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Australian Institute of Criminology

Submission

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement: Inquiry into the capability of law enforcement to respond to cybercrime

Prepared by the Australian Institute of Criminology

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Introduction

The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) is Australia's national research and knowledge centre on crime and justice. The AIC informs crime and justice policy and practice in Australia by undertaking, funding and disseminating policy-relevant research of national significance.

The AIC has prepared this submission in response to an invitation from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement (PJCLE) as part of its inquiry into the capability of law enforcement to respond to cybercrime, which was re-referred to the new Parliament in July 2025. This is an updated version of the submission originally provided in November 2023.

The AIC welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the PJCLE review and provide an updated submission. Cybercrime is a major focus of the AIC's research program. The information presented in this submission is based on the AIC's recent Cybercrime in Australia 2024 report, other AIC research and the wider Australian and international evidence base. Unless otherwise stated, statistics in this submission are drawn from the Cybercrime in Australia 2024 report (Voce & Morgan 2025a), released in August 2025, with key sections summarised for the purpose of this submission.

Our submission covers a wide range of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes. While we recognise the importance of improving law enforcement capability to respond to the online sexual exploitation of children (OSEC), this crime is not a specific focus of this submission. A detailed overview on the OSEC problem and evidence-based responses was provided by the AIC to the PJCLE inquiry into law enforcement capabilities in relation to child exploitation.

Cybercrime Research Program

The AIC is undertaking a significant body of research into cybercrime to enhance the Commonwealth's capability with respect to understanding new and emerging cybercrime threats. Our goal is to draw on our specialist research expertise and a crime science approach to better understand and disrupt cybercrime, including the development of innovative methods and analytical tools to understand cybercrime victimisation. Our focus is on the human factor in cybercrime—the victims who are vulnerable to exploitation and who are impacted by cybercrime, the offenders who exploit digital technology to commit offences, and the institutional responses to cybercrime (Leukfeldt & Holt 2020).

Current focus areas

High quality evidence is central to the development of effective responses to cybercrime. This research needs to advance our understanding of the patterns and causes of cybercrime, but also the impact of prevention, disruption and enforcement. We are focused on several areas, including:

- Cybercrime in Australia, our annual report on the state of cybercrime victimisation, online safety, help-seeking and harms;
- vulnerability to cybercrime victimisation and repeat victimisation;
- building cybercrime prevention capability;
- impact of cybercrime on small to medium businesses, including ransomware; and
- emerging technologies and their role in cybercrime.

We will continue to work with our partners across the Commonwealth government to ensure this research is focused on government priorities and reflects the evolving nature of cybercrime.

Australian Cybercrime Survey

A major component of the cybercrime research program is the Australian Cybercrime Survey. This survey was developed as an annual survey and collects a wide range of data on Australian computer users' experiences of cybercrime victimisation. The survey examines a range of cyber-dependant and cyber-enabled crimes, including online abuse and harassment, malware, identity crime and misuse and online scams and fraud. The core survey, which is completed by a minimum of 10,000 respondents, collects information on recent and lifetime victimisation, help-seeking behaviour and the financial losses and other harms from victimisation, along with a range of information about online behaviour that can help inform the development of prevention strategies. The ACS was first conducted in 2023, and was repeated again in 2024. The AIC has funding for the ACS until 2026.

Cybercrime in Australia

Cybercrime is a common but varied crime type

Cybercrime is a common occurrence among Australian computer users. Two-thirds of respondents to the Australian Cybercrime Survey said they had been a victim of at least one type of cybercrime measured by the survey during their lifetime. Forty-seven percent of respondents had been a victim of cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey.

While there is no equivalent measure in Australia, data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales shows that fraud—much of which will be cyber-enabled—and computer misuse accounts for nearly half of all self-reported crime incidents (Office for National Statistics 2023).

It is important to recognise that cybercrime is not just one type of crime. Cybercrime comprises an extremely broad range of crime types, each with different targets, risk factors, offender motivations and modus operandi, harms to victims and response requirements. It spans both property and personal offences and intersects with other offline crime types. This calls for more of a problem-solving approach (Dodge & Burruss 2020) than is currently used. This involves detailed assessment of specific problems and the development and testing of tailored solutions. This approach is likely to be more effective than trying to develop responses to cybercrime that do not distinguish between different types of incidents.

Online abuse and harassment

According to the 2024 survey, online abuse and harassment was the most common type of cybercrime experienced by computer users. In the 12 months prior to the survey, more than one in four (26.8%) respondents had been a victim of online abuse and harassment. The most common form was being sent unsolicited sexually explicit messages, images or videos (7.6%); impersonation, such as someone hacking into their social media or network account (7.6%); cyberbullying (5.6%) and being a victim of extortion or harassment involving images or videos (5.4%).

Unlike other forms of cybercrime, online abuse and harassment often involves people known to the victim. While at least half of all victims said it involved a stranger online (47.0%), friends, former friends, partners, former partners, and family members accounted for around a quarter of offenders in the most recent incident (28.5%). This may reflect a wider pattern of behaviour that also involves offline offending.

Malware

Twenty-one percent of respondents had been a victim of malware in the 12 months prior to the 2023 survey. Ransomware is one type of malware that has attracted concern. While the focus is frequently on ransomware attacks against larger organisations, ransomware can also impact individuals and smaller businesses. According to the Australian Cybercrime Survey, 4.9 percent of

respondents received a ransom message on their device demanding payment in the 12 months prior to the survey. This includes pure ransomware—where there are obvious signs of the respondent’s device having been compromised or access disrupted (2.4% of respondents) —and ransomware-related data theft and extortion, which may or may not involve signs the device had been compromised (2.6% of respondents). There were no significant differences between 2023 and 2024 in the prevalence of pure ransomware and ransomware-related data theft and extortion.

Identity crime and misuse

One in five respondents (21.9%) had been a victim of identity crime and misuse in the 12 months prior to the survey. Most often this involved the compromise of financial accounts (17.5%). More specifically, the most common incidents of identity crime and misuse that respondents experienced in the past year were suspicious transactions appearing in their bank statements or accounts, credit card or credit report (10.1%); receiving calls from debt collectors asking about unpaid bills they did not recognise (4.4%); and someone using their details to purchase or order something or receiving unfamiliar bills, invoices or receipts (2.9%). Together, these accounted for over two-thirds (68.9%) of the most recent incidents of identity crime and misuse.

Online fraud and scams

Eight percent of respondents had been a victim of fraud and scams in which they paid money or provided sensitive information. Scams related to buying or selling products or services online were the most common sub-category of online fraud or scam reported in the 12 months prior to the survey (4.4% of respondents) and accounted for nearly two-fifths of the most recent incidents reported by victims. This was followed by investment scams (1.5%), phishing scam (1.4%), remote access scams (0.9%) and unexpected money scams (0.9%). While less common than other cybercrime types, online fraud and scam victims lost more money on average than other victims and also experienced more negative outcomes, including practical, social and health-related harms. Overall, one in three (34.3%) scams was initiated by a phishing message, which is when scammers email, message or call potential victims pretending to be from reputable companies or known people to induce the victim to reveal personal information or send money.

Victimisation from certain types of cybercrime has decreased, though the reasons for this remain unclear

According to the most recent Australian Cybercrime Survey, the prevalence of online abuse and harassment (27.5% in 2023 vs 25.9% in 2024), malware (22.2% vs 19.8%) and fraud and scams (8.1% vs 6.9%) was lower among 2024 respondents than in the 2023 survey. The prevalence of identity crime and misuse had not changed (20.4% in 2023 vs 20.6% in 2024).

The reasons for this decrease are not clear. Further analysis revealed that there were few sub-categories where there was a decline in victimisation. The proportion of respondents who said they had received unsolicited sexual content in the 12 months prior to the survey was lower in 2024 (7.5%) than in 2023 (10.0%). There was also a smaller proportion of respondents in 2024 who said they were a victim of suspected malware that was not related to ransomware (19.4% in 2023 vs 16.8% in 2024), and phishing scams (1.6% in 2023 vs 0.9% in 2024). We note that all of these are crime types where supply-end disruptions—especially action taken by platform operators and device developers to protect the online safety of their users—could reduce people’s exposure to criminal actors and therefore risk of victimisation.

The prevalence of victims experiencing multiple types of cybercrime was also lower in 2024 than it was in 2023 (43.2% of victims in 2023 vs 39.4% of victims in 2024). We are unable to tell from these data whether respondents experienced more than one type of cybercrime as part of the same incident, whether the different types of cybercrime were connected but separate incidents, or

whether the respondent was a victim of multiple unrelated incidents of cybercrime. It may be that this result indicates a fall in the rate of repeat victimisation. There has been a rise in help-seeking from police and ReportCyber among victims. Victims who seek help, support and advice following an incident may be more likely to implement online safety strategies that reduce their risk of falling victim a second time.

Large-scale data breaches increase the risk of cybercrime

A quarter of respondents (24.9%) had their financial or personal information exposed in a data breach in the 12 months prior to the Australian Cybercrime Survey in 2024. This was a significantly lower proportion than in 2023 (33.7%). This may reflect the timing of the surveys. The observation period for the 2023 survey included the period in which the customer databases of Optus and Medibank were breached. The Latitude Financial data breach was reported in the days after the completion of data collection, and the timing of the 2024 survey means that it was unlikely to have captured the full extent of this breach.

Nevertheless, this finding is important, given research shows that data breaches increase the risk of cybercrime. According to McAlister et al. (2023), one in seven (14.4%) identity crime and misuse victims said that, in the most recent incident, their information was obtained during a data breach. AIC research has shown that data breaches significantly increase the likelihood of identity theft, online scams and fraud and ransomware (Morgan & Voce 2022). This highlights the importance of proactive prevention strategies for people impacted by data breaches.

Contextual factors and emerging technologies provide new opportunities for malicious actors

Cybercrime is constantly evolving. While the major threats to individuals, business and government are relatively constant, the modus operandi of perpetrators is constantly evolving. This 'arms race' occurs in response to both emerging opportunities and action taken by governments and law enforcement to disrupt prominent forms of cybercrime. We can categorise these emerging opportunities into two main groups—the opportunities created by situational factors, and the opportunities created by advancement in new technologies that can be used by malicious actors.

An excellent example of the opportunities created by contextual factors is how malicious actors have exploited major disaster events (Smith & Levi 2021). During the COVID-19 pandemic, phishing scams shifted their focus, exploiting people's fear of illness, and need to access health products and financial supports—messages that would have been unlikely to work in other contexts. Offenders have also attempted to capitalise on natural disasters, including bushfires and floods, such as with charity fundraising scams. AIC research has demonstrated that the risk of cybercrime victimisation increases when someone's life circumstances make them vulnerable to manipulation, coercion and exploitation (Voce & Morgan 2023b), which may be especially true when communities are affected by natural disasters.

A range of new technologies have and will continue to create new opportunities for cybercrime. The last decade has seen the uptake of artificial intelligence (AI), end-to-end encryption, the darknet, cloud data storage platforms, cryptocurrency, and various new social media and messaging apps. Cybercriminals are quick to adopt emerging technologies for criminal purposes. For example, AI is already being leveraged by criminal actors to upscale and enhance criminal activities, exploit human-centric vulnerabilities and lower the barriers and costs to engaging in criminal activities (EUROPOL 2020). Artificial intelligence has the potential to facilitate better targeted, more frequent and widespread criminal attacks, and is already being used for password guessing, CAPTCHA-breaking and voice cloning (EURPOL 2020). Large language models like ChatGPT have the potential to improve the success rates of phishing and fraud attempts, where emails and messages can be created faster,

be tailored to prey on specific vulnerabilities, appear more legitimate and be deployed at a significantly increased scale (EUROPOL 2023).

The AIC included a module as part of the 2024 Australian Cybercrime Survey to capture better data on the impact of emerging technologies, namely AI. This included data on awareness, use and consequences of these technologies.

Cybercrime disproportionately impacts certain groups in our community

Not everybody has the same risk of falling victim to cybercrime. It disproportionately affects certain groups in our community. According to the Australian Cybercrime Survey:

- Younger respondents, First Nations respondents and respondents with a restrictive health condition were each more likely to have been a victim of all four types of cybercrime.
- Men were more likely than women to be the victim of malware and online abuse and harassment.
- Respondents who identified as LGB+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual or other non-heterosexual orientation) were significantly more likely than heterosexual respondents to have been a victim of online abuse and harassment and fraud and scams.
- Respondents who mainly spoke a language other than English at home were more likely to have been a victim of online abuse and harassment, malware, and scams and fraud.

While some of this may be due to differences in online behaviour and technology use, it is also possible that some of these groups are more vulnerable to exploitation. It highlights the need to consider tailored responses that meet the needs of different sections of our community.

Cybercrime is most frequently a high volume, low yield crime, but with big financial losses to some victims

Individual losses associated with cybercrime victimisation vary widely. Most victims report losing no money from the most recent incident. Among those victims who do lose money and who could report how much, the majority lost less than \$1,000. A small group of victims did lose substantial amounts of money. Five percent of online abuse and harassment victims, 3.5 percent of malware victims, 2.8 percent of online fraud and scam victims and 2.8 percent of identity crime victims lost more than \$10,000 in the most recent incident. 1.2 percent of fraud and scam victims lost more than \$100,000 in the most recent incident. The impact of these losses is potentially catastrophic and can have long-term effects on victims. These incidents are more likely to be reported to authorities and tend to be reflected in estimated losses based on recorded data.

Cybercrime targeting individual computer users is most frequently a high volume, low yield crime. The high rate of victimisation means that, even with the relatively small median losses per victim, the overall cost to Australian individuals is likely to be enormous. Previous AIC research into the cost of pure cybercrime showed that the amount lost per victim was relatively small, but the total estimated cost to Australian computer users exceeded \$3 billion (Teunissen, Voce & Smith 2021). Similar patterns in terms of individual losses have been observed in other countries (Office for National Statistics 2022).

With such a high rate of victimisation, even with modest returns, the cybercrime targeting Australian computer users is extremely lucrative for cybercriminals.

Cybercrime impacts extend well beyond financial losses

Given the profit-motivated nature of many types of cybercrime, the emphasis is often on financial losses. However, the impact of cybercrime can extend well beyond these financial losses (Cross, Richards & Smith 2016). According to the Australian Cybercrime Survey, 56.8 percent of cybercrime

victims were negatively impacted by cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey. Taking into account the prevalence of victimisation, this means an estimated 26.1 percent of all respondents to the survey were negatively impacted by cybercrime. Practical impacts, such as the loss of confidence in using the internet, impact on a person's ability to communicate with others, or problems accessing accounts or resources were most common (40.0% of victims). This was followed by social impacts, such as the loss of trust, increased isolation, and relationship breakdown (26.8%). Health impacts included mental or emotional distress, trouble sleeping and deteriorating health (19.7 percent). Around one in six victims (16.7%) reported financial problems, meaning not everyone who lost money were impacted financially. While financial support is important, support for cybercrime victims must address these non-financial harms.

More victims were negatively impacted by cybercrime in 2024 than in 2023, particularly for social and health related harms. The increase in social harm appears to be driven by a threefold increase in respondents who said they were embarrassed or their reputation was damaged. The increase in health-related harm was driven by the growing proportion of victims who experienced difficulty sleeping, who had to seek medical treatment, and who increased their consumption of alcohol or legal and illegal drugs.

Intervention and support efforts can also be targeted at types of cybercrime that cause the highest harm to victims. The AIC has developed a harm index for individual victims of cybercrime that provides validated measures of the relative harm from different types of cybercrime (Voce & Morgan 2025b). The index is based on a 34-item measure of the prevalence and severity of practical, health, social, financial and legal impacts that victims experienced as a result of cybercrime victimisation. The scores provide a measure of the relative severity of 18 types of cybercrime. Among the most harmful cybercrimes to the community were stalking and harassment and having images or personal information stolen or shared without consent. These are forms of serious technology-facilitated violence that often occur as part of a pattern of abuse, often involving intimate partners. Remote access scams and online shopping scams were the two highest ranked profit-motivated cybercrimes. These harm scores can be used to measure the concentration of harm among cybercrime victims. Overall, just 10.9 percent of victims accounted for 57.7 percent of the harm to all victims who completed the survey. These victims are disproportionately impacted and should be prioritised for intervention.

Victims who experience multiple forms of cybercrime account for a disproportionate level of harm

Much of this concentration in harm can be explained by victims experiencing more than one type of cybercrime in a 12-month period. The 2024 Australian Cybercrime Survey found that nearly half of all cybercrime victims (42.1%) reported having experienced multiple types of cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey. Those who did, experienced much greater levels of harm as a result.

Despite this, there has been relatively limited research on how repeat victimisation occurs for cybercrime victims and offences. In traditional crime, research demonstrates that an individual's risk of becoming a repeat victim is heightened during the period immediately following a victimisation incident, and that the risk of repeat victimisation increases with each subsequent incident (Grove & Farrell 2012). Most recorded crime constitutes repeat victimisation of the same targets, with a small group of victims experiencing a disproportionate amount of repeat victimisation (O, Martinez, Lee & Eck 2017).

The AIC's harm index for individual victims of cybercrime shows that a relatively small group of victims who experience multiple forms of cybercrime account for a disproportionate level of harm. It provides clear evidence that repeat victims who experienced multiple types of cybercrime are disproportionately impacted and should be prioritised for intervention.

Small to medium businesses are especially vulnerable to cybercrime

Small to medium businesses account for more than 99 percent of all Australian businesses (ASBFEO 2023). Small to medium business owners, operators and managers experience significantly higher rates of all types of cybercrime. When they fell victim, small to medium business owners and operators are more likely to lose money or spend money on consequences. Two in five respondents who were small business owners and operators and who said they were a recent victim of cybercrime said their business was impacted as a result.

Small to medium businesses may be large enough to have the infrastructure, data holdings (or access to networks of larger organisations) and profits to be attractive targets for cybercrime, but not have the resources, expertise and capability of larger organisations to prevent cybercrimes. Despite being more likely to lose money than other victims, there was little difference in reporting, suggesting that small business owners and operators may be reluctant to seek help from law enforcement. The effect of cybercrime on small businesses may have flow-on implications, such as for customers who are secondary victims of data breaches, or for larger organisations, if offenders use these smaller businesses in the supply chain to gain access to other systems and networks.

This highlights the importance of building the capability of small to medium business operators to prevent cybercrime and ensuring that support for victims is both available and accessible. There were some signs of improvement in the most recent survey, with fewer small to medium business operators saying they were a victim of malware and online fraud or scams in 2024 than in 2023, and an increase in help-seeking from police and ReportCyber. Nevertheless, further work is needed to understand what types of prevention activities are most effective in preventing cybercrime against small businesses (Kemp 2023).

Law enforcement response to cybercrime

Under-reporting impacts on official data sources

The 2024 Australian Cybercrime Survey showed that most cybercrime victimisation went unreported to police or to ReportCyber (the main online reporting platform for reporting cybercrime to police). Data on whether victims made an official report following the most recent incident to police or ReportCyber can be used to estimate multipliers, which can be applied to the number of recorded cybercrime incidents to estimate the total number of incidents impacting Australian computer users:

- Since 10.3 percent of online abuse and harassment victims made an official report to police or ReportCyber, the true number of online abuse and harassment incidents involving unique victims will be at least 9.7 times the number recorded by ReportCyber.
- Since 9.5 percent of malware victims made an official report to police or ReportCyber, the true number of malware incidents involving unique victims will be at least 10.5 times the number recorded by ReportCyber.
- Since 10.3 percent of identity crime victims made an official report to police or ReportCyber, the true number of identity crime incidents involving unique victims will be at least 9.7 times the number recorded by ReportCyber.
- Since 12.5 percent of fraud and scam victims made an official report to police or ReportCyber, the true number of fraud and scam incidents involving unique victims will be at least 8.0 times the number recorded by ReportCyber.

While these are broad categories of cybercrime, these multipliers illustrate the large number of incidents not captured by ReportCyber—which recorded nearly 87,400 reports in 2023–24, equivalent to one report every six minutes (ASD 2024).

There is a disconnect between the expectations of victims and what can be delivered by law enforcement

Most victims sought help from police or ReportCyber in order to prevent the crime happening to them again or to someone else; however, two in five victims of identity crime and misuse and half of fraud and scam victims who sought help did so because they wanted to get their money back or be compensated for loss or damage. Many police agencies are clear that they are unable to assist with the recovery of funds when a victim makes a report.

Data from the Australian Cybercrime Survey shows that many victims of identity crime and misuse are able to recover at least some of their losses and, on average, those who did recover money recovered more than 90 percent of their financial losses. That was not the case for other types of cybercrime. 38.4 percent of fraud and scam victims who lost money were able to recover any of their losses.

Seeking help from police or ReportCyber does not always result in an investigation or outcome (see 'Barriers to policing cybercrime can impact clearance rates'). An AIC evaluation of the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) —the predecessor to ReportCyber— showed that, when victims' expectations about what will happen when they report to police are not met, they are much less likely to be satisfied with the outcome of the report (Morgan et al. 2016).

There are positive signs with victim satisfaction with reporting to police, but still room for improvement

Victims who reported the most recent incident to police or to ReportCyber were usually more likely to be satisfied than dissatisfied with the outcome of their report. Up to 61.3 percent of victims who sought help were satisfied with the outcome and up to 35.7 percent were dissatisfied with the outcome.

Since the introduction of ACORN the platform has been improved and steps taken to improve the information sharing with law enforcement and the capability of police to respond to cybercrime reports. While there are still significant challenges, it is possible that these changes have led to some improvements in the reporting experiences of victims.

As part of an evaluation of ACORN, cybercrime victims who had reported to ACORN were surveyed about the outcome of their report and their satisfaction with that outcome (Morgan et al. 2016). Despite some methodological differences, this allows for some crude comparisons of satisfaction rates between victims who reported to ACORN in mid-2015 and victims who sought help, advice or support from police or ReportCyber in 2022:

- 21 percent of victims of cyberbullying, sexting, online harassment or stalking who reported to ACORN were satisfied with the outcome, compared with 41 percent of online abuse and harassment victims who sought help, advice or support from the police or ReportCyber;
- 32 percent of victims of computer system attacks who reported to ACORN were satisfied with the outcome, compared with 61 percent of malware victims who sought help, advice or support from the police or ReportCyber; and
- 30 percent of victims of online scams and fraud who reported to ACORN were satisfied with the outcome, compared with 41 percent of victims who sought help, advice or support from the police or ReportCyber.

The consistent upward trend in satisfaction rates suggests that responses to cybercrime victims have improved. Nevertheless, there is scope to ensure that victims receive the necessary support, especially given the range of harmful impacts they may experience.

Barriers to policing cybercrime can impact clearance rates

Among those who sought help from police or ReportCyber, between 18.6 and 39.1 percent either heard nothing, did not know what had happened, or were told nothing could be done. Overall, 15.6 percent of online abuse and harassment victims, 21.4 percent of malware victims, 7.5 percent of identity crime victims and 10.6 percent of fraud or scam victims were told by the police that someone had been arrested, charged or prosecuted.

This reflects the many barriers encountered by law enforcement in trying to respond to cybercrime. Several factors can influence whether a cybercrime reported to police (including via ReportCyber) is investigated and, if so, whether the offender will be apprehended. Some of these factors are not unique to cybercrime. Not every incident reported to police or ReportCyber will meet the threshold for a criminal offence. In other cases, there will be a low prospect of arrest, particularly where there is insufficient evidence to proceed with an investigation.

Previous research has highlighted some of the challenges associated with investigating cybercrime. Limited specialist capability and training impacts the ability and confidence of police to respond (Wilson et al. 2022). These capability gaps are amplified by increasingly complex and technologically sophisticated offenders and offences, which also undermine police surveillance and evidence-gathering efforts (Cross et al. 2021). Further, jurisdictional boundaries and the borderless nature of cybercrimes also hinder investigation and offender identification (Morgan et al. 2016). Many cybercrimes are committed by offenders located in geographical jurisdictions different from their victims, which creates distinct issues with establishing jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute offenses (Cross 2019).

There is still a need to raise awareness of reporting options

The most common reasons that victims gave for not reporting to police or ReportCyber were that they felt they could deal with the incident by themselves or they did not regard the incident as a serious offence. This is consistent with reporting to police among victims of crime more generally—the harm associated with crime incidents, as measured by the degree of bodily injury, economic loss, emotional damage, potential for harm, and perceived wrongfulness, is the strongest correlate of victim reporting (see Xie & Baumer 2019 for a review). This relationship extends to cybercrime, with a study conducted in the Netherlands finding that the seriousness and type of offence were the best predictors of cybercrime reporting (Van de Weijer, Leukfeldt & van der Zee 2021).

While many people didn't report because they felt they could deal with the problem themselves or because it wasn't serious enough, a large proportion didn't know where or how to report. They did not know reporting to the police or ReportCyber was an option, did not think the police or the ACSC would be able to do anything, or did not know how or where to report the matter.

As has already been made clear, police are already responding to cybercrimes which, on average, are more harmful and results in higher financial losses. Further, there is already a large volume of reports submitted to ReportCyber—one every six minutes (ASD 2024)—which far outweighs the capacity of law enforcement to respond. Efforts to increase reporting need to be balanced against the potential implications of exceeding law enforcement's capacity to respond.

Cybercrime prevention

Certain platforms expose online Australians to increased risk of cybercrime

AIC research shows that frequent use—defined as daily or weekly use—of certain platforms is associated with a much higher likelihood of online abuse and harassment and profit-motivated cybercrime (Voce & Morgan 2023a). Using subscription-based sexually explicit interactive adult platforms; making donations or payments over gaming, streaming or fundraising platforms; being

active on dating or romance websites and apps; and purchasing items from online marketplaces is associated with much higher rates of victimisation. In the case of profit-motivated cybercrimes, this is true even after other factors have been considered (Voce & Morgan 2023b). These platforms may be attractive for malicious actors to exploit, as they often involve communication between strangers, registration processes, and payments between parties and the platform.

While we can encourage people using these platforms to take steps to protect their safety online, some responsibility must fall to the operators of these platforms to ensure the safety of their users. This kind of ‘passive’ approach to crime prevention is generally more effective than approaches that rely on active engagement by users (Brown 2013).

People use online safety measures, but not as frequently as they could

We know that many people use online safety measures to protect themselves from cybercrime. However, many other people do not. For example, half or fewer than half of all respondents to the Australian Cybercrime Survey said they used online safety measures that are widely promoted as ways to stay safe online. This includes using a different password for secure online accounts, especially for banking or financial transactions (50.7% of respondents), using voice, fingerprint, facial or iris recognition technology to access devices such as their mobile phone (46.7%), installing or using antivirus software or firewalls on their devices (39.3%), checking their privacy settings on social media accounts (37.8%), and regularly updating the security software on their device when prompted by their device’s security system (38.6%).

This also extends to measures to protect the safety of children online. Among respondents who had children living at home, around one in five (20.0%) said they had set, or had already installed, parental controls on devices and browsers to restrict access to certain content.

Relatively few people had recently participated in cybercrime education and awareness raising. Only one in eight respondents said they had recently participated in training to stay safe online or to protect their information (13.5%).

AIC’s 2023 Cybercrime in Australia report showed that respondents who used various online safety measures had a higher prevalence of cybercrime victimisation. This may be because respondents who had fallen victim to cybercrime were more likely to implement safety measures to prevent repeat victimisation. Further analysis by McAlister et al. (2023) showed that many victims of identity crime and misuse implemented simple online safety measures after they have fallen victims—being more careful when using or sharing personal information (55.6% of victims), changing passwords (42.2%), implementing two-factor authentication (32.5%), being more cautious about adding people on social media (27.7%) and reviewing financial statements more carefully (26.9%).

AIC research also shows certain higher risk online activities have been shown to increase the likelihood of victimisation (Voce & Morgan 2023b). These activities included using freely available Wi-fi in a public location to conduct a financial transaction, opening emails from people or organisations they did not know, accepting friend requests from people they had not met in person, and sharing a password or a code for an account with someone else. Importantly, around one in 10 respondents or fewer have engaged in these behaviours in the 12 months prior to the 2024 Australian Cybercrime Survey, suggesting most people understand the risks.

However, the latest Cybercrime in Australia report also showed that respondents were less likely to use online safety strategies in 2024 than they were in 2023, and that there was only a small decrease in certain unsafe online behaviours. There may be several reasons for this. Respondents were more confident in their knowledge of technology in 2024 than in 2023, which may lead them to place less importance on protective behaviours. The frequent use of social media also significantly declined from 2023 to 2024, which could explain why respondents are not checking or adjusting their social media profiles. The decline in the proportion of people who avoided clicking on links or who

independently contacted a company may relate to them receiving fewer scam approaches due to government and industry measures such as telecommunications companies blocking scam calls and text messages. The rate of victimisation among 2024 respondents was lower than in 2023, as was the likelihood of having information exposed in a data breach, and this may explain some of the observed decrease in online safety strategies, since many people put in place these measures after they have been targeted. But the fall in victimisation was not consistent across all cybercrime types, and the difference was relatively small. Overall, there is no obvious explanation for respondents being less likely to use online safety strategies in 2024 than in 2023.

This information should be used to help shape the development of more targeted prevention efforts and continuing to improve resilience to cybercrime among Australians online. Especially for people who have already fallen victim and who might be at risk of becoming repeat victims.

Prevention programs must be based on rigorous evidence, which is currently lacking

There is mixed evidence about the role cybercrime prevention and awareness campaigns can play in reducing victimisation by educating individuals and organisations about potential threats and preventive measures. School educational campaigns are often cited as a cost-effective means for addressing prevention and criminal justice issues with youth, particularly regarding cyberbullying and raising young people's awareness of emerging risks (CCPCJ 2010). Some cyberbullying prevention and internet safety initiatives which are employed in school environments are evidence-based and have produced positive outcomes. These include iSAFE in the United States, KiVa in Finland, ConRed in Spain, No Trap in Italy, and ViSC in Austria (See ICPC 2018, Brewer et al 2019). However, empirical studies testing the impact of school campaigns have shown mixed results with regards to participants' intentions to take protective actions online (Dooley et al 2011) and no impact with regards to changes in risky online behaviour (Mishna et al 2009).

Kemp (2023) recently analysed whether two UK government schemes aimed at encouraging and helping businesses to adopt cybersecurity controls and policies ('Cyber Essentials' and '10 Steps to Cyber Security') were associated with safer organisational behaviour and whether adopting the recommended measures was related to lower levels of cybercrime victimisation and its impacts. They showed that awareness of the Government schemes was associated with more cyber secure practices; however, it is possible that more cautious businesses may be more likely to hear of the scheme. Moreover, there was no evidence that implementing the recommended measures was associated with a lower likelihood of victimisation or negative consequences.

Further, van Steen and colleagues (2020) recently analysed 17 government-sponsored cybersecurity campaign materials aimed at improving citizens' cybersecurity hygiene, awareness and skills. They found that that security campaigns are often focused on education and increasing awareness, under the assumption that if citizens are made aware of risks and how to improve their security behaviour, they will change their behaviour. They identified a lack of published studies investigating the direct effects of governmental cybersecurity campaigns, and noted that merely increasing awareness does not necessarily lead to behavioural change.

Importantly, research has repeatedly demonstrated that the effectiveness of messages is greatly influenced by how they are designed. For example, messages are more likely to influence decision-making when they attract attention, are clear and concise, are believable, come from a credible source, and impart explicit information about specific hazards, potential harms, and what to do to avoid harm (Haddad et al. 2020; Prichard et al. 2022). According to Bada, Sasse and Nurse (2014), effective influencing requires more than simply informing people about what they should and should not do. In the context of cyber security awareness campaigns, the way a person carries out a campaign's recommendations depends on both their appraisal of threat and their self-efficacy

(Bada, Sasse & Nurse 2014). The attempt to change a certain behaviour is much more difficult when a person is overwhelmed by a large number of messages about certain issues. One way of increasing behavioral compliance may be to break down complex goals into smaller 'calls to action' which are specific, easy and achievable (Neimand et al 2020).

Giving clear and simple instructions is associated with behaviour change and compliance. The Behavioural Economics Team at the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2020) examined the use of behavioural insights to boost the impact of cyber security alerts. They found that a salient call to action (ie. having a banner encouraging email recipients to share the email with their contact list) more than doubled the rates at which participants engaged in that desired action.

Building on these findings, the AIC partnered with the Australian Federal Police Joint Policing Cybercrime Coordination Centre (JPC3) and eSafety to test the effects of targeted prevention messages with clear calls for action. A randomised control trial was undertaken to test whether delivering targeted messages to computer users can reduce the prevalence of online abuse and harassment and profit-motivated cybercrime. Results from this experiment, including the impact on online safety, cybercrime victimisation and the harm from cybercrime will be available soon. This is an important step in building an Australian evidence base.

Summary

Main findings

We end our submission by summarising our main findings:

- Cybercrime is a common but highly varied crime problem affecting a large proportion of online Australians. The harms extend well beyond financial losses.
- The risk of cybercrime is not evenly distributed. Certain groups within the community are more likely to be a victim.
- The frequent use of certain platforms, and some higher risk online behaviours, are associated with a higher likelihood of falling victim to cybercrime.
- Many victims experience multiple types of cybercrime and, as a result, are more negatively impacted across a range of measures. They account for a disproportionate level of harm.
- Most incidents of cybercrime are not reported to police or to ReportCyber. Official statistics significantly underestimate the scale of the problem. Reported cybercrime is more serious and involves greater financial losses.
- Many victims of cybercrime do not seek help from police or ReportCyber because they do not know where or how to report cybercrime incidents.
- Very few incidents of cybercrime reported to police result in an offender being arrested and convicted. This reflects the many barriers encountered by law enforcement in trying to respond to cybercrime.
- Expectations of the law enforcement response to cybercrime vary, and a significant proportion of victims report to police or ReportCyber in the hope their lost funds will be recovered. Whether these expectations are met has a significant bearing over whether victims are satisfied with police.
- Research into cybercrime, especially the human factor of cybercrime, is not as well developed as other crime types. There are significant gaps in our knowledge of how certain cybercrimes are committed, what makes certain individuals and businesses more vulnerable, the response

to cybercrime by victims, why individuals become involved in cybercrime, and the efficacy of prevention, disruption and enforcement efforts.

Implications

The implications of these findings are as follows:

- Adopt a problem-solving approach that allows for a detailed assessment of specific cybercrime problems and the development and testing of tailored solutions.
- Ensure that responses are tailored to the needs of different sections of our community, particularly those who are a higher risk of victimisation.
- Target intervention and support efforts at types of cybercrime that cause the highest harm to victims.
- Prioritise repeat victims who experience multiple types of cybercrime and are disproportionately impacted.
- Build the capability of small to medium business operators to prevent cybercrime and ensuring that support for small to medium business victims is both available and accessible.
- Raise awareness of reporting options for victims and address any confusion about the different options that are available. Balance this against the potential implications of exceeding law enforcement's capacity to respond.
- Build the capability of specialist and frontline police to respond to cybercrime victims.
- Ensure that operators of those platforms which are associated with higher rates of cybercrime take their own steps to ensure the safety of their users.
- Use information on people's online behaviour to shape the development of more targeted prevention efforts, especially for people who have already fallen victim and who might be at risk of becoming repeat victims, and measure the impact of prevention programs using rigorous methods.
- Increase the research capability within government that can capitalise on the vast amount of data collected on cybercrime and provide high quality evidence to guide decision making. This is particularly true of research into what works in prevention, disruption and enforcement.

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