228
2013–14	80	46	38	27	15	8	1	13	228
2014–15	62	40	47	27	17	3	5	6	207
2015–16	41	50	45	26	19	3	3	3	190

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Table A13: Victims of murder, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (*n*)									
2016–17	63	52	35	31	18	9	1	4	213
2017–18	51	47	32	28	11	1	1	4	175
2018–19	71	43	41	31	14	2	2	6	210
2019–20	70	51	53	31	13	4	1	5	228
Total	2,698	1,661	1,623	855	650	207	57	385	8,136

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Note: Includes male and female victims of murder
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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Table A14: Victims of murder, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
1989–90	1.66	1.71	2.21	1.55	1.40	1.30	0.00	10.38	1.78
1990–91	2.29	1.63	1.49	1.41	1.73	1.07	0.00	14.50	1.90
1991–92	1.70	1.17	1.95	1.75	1.86	1.91	0.68	10.09	1.69
1992–93	1.88	1.10	2.23	2.08	1.85	1.48	0.33	9.32	1.80
1993–94	2.07	1.05	1.67	1.29	1.85	0.63	0.66	13.15	1.70
1994–95	1.38	1.58	1.54	2.53	2.05	1.05	0.65	10.02	1.69
1995–96	1.80	1.19	2.06	1.58	0.95	8.41	0.32	11.38	1.85
1996–97	1.71	1.14	2.12	1.00	1.49	1.26	0.32	7.38	1.58
1997–98	1.76	0.96	1.91	1.53	1.96	0.84	0.32	5.18	1.57
1998–99	1.82	1.18	1.74	1.89	2.55	1.27	0.64	8.16	1.74
1999–2000	1.63	1.21	2.02	2.13	1.60	1.69	0.63	3.51	1.65
2000–01	1.67	1.15	1.60	1.10	1.40	1.69	0.00	7.44	1.48
2001–02	1.53	1.74	1.64	1.56	2.18	1.90	0.92	9.89	1.74
2002–03	1.43	1.37	1.55	1.43	1.38	1.04	0.92	7.44	1.48
2003–04	1.19	1.34	1.46	1.46	1.83	0.41	0.91	4.93	1.37
2004–05	1.06	0.92	1.25	1.14	1.30	2.26	0.91	3.40	1.14
2005–06	1.29	1.40	1.35	1.07	1.42	0.41	0.60	5.74	1.33
2006–07	1.20	0.85	1.17	1.09	0.64	1.42	0.88	7.49	1.12
2007–08	1.31	0.78	1.21	1.24	1.01	0.60	0.29	7.28	1.16
2008–09	0.94	0.84	0.99	1.21	1.24	1.39	1.69	4.42	1.03
2009–10	0.94	1.12	1.09	0.92	1.17	0.98	0.28	3.92	1.05
2010–11	0.85	0.69	1.07	0.76	1.16	0.78	0.00	1.73	0.86
2011–12	1.03	0.83	0.92	0.95	0.91	0.98	0.80	6.36	0.99
	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	ACT[a]	NT	Total
2012–13	0.96	0.68	0.95	1.41	0.96	1.95	0.26	4.96	0.99
2013–14	1.07	0.78	0.81	1.07	0.89	1.56	0.26	5.35	0.97
2014–15	0.81	0.66	0.98	1.06	1.00	0.58	1.26	2.45	0.87
2015–16	0.53	0.81	0.93	1.02	1.11	0.58	0.74	1.22	0.79

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Table A14: Victims of murder, 1989–90 to 2019–20 (rate per 100,000)									
2016–17	0.80	0.83	0.71	1.20	1.04	1.70	0.24	1.61	0.87
2017–18	0.64	0.73	0.64	1.07	0.63	0.19	0.23	1.61	0.70
2018–19	0.88	0.66	0.80	1.16	0.79	0.36	0.45	2.42	0.83
2019–20	0.86	0.77	1.02	1.14	0.72	0.71	0.22	2.01	0.89

a: Includes Norfolk Island
Note: Includes male and female victims of murder
Source: AIC National Homicide Monitoring Program [computer file] [unpublished data]

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SENATE
QUESTION

QUESTION NUMBER: PQ22-900016

Michaelia Cash asked the following question, upon notice, on 23/09/2022.

With reference to contract notice CN3902322, published by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission on the Austender website on 3 August 2022 relating to venue hire: 1. To what event did this venue hire relate, and precisely where was the event held.
2. Can an itemised list of all costs relating to the event be provided.
3. Can a guest list for the event be provided, including, without limitation, de ails of any ministers, ministerial staff or APS staff who attended.
4. Can an itemised list be provided for:
a. any food served; and
b. any beverages served, including the names and vintages of any wines or champagnes.
5. Were any catering services procured for the purposes of the event, for example waiters, kitchenhands, or cleaning staff; if so, can full details be provided.
6. Was any entertainment provided at the event; if so, can full details be provided.
7. Was any audio visual equipment or were any services procured for the purposes of the event; if so, can full details be provided.
8. Were any decorations purchased for the purposes of the event; if so, can an itemised list be provided.
9. Can any photographs of the event be provided. 10. Can copies of any presentations delivered at the event be provided.

Senator the Hon Murry Watt – The Hon Mark Dreyfus KC MP has provided the following answer to the senator's question:

1. The Australian Criminal Intell gence Commission's (ACIC) CEO Awards are held annually to recognise and reward the achievements of individuals and/or teams in the agency. The event also doubles as an all staff meeting. It will be held on Tuesday 13 December 2022 at the National Gallery of Australia (walking d stance from the Canberra office and large enough to hold attending staff).

2.

Item	Cost
Venue hire (National Gallery of Australia)	$2,750.00 (ex GST)
Morning tea package (National Gallery of Australia)	$14,000.00 ($35 x 400) (ex GST)
AV Equipment, delivery/pick up and labour (Event AV Services)	$3,485.00 (ex GST)

3. A list of attendees is currently unavailable. ACIC executives, Canberra-based staff and award winners from other ACIC offices will be invited, with an estimate of 400 ACIC staff to attend.

4.

   a. The morning tea menu selections are yet to be finalised. It is expected that they will include options of fruit, cakes, sweet and/or savoury pastries, or similar.

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b. Filtered coffee, tea and a juice and chilled water station. No alcohol will be served.

5. No.

6. No entertainment is planned. A Welcome to Country is scheduled, although has not yet been booked.

7. The event will be recorded for those staff who cannot attend in person. Equipment, delivery/pick up and labour of AV cost is $3,485.00 ex GST. A full break down of AV costs, supplied by Event AV Services, is below:

QTY	Description				Unit Price	Extended Price
	VISION					
1	One camera video record package				790.00	790.00
1	Lenovo T460s ThinkPad, Windows 10				160.00	160.00
1	Blackmagic ATEM Pro HD switcher				460.00	460.00
1	Blackmagic Hyperdeck Studio Mini Recorder (SD)				200.00	200.00
	AUDIO					
1	Behringer X32 Compact Digital Console				250.00	250.00
1	Sennheiser 4 Ch Radio Mic Kit Group A				405.00	405.00
1	RF Venue CP Beam Antenna 470-698MHz				55.00	55.00
	LIGHTING					
1	Scenemaster 3 12/24 Lighting Console				65.00	65.00
2	LED - Fresnel WW - 200W				65.00	130.00
1	Event Lighting Wireless DMX Kit				90.00	90.00
	Labour					
Tuesday 13 December 2022						
0800 - 1000	Crew	- Setup	2 @ ST:	2 Hour(s)	80.00/H	320.00
1030 - 1230	Audio Tech	- Operate	1 @ ST:	2 Hour(s)	80.00/H	160.00
1030 - 1230	Cameraman	- Operate	1 @ ST:	2 Hour(s)	80.00/H	160.00
1230 - 1400	Crew	- Packup	2 @ ST:	1.5 Hour(s)	80.00/H	240.00

8. Not applicable.

9. Not yet available.

10. Not yet available.

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SENATE QUESTION

QUESTION NUMBER: PQ22-900015

Michaelia Cash asked the following question, upon notice, on 23/09/2022.

With reference to contract notice CN3882397 published by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission on the Austender website on 10 June 2022 relating to venue hire:
1. To what event did this venue hire relate, and precisely where was the event held.
2. Can an itemised list of all costs relating to the event be provided.
3. Can a guest list for the event be provided, including, without limitation, de ails of any ministers, ministerial staff or APS staff who attended.
4. Can an itemised list be provided for:
a. any food served; and
b. any beverages served, including the names and vintages of any wines or champagnes.
5. Were any catering services procured for the purposes of the event, for example waiters, kitchenhands, or cleaning staff; if so, can full details be provided.
6. Was any entertainment provided at the event; if so, can full details be provided.
7. Was any audio visual equipment or were any services procured for the purposes of the event; if so, can full details be provided.
8. Were any decorations purchased for the purposes of the event; if so, can an itemised list be provided.
9. Can any photographs of the event be provided.
10. Can copies of any presentations delivered at the event be provided.

Senator the Hon Murry Watt – The Hon Mark Dreyfus KC MP has provided the following answer to the senator's question:

1. The venue hire related to bulk recruitment processes being undertaken by the ACIC for Intelligence Analysts and Investigators. Venues were hired through a single supplier in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth.

2. Costs only related to venue hire. Contract recorded in Austender to the value of $55,816.20. Total cost was $56,023.20 due to the requirement to hire an additional room in Brisbane at late notice to cater for additional candidates. Itemised list of costs:

Item	Cost
Cliftons Sydney Venue	$13,068
Cliftons Melbourne Venue	$13,374
Cliftons Brisbane Venue	$15,087.60
Cliftons Adelaide Venue	$7,543.80
Cliftons Perth Venue	$6,949.80
TOTAL	$56,023.20

3. Given this related to a bulk recruitment process, guests changed each day and consisted of both ACIC staff conducting the recruitment activity and candidates for role at the ACIC. No ministers or ministerial staff attended. No APS staff from other agencies or departments attended.

4. No food or beverages were served.

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5. No catering services were procured.
6. No entertainment was provided.
7. No audio-visual equipment or services were procured.
8. No decorations were purchased.
9. No photos were taken.
10. No presentations were delivered.

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-A

Senator Thorpe: relationship with ex-Rebels president Dean Martin

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

PJCLE engagement and disclosures

- The ACIC provides information to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement (PJCLE) to enable it to fulfil its duties in oversighting the agency and in undertaking relevant inquiries and reviews.
- In July 2021, the ACIC provided classified material to the PJCLE to inform the r review of the operation of the *Australian Crime Commission Amendment (Special Operations and Special Investigations) Act 2019*.
    - Disclosed under section 59(7) of the *ACC Act 2002*
- The ACIC expects any material provided to the PJCLE, or any other committee, is treated confidentially and in line with security classification requirements.

ACIC intelligence

- ACIC has no intelligence relating to the relationship between Greens Senator Lidia Thorpe and Dean Martin, the former Victorian president of the Rebels outlaw motorcycle gang.

Background

- On 20 October 2022, Senator Thorpe publicly confirmed that in early 2021 she "briefly dated" Dean Martin.
- Senator Thorpe's relevant committee membership includes:
    - PJCLE – 2 February 2021 to 11 April 2022
    - Legal and Constitutional Affairs – 6 October 2020 to present.

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Version: 1	Cleared by: Penny Edwards, National Manager Executive	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii), EO to the CEO
Current at: 24/10/22	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-B

Australian Crime Commission (Special Operations and Special Investigations) Bill 2022

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

The Australian Crime Commission (Special Operations and Special Investigations) Amendment Bill 2022 was passed on Wednesday 26 October 2022

Key Points

- Serious and organised crime groups threaten the safety, security and prosperity of Australia and the Australian way of life. This threat is constantly evolving.
- In 2020-21, the ACIC estimated that serious and organised crime cost the Australian community more than $60 billion.
- The ACIC undertakes essential and indispensable functions in gathering intelligence and undertaking investigations to inform Australia's national picture of crime.
- This Bill will ensure that the ACIC can continue to do its great work to effectively detect, prevent and disrupt the nefarious activities of serious and organised crime.
- This Bill will primarily make technical amendments to the *Australian Crime Commission Act 2002* (ACC Act) to provide greater certainty in making determinations authorising special ACIC operations or special ACIC investigations.
- The Bill repeals the current definition of federally relevant criminal activity in subsection 4(1) and replaces it with a new definition of federally relevant crime. The current definition of relevant crime in subsection 4(1) is also amended. These changes reduce the nested, multi-layered definitions that currently exist in these provisions, which create unnecessary complexity.
- This Bill does not expand or otherwise alter the powers available to the ACIC when undertaking these special ACIC operations or investigations.
- It is critical that this Bill be passed in the current parliamentary sitting given the amendments are vital to ACIC undertaking their statutory functions to contribute to a safer and more secure Australia.

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Background

- Under subsections 7C(2) and (3) of the ACC Act, the ACIC Board is authorised to make a determination authorising special ACIC operations or special ACIC investigations.

Version: 1.	Cleared by: Penny Edwards, National Manager Executive	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii), Senior Advisor, Ministerial and Executive Support
Current at: 24/10/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-C

Recent Cyber Security Vulnerabilities

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

Key Points

- The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) employs a 'defence in depth' approach to cyber security incorporating key government policy, such as the Attorney General's Department's (AGD's) Protective Security Policy Framework and the Australian Cyber Security Centre's (ACSC's) Information Security Manual.
- Uplifting the ACSC's Essential Eight Maturity Model remains a high priority for the ACIC in protecting its ICT environment.
- To complement its cyber security capabilities the ACIC partners with relevant Commonwealth agencies to protect its ICT and information assets
- The ACIC does not comment about its ICT systems and data holdings, other than to convey to the Committees its strict adherence to all necessary cyber security policy and governance arrangements.

BACKGROUND

The Cyber Threat Landscape

As highlighted by recent events, the threat from cyber-attacks is increasing both worldwide, and in Australia. A cyber-attack is any attempt to gain unlawful access to an ICT system. The primary goal of a cyber-attack is to steal, destroy and/or compromise ICT systems and information assets. The ACIC utilises a series of defensive cyber security mechanisms to protect the confident ality, integrity and availability of its ICT systems and information assets.

ACIC Cyber Security Capabilities

The ACIC provides the following cyber security capabilities to protect its ICT systems and information assets:

- governance and risk management
- security compliance, assurance and reporting
- ICT security operations – patching, monitoring, alerting and vulnerability scanning
- ICT security incident and event management
- maintenance of cyber security policy, procedure, instructions and internal processes
- internal / external threat analysis.

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Government Partners

To complement its cyber security capabilities the ACIC works in partnership with s 47E(d) [redacted]

[redacted]

Essential Eight

While no single mitigation strategy is guaranteed to prevent cyber security incidents, ACSC recommends that organisations implement eight essential mitigation strategies as a baseline. This baseline, known as the Essential Eight, makes it much harder for adversaries to compromise ICT systems and information assets.

s 47E(d) [redacted]

Version: 1	Cleared by: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted] a/g Executive Director, Intelligence and Information Systems	Action officer: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]
Current at: 7 November 2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii) [redacted]

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BACK POCKET BRIEF BPB-ACIC-D

Human trafficking investigations - recent media reporting

PA-Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

On 3 November, media reporting in *The Age* 'Colleges linked to illegal sex ring', by Nick McKenzie November stated, 'The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission was involved in the investigation that identified the suspect colleges. It was sparked by a probe into a nationwide criminal network linked to Melbourne brothel 39 Tope'.

More broadly, from 30 October on Channel Nine's *60 MINUTES*, and print *The Age* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*, journalist Nick McKenzie exposed 'a global human trafficking syndicate' suggesting flaws in Australian border security and the immigration system, allowing the syndicate to run a national illegal sex racket moving exploited foreign women.

Key Points

- Recent media reporting (The Age, 3 November) linked ACIC involvement to human trafficking investigations.
- The ACIC does not publicly comment on its operational activities.
- The ACIC's primary role is to provide unique insights into serious and organised crime (SOC) and only collects intelligence directly on human trafficking, illegal labour hire, modern slavery and associated offences (e g. illegal sex work) where they intersect with SOC.
- From March 2016 to November 2021, the ACIC supported the Department of Home Affairs and Australian Border Force under Project Jacto.
- The ACIC's intelligence col ection was focused on:
    - Registered migration agents facilitating fraud
    - Visa sponsors exploiting skills visa programs to enable SOC
    - Offshore SOC networks facilitating entry into Australia for individuals to participate in SOC
    - Use of student visas to facilitate entry into Australia for women who were later exploited in the illegal sex industry.
- The ACIC continues to liaise with Department of Home Affairs and Australian Border Force under a visa and migration fraud strategy.

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Version: 1.00	Cleared by: s 22(1)(a)(ii) – a/National Manager Operational Strategy	Action officer s 22(1)(a)(ii) – Ministerial Officer
Current at: 04/11/2022	Phone number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)	Action officer number: s 22(1)(a)(ii)