AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE COMMISSION

BOARD OF THE AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE COMMISSION

CHAIR ANNUAL REPORT

2024–25



Contact details

This report and more information about the ACIC are available at acic.gov.au.

To enquire about this report, please contact:

Director Communication and Media
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
GPO Box 1936, Canberra City ACT 2601

02 6268 7343
media@acic.gov.au

acic.gov.au

facebook.com/ACIC

instagram.com/acic_govau

linkedin.com/company/acic-govau

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Letter of transmittal

The Hon Tony Burke MP
Minister for Home Affairs
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
Minister for Cyber Security
Minister for the Arts
Leader of the House

The Hon Tony Burke MP
Minister for Home Affairs
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

Dear Minister

On behalf of the Chair of the Board of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC), I present the *Board of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Chair Annual Report 2024–25*.

The report has been prepared in accordance with section 61 of the *Australian Crime Commission Act 2002* (ACC Act), which requires the Chair of the ACIC Board to prepare a report on the ACIC's operations during the year as soon as practicable after 30 June.

Section 61(1) of the ACC Act requires the Chair of the Board to furnish the report to the Inter-Governmental Committee on the Australian Crime Commission for comment and transmission. Consultation was completed out of session in July 2026; no comments were received.

The report is to be laid before each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days of that house after your receipt of the report.

Yours sincerely

The Hon Tony Burke MP
Chair of the Inter-Governmental Committee on the Australian Crime Commission
17/08/2026

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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

This section provides an introduction to the ACIC and the ACIC Board, explains the role of this report, and presents the Chair's review of ACIC achievements in 2024–25.

About the ACIC

The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) is Australia's national criminal intelligence agency. Its purpose is to protect Australia from serious criminal threats by collecting, assessing and disseminating intelligence and policing information.

The ACIC has 2 distinct roles:

- to collect, analyse and communicate intelligence relating to serious and organised crime impacting Australia, including where it has a transnational dimension
- to ensure that there are systems and services that enable criminal intelligence and policing information to be shared across jurisdictions, including the provision of nationally coordinated criminal history checks.

The ACIC's legislative framework is established by the *Australian Crime Commission Act 2002* (ACC Act). Section 7A of the ACC Act defines the ACIC's core functions, which are underpinned by supporting legislation in each state and territory. The ACC Act provides the ACIC with intelligence-gathering and investigative powers and enables the use of specialised tools. The Act also assigns the ACIC's key roles in delivering and enhancing criminal intelligence, national policing information services, and nationally coordinated criminal history checks.

From 1 July 2024 to 12 May 2025, the ACIC was part of the Attorney-General's portfolio and reported to the Attorney-General. The agency moved to the Home Affairs portfolio on 13 May 2025 and now reports to the Minister for Home Affairs.

About the ACIC Board

The ACIC Board is established under section 7B of the ACC Act and has a range of functions as set out in section 7C of the Act. The functions include:

- providing strategic direction and determining the ACIC's priorities
- determining national criminal intelligence priorities
- authorising special ACIC investigations and special ACIC operations, which allows the use of the ACIC's coercive powers
- making recommendations about charges for national policing information services, including criminal history checks
- determining priorities in relation to national policing information systems and services, and providing recommendations to the minister for investment to improve, maintain and expand those systems and services
- reporting to the Inter-Governmental Committee on the ACIC's performance.

Members and observers

The board is chaired by the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, and comprises the heads of each Commonwealth, state and territory police force and a number of national security and regulatory agencies, as set out in section 7B(2) of the ACC Act.

The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the ACIC is a non-voting member of the board. The CEO of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre attends board meetings as a non-voting observer.

Meetings and matters considered

The board considers a range of issues at each meeting, including current and emerging strategic priorities, performance against responsibilities, progress of national policing information systems projects, and the status of the National Policing Information Systems and Services Special Account (Special Account).

The board met 3 times in 2024–25, and:

- approved access to the National Criminal Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD) and NCIDD Integrated Forensic Analysis tool for the Office of the Director of Forensic Science Queensland
- approved a request from the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia to access protection order information held in the National Police Reference System Court Portal
- received updates on the independent review of the ACIC
- approved changes to the ACIC Board Charter of Governance in response to a recommendation made by the Commonwealth Ombudsman
- approved the extension of Task Force Reston, to continue the sharing of criminal information and intelligence in support of the ACIC-led Fraud Fusion Taskforce Intelligence Program. Eight agencies were added as participants in the task force.

Subcommittee

The board's National Policing Systems Subcommittee is responsible for considering national policing information systems and Special Account matters and making recommendations to the board for endorsement.

The subcommittee met twice in 2024–25. It discussed and received updates from the ACIC on Special Account revenue, and on the:

- National Firearms Register Program
- National Criminal Intelligence System Program
- National Police Checking Service Modernisation Program
- National Police Checking Service Secondary Clearing
- National Policing Information (NPI) Capability Roadmap and NPI Dashboard
- Law Enforcement Information Services Capability Committee and Technology Capability Committee.

About the annual report

The annual report by the Chair of the ACIC Board fulfils the reporting requirements set out in section 61 of the ACC Act. It is presented to the Minister for Home Affairs and the appropriate minister of each state and territory via the Inter-Governmental Committee established under section 8 of the ACC Act.

A separate annual report by the CEO of the ACIC fulfils the reporting requirements set out under section 46 of the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013*. It documents progress against the ACIC's purpose and performance criteria, provides information on management and accountability, and includes audited financial statements.

Both reports are available at www.acic.gov.au/publications/annual-reports.

This Chair annual report addresses the requirements of section 61 of the ACC Act as shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Compliance with reporting requirements of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002

Information required under section 61(2)	Location in this report
(a) a description of any special ACC investigations undertaken during the year	Section 3: Special ACIC operations
(b) a description, which may include statistics, of any patterns or trends, and the nature and scope, of any criminal activity that have come to the attention of the ACC during that year in performance of its functions	Section 2: Australia's criminal environment Section 3: Special ACIC operations
(c) any recommendations for changes in the laws of the Commonwealth, of a participating State or of a Territory, or for administrative action, that, as a result of the performance of the ACC's functions, the Board considers should be made	Section 5: Legislative framework and legal actions
(d) the general nature and the extent of any information furnished by the CEO during that year to a law enforcement agency	Section 3: Special ACIC operations Section 4: Systems and services
(da) the general nature and the extent of any information disclosed by the CEO during that year to a body corporate under section 59AB	Section 3: Special ACIC operations
(e) the extent to which investigations by the ACC have resulted in the prosecution in that year of persons for offences	Section 5: Legislative framework and legal actions
(ea) the extent to which investigations by the ACC have resulted in confiscation proceedings	Section 5: Legislative framework and legal actions
(g) particulars of the number and results of: (i) applications made to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) under the *Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977* for orders of review in respect of matters arising under this Act; and (ii) other court proceedings involving the ACC; being applications and proceedings that were determined, or otherwise disposed of, during that year	Section 5: Legislative framework and legal actions

Chair's review



In 2024–25, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) continued to play a vital role in strengthening Australia's collective response to serious and organised crime. The ACIC supported more than 72,000 frontline officers nationwide, providing the intelligence, information and systems needed to detect, disrupt and prevent criminal activity.

Remaining agile and strategically positioned, the ACIC leveraged strong domestic and international partnerships to provide intelligence and expertise critical to hardening Australia's defences against criminal exploitation.

Through the delivery of vital policing systems, thousands of intelligence products and millions of background checks, the ACIC continues to make a direct and measurable contribution to operational effectiveness and community safety across Australia.

The ACIC also advanced the implementation of recommendations from the *Independent Review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements*, which set out a blueprint to strengthen the agency's ability to combat the significant threat posed by serious and organised crime.

Criminal intelligence

The ACIC delivers crucial insights into the highest-level criminal threats impacting Australia. In 2024–25, the agency utilised collection capabilities to uncover new information relating to special ACIC operations, and produced 2,002 unique intelligence products, which were disseminated 12,500 times to 291 national or international partners. The agency also produced and published reports 22 and 23 of the National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program.

Beyond intelligence gathering, the ACIC plays a critical role in bringing law enforcement partners together to build operational strategies and coordinate disruption activities. These collaborative efforts contributed to the disruption of criminal entities, leading to the seizure of drugs and precursor chemicals with an estimated street value of $58.4 million and cash and assets with an estimated value of $7.32 million.

National policing information systems and services

The ACIC manages a portfolio of 12 national policing information systems, which are crucial tools for partners working to prevent, detect and reduce crime across Australia.

The operational value of the systems is clear. In 2024–25, they directly helped police to solve crimes by enabling more than 405,300 positive fingerprint data matches, approximately 2 million DNA profiles, and 64 positive crime scene ballistics data matches.

The National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS) is the core system for providing secure, nationwide access to critical criminal intelligence and information for law enforcement and other partners. This connectivity delivers a truly national picture of crime, directly enhancing agency capabilities and contributing to a safer Australia.

During 2024–25, the ACIC continued to add NCIS datasets, capabilities and system integrations. As at 30 June 2025, information shared through NCIS integrated with 21 local police systems nationally and was actively used by more than 52,000 officers in frontline operations. NCIS is trusted to provide a national view of criminal intelligence and information, enhancing officer and community safety.

National Police Checking Service

The ACIC's National Police Checking Service plays a critical role in community safety by delivering timely and accurate information to inform decisions on employment and other entitlements. The sheer volume of this work is significant: during 2024–25, the service processed more than 7.26 million nationally coordinated criminal history checks.

Looking ahead

In 2024–25, I observed the ACIC navigating a year of change and consolidation with focus and purpose. I extend my thanks to Reece Kershaw APM, former Australian Federal Police Commissioner, who held the position of Chair of the ACIC Board in that period.

Since my appointment as Chair in October 2025, the ACIC has continued to strengthen its position as Australia's national criminal intelligence agency – attuned to the increasing complexity of the threat environment, and driven by the need for unique, actionable and insightful intelligence.

The ACIC is not merely responding to a more complex criminal landscape. Under the board's oversight, the agency's stewardship of national policing information systems and secure sharing of information continue to be critical to the safety of our communities.

As we look ahead, the board remains committed to supporting the evolution of the ACIC and ensuring that the agency has the capability, partnerships and direction needed to deliver intelligence that protects Australia's national interests, safeguards our institutions, and strengthens our collective resilience.

Krissy Barrett APM
Chair
Board of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission

SECTION 2:
AUSTRALIA'S CRIMINAL ENVIRONMENT

This section draws on intelligence gathered by the ACIC and its partners to describe the nature, scope, trends and patterns of criminal activity impacting Australia.

Key characteristics

Serious and organised crime cost the Australian economy approximately $82.3 billion in 2023–24. It undermines Australia's geopolitical and domestic interests, and targets and harms Australian citizens. Our work exposes the complex and ever-shifting nature of serious and organised crime impacting Australia, including where it has a transnational dimension.

- **Serious and organised crime threatens Australia's security and prosperity.** Serious and organised crime actors are exploiting growing uncertainty in our economy and interfering in geopolitical and global conflict, focusing firmly on opportunities to derive profit at the expense of the security and wellbeing of the Australian community.
- **Serious and organised crime impacts everyone.** Serious and organised crime actors are highly adept at using everyday systems and services to enable destructive, pervasive and complex illicit ventures. They make our communities less safe, create unfair competition for legitimate businesses and industries, exploit our most vulnerable people, and increase pressure on the economy and vital services.
- **Criminals prioritise personal gain above all else.** The heads of criminal networks lead global organisations focused on maximising profits. These high-level criminals will go to great lengths to achieve their goals, regardless of traditional allegiances, geographic boundaries, or the harm they cause.
- **Serious and organised criminal enterprises are globalised and collaborative.** Criminal networks are global, technology enabled and resilient. But even the highest-threat criminal enterprises have limitations to their reach and rely on the services, access and expertise of other criminals to succeed in their illicit ventures. Serious and organised crime groups continue to prioritise collaboration over competition where it does not affect their bottom line.
- **Technology is expanding opportunities for criminals across every category of crime.** Criminals quickly adopt emerging and advanced technologies to enable and expand their end-to-end business models. As Australians rely more heavily on online services and platforms, opportunities for cybercrime, serious financial crime and victim-based crime expand. Our increasingly digital world also grants criminals easier access to illicit commodities, digital currencies, and specialist tools and technologists. These tools and methodologies are also commoditised by criminals across online forums and marketplaces.
- **Insiders and professional facilitators enable criminal groups.** Serious and organised crime networks rely on a range of skills to help conceal their activity and manage the profits of crime. Criminals exploit insiders in Australian supply chains, leveraging their access and knowledge to evade detection by law enforcement and border security. Professionals such as lawyers, accountants and real estate agents are also engaged or co-opted, both wittingly and unwittingly, for their skills in masking and facilitating complex criminal activities.

Understanding criminal networks and how they operate, and identifying emerging threats, allows us to inform and support prevention and disruption actions, creating a more hostile operating environment for serious and organised crime actors.

Key enablers

Enablers are activities or capabilities that underpin and contribute to the effectiveness of serious and organised crime. They may be crimes themselves. The key enablers described here are widely used in Australia, although not all enablers are present in every illicit market. Multiple enablers may be used concurrently within the same criminal enterprise.

Technology

Most serious and organised crime activities make use of technology and digital infrastructure. Examples include technology-enabled identity crime and fraud in the areas of banking, trade and superannuation.

The ability to target individuals remotely from any location in the world is attractive to serious and organised crime groups that use technology to target the financial sector or trade illicit goods. Serious and organised crime uses tools such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) to simplify complex tasks, enabling offenders to commit more sophisticated crime online – with increased frequency and speed, against greater numbers of victims – while lowering barriers to entry and creating opportunities for non-specialists to enter criminal markets. The rapid increase in generative AI capability and uptake in serious and organised crime is a challenge for law enforcement.

Through the use of online platforms and services, child sexual exploitation and abuse are becoming more prevalent, commodified and organised. Offenders increasingly use technological means to commit acts of exploitation and abuse such as grooming children and distributing child abuse material.

Professional facilitation

The role of professional facilitators of criminal activity is a fundamental issue for law enforcement and regulatory agencies. In an increasingly complex global environment, criminals engage a range of professional facilitators – such as legal, real estate and accounting professionals and other business services providers, including registered migration agents and education agents – to assist them to commit crimes, avoid detection and conceal assets.

Crime-as-a-service

Crime-as-a-service arrangements provide opportunities for criminal entities with limited knowledge or capability to expand and diversify their activities by purchasing or outsourcing expertise in illicit activity. Crime-as-a-service is easily accessible and has a low cost to implement.

The availability of crime-as-a-service lowers the barriers to entry, allowing greater scope for serious and organised crime activity to be committed by individual actors. It provides the opportunity for a new generation of digital natives to engage in serious criminal activities.

The crime-as-a-service model allows serious and organised crime networks to gain resources and optimise sales and profits while developing mutually beneficial partnerships with other criminal networks. It can also impede the discovery of criminal threats and the identification of offenders.

Identity crime

As well as being one of the most common types of crime committed in Australia, identity crime is an enabler of other significant criminal activities, including money laundering, financial crime, drug trafficking and fraud.

There is a growing trend towards commissioning identity crime online through the production and sale of identity documentation and fraudulent use of personal information.

The true extent of identity crime is difficult to quantify, due to under-reporting, differences in jurisdictional reporting, and instances where identify theft is undetected.

Violence and intimidation

Violence and intimidation underpin serious and organised criminal activity in various ways. For example, they may be used to extort financial gain, to coerce people or businesses into facilitating or undertaking criminal activity, or to control drug networks and settle disputes.

Violence linked to organised crime is becoming increasingly visible and brazen, with innocent bystanders and legitimate businesses often caught in the crossfire. Incidents such as daylight shootings, arson attacks and public acts of intimidation are occurring more frequently. Some criminal groups even record and share footage of their offences, amplifying fear and normalising violent behaviour.

The escalating frequency and severity of such violence erodes community confidence, leaving people feeling less safe, less secure and more divided.

Public sector corruption

Exploitation of the public sector by serious and organised crime groups weakens the instruments of government and strengthens criminal networks, undermining the community’s confidence in government and public officials.

Areas most at risk include bodies responsible for procurement, across all levels of government; frontline agencies such as police, customs and border protection; and any agencies responsible for dispensing government funding without established anti-corruption practices.

Australia is at lower risk from serious and organised criminal involvement in public sector corruption. However, corruption of individuals in private companies, industries, and union organisations – highlighted by recent incidents and investigations involving organised crime links to the building industry in Australia – suggests that there is a need to remain vigilant in this area.

Key markets

Australia is exposed to serious and organised criminal activities conducted locally and across geographic boundaries. Key crime markets include illicit commodities such as drugs and firearms, and increasingly sophisticated enterprises such as financial crime and intellectual property crime.

Illicit commodities

Serious and organised crime groups with significant supply chain capability are highly active in Australian markets for illicit commodities such as drugs, tobacco and firearms. They are increasingly commodity agnostic, and engage across multiple networks, methodologies and commodities to generate criminal profits and enhance their capability.

Drugs and precursor chemicals

The illegal importation, manufacture, cultivation and distribution of harmful drugs in Australia generates billions of dollars in profits for organised criminal groups.

The Australian illicit drug market is sustained by demand for a wide variety of substances, as described in Table 2.1. Some serious and organised crime groups capitalise on the demand by importing, cultivating, manufacturing or trafficking several drug types simultaneously.

Table 2.1: Key substances in the Australian illicit drug market 2024–25

Substance	Market characteristics
Cannabis	Serious and organised crime (SOC) groups are well established in the Australian cannabis market, although they do not dominate it. The market is robust and profitable, and supplied by a large number of often unsophisticated groups and individuals. Almost all cannabis consumed in Australia is cultivated domestically, and some cultivation is increasingly sophisticated and coordinated. Cannabis is the most consumed illicit drug in Australia. Report 24 of the National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program (the Program) shows the level of cannabis consumption is nearly 4 times that of methylamphetamine consumption. Regional average consumption exceeds capital city average consumption. Consumption remained relatively stable between August 2023 and August 2024.
Cocaine	All cocaine imported into Australia is almost certainly sourced from South American countries. SOC groups import cocaine through many different transhipment points. Report 24 of the Program shows that cocaine consumption has increased in all states and territories to the highest weight recorded by the Program. Average capital city consumption exceeds average regional consumption. During the year ended August 2024, an estimated 6,835 kilograms of cocaine was consumed nationally, with an estimated street value of $2.22 billion.
Hallucinogens and anaesthetics	While the markets for hallucinogens and anaesthetics do not rival the major illicit drug markets, they do have a tangible SOC presence and show signs of expansion. The ketamine market is a concern, due to its links to poly-drug use with other illicit stimulants and the very large market for ketamine across parts of Asia. Ketamine is both illicitly imported and diverted domestically from the medical and veterinary sectors. Ketamine has been monitored by the Program since December 2020. Report 24 of the Program shows ketamine excretion increased in capital cities in October 2024 to the highest levels recorded by the Program. Capital city average excretion exceeds regional average excretion.
Heroin	All heroin in Australia is imported by SOC groups, and almost all of it originates in South-East Asia. Report 24 of the Program shows that heroin consumption has increased in all states and territories to a record high level. Average capital city consumption exceeds average regional consumption. During the year ended August 2024, an estimated 1,137 kilograms of heroin was consumed nationally, with an estimated street value of $284.25 million.

Substance	Market characteristics
Synthetic opioids	Synthetic opioids in the illicit market in Australia include nitazenes, opioid-based pain relief medications such as fentanyl and oxycodone, opioid substitution drugs, and codeine. The Program monitors the consumption of fentanyl and oxycodone, with data reflecting both licit and illicit use. Report 24 of the Program shows that consumption of these drugs remains relatively stable at lower levels than were reported earlier in the Program. Average regional consumption generally exceeds capital city consumption. Nitazenes pose a significant threat and are being closely monitored to identify new substances and the nature and extent of SOC involvement in supply. Nitazenes continue to be implicated in fatal overdoses.
MDMA[a]	SOC groups are involved in the importation, domestic manufacture (to a limited extent) and distribution of MDMA in Australia. Most MDMA that is imported into Australia is sourced in Europe. Report 24 of the Program shows that average consumption of MDMA has increased in all states and territories. During the year ended August 2024, an estimated 1,430 kilograms of MDMA was consumed nationally, with an estimated street value of $147.93 million.
Methylamphetamine	SOC groups are involved in the importation, domestic manufacture and distribution of methylamphetamine in Australia. Imported methylamphetamine is primarily sourced from Asia and the Americas. Domestic manufacture constitutes an estimated 20% of the market, and is becoming more diverse and sophisticated. Methylamphetamine causes disproportionate harm because there is strong and resilient demand for the drug in both capital city and regional areas. Report 24 of the Program shows that average methylamphetamine consumption has increased in all states and territories to the highest level recorded by the Program. Average regional consumption exceeds capital city consumption. During the year ended August 2024, an estimated 12,815 kilograms of methylamphetamine was consumed nationally, with an estimated street value of $8.97 billion.
GHB, GBL and 1,4-BD[b]	The involvement of SOC groups in the related markets of GHB, GBL and 1,4-BD is highlighted through multi-tonne illicit importations and diversion from legitimate industrial uses. All 3 substances feature in poly-drug use with substances such as methylamphetamine. The drug 1,4-BD was scheduled in Commonwealth legislation in early 2024. Since then there have been sizeable detections at the border, the total amount of which is rivalled only by detections of methylamphetamine.

Table 2.1: Key substances in the Australian illicit drug market 2024–25 (continued)

Substance	Market characteristics
New psychoactive substances	SOC groups have limited influence in the market for new psychoactive substances, which have similar chemical structures to, or mimic the effects of, other illicit drugs. These substances have been available in Australia since the mid-2000s. Hundreds of the substances are introduced to the market each year, and many feature for only short periods of time. Through the surface web and the dark web, the internet is used extensively for buying, selling and sharing information on these substances. The market is highly reactive, appearing to change in response to user preferences and to changes in other drug markets, and does not rival the traditional drug markets in terms of use or size.
Performance and image enhancing drugs	Users from an increasingly diverse demographic are consuming a wide range of performance and image enhancing drugs (PIEDs). SOC groups are involved in the importation and manufacture of PIEDs, but do not dominate the market. The market for PIEDs is linked to the markets for illicit stimulants and illicit pharmaceuticals. In this market the role of professional facilitators, such as doctors and pharmacists, is a major concern. There is potential for growth in the market as the substances are used increasingly to enhance personal image as well as performance.
Precursor chemicals	Precursor chemicals are essential for illicit drug production, and the diversion and trafficking of precursor chemicals is a profitable enterprise in itself. Precursor chemicals can be diverted from a range of sources, including the legitimate chemical industry, the scientific supply industry, the transportation and logistics industry, or medical facilities and pharmacies. SOC groups dominate the sophisticated end of this market. Large importations of precursor chemicals have been detected in recent years. This market has potential to increase as the domestic manufacture of drugs forms part of the business model of sophisticated SOC groups. The market is increasingly seeing SOC groups move to the use of pre-precursors to avoid regulatory and legislative controls over the more traditional precursors.

a MDMA is the chemical 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, also known as 'ecstasy'.

b GHB is the chemical gamma hydroxybutyrate, also commonly known as 'fantasy'. GBL (gamma butyrolactone) and 1,4-BD (1,4-butanediol) are closely related chemicals that convert to GHB when ingested.

Other commodities

Serious and organised crime groups are expanding their involvement in the highly lucrative illicit tobacco market in Australia, through the illegal importation of tobacco and vape products and the local production of illicit tobacco.

While Australia has some of the strongest firearm controls in the world, illicitly obtained firearms remain a significant enabler of criminal activity. Organised crime groups, including outlaw motorcycle gangs, use firearms to gain status and to enact or threaten violence. The nature and extent of firearms trafficking by these groups remains an ongoing focus.

In 2023, the ACIC conservatively estimated that there were approximately 200,000 illicit firearms, comprising 190,000 long arms and 10,000 handguns, in the domestic illicit market. The rapid rate of technological advancement in privately manufactured 3D-printed firearms requires careful monitoring, to provide early warning and action options in the event that serious and organised crime groups turn to 3D printing to source potentially lethal weapons at scale.

Financial crime

Financial crimes are diverse in their nature and scale, and in the level of harm they cause. Financial crime markets include money laundering, cybercrime, investment and financial market fraud, revenue and taxation fraud, superannuation fraud, card fraud, and health and welfare fraud.

The expansion of serious and organised crime in the financial sector poses a significant risk to the integrity of Australia's economy, financial markets, regulatory frameworks and revenue collection.

Transnational crime markets

Among the crime markets that transcend national boundaries, the following present a particular threat to the Australian community and Australia's national security interests:

- **Cybercrime** – Cybercrime covers a wide variety of offences, including identity crime, computer hacking, phishing, botnet activity, computer-facilitated crime, and cyber intrusion directed at private and national infrastructure.
- **Money laundering** – Organised criminals use money laundering networks to transfer, store and access proceeds of crime. The international flow of illicit proceeds threatens global security and economic stability.
- **Online sexual exploitation and extortion** – The threat of child sex offending is exacerbated by evolving methods of offending, such as live online abuse; developments in digital technology; and the deployment of end-to-end encryption and anonymising tools. AI tools industrialise the production of child abuse material and provide opportunities to monetise its distribution. In addition, serious and organised crime groups are becoming increasingly involved in financially motivated online sexual extortion.

- **Human trafficking and slavery** – This is a global concern, and the mass movement of refugees and migrants in recent years has escalated the threat. Under-reporting is endemic within this crime type, but increased awareness and outreach programs are likely to have contributed to increasing referrals to law enforcement for these offences.
- **Visa and migration fraud** – Serious and organised crime groups exploit the Australian visa and migration system, engaging the services of professional facilitators to enable entry into Australia.
- **Intellectual property crime** – Piracy and counterfeiting are serious international issues. The main forms of intellectual property crime in Australia are the importation of counterfeit goods, such as clothing, and the domestic manufacture of goods that infringe copyright.
- **Environmental crime** – Environmental crimes are diverse and occur in several crime markets, including wildlife crime, illegal logging and fishing, and illegal disposal of rubbish. Transnational organised crime syndicates and opportunistic individuals exploit these markets, which are characterised by high profit margins and low detection rates.

SECTION 3:
SPECIAL ACIC OPERATIONS

This section provides an overview of special ACIC operations and describes the operations that informed mission critical intelligence in 2024–25.

Overview

Subject to authorisation by the ACIC Board in line with section 7C of the ACC Act, the ACIC may conduct:

- **Special ACIC operations**, which are focused on gathering intelligence around particular criminal activity so that response decisions can be informed by an improved understanding of the extent, impact and threat of that activity (and may contain an investigative component)
- **Special ACIC investigations**, which are designed to reduce the incidence and effect of specified serious and organised crime activity (including through disruption and prevention) by collecting evidence and intelligence about criminal activity.

Special ACIC investigations and special ACIC operations are authorised by the board by written determination.

Nine special ACIC operations authorised in December 2022 were active in 2024–25. No new special ACIC operations or special ACIC investigations were authorised in 2024–25.

Active operations

This section describes the aims and activities of special ACIC operations in 2024–25. The ACIC's *Annual Report 2024–25* contains additional details on its achievements in priority areas, including comparisons with previous reporting periods.

Cybercrime

Cyber-related crime covers a wide variety of offences that present a significant threat to Australia, including identity crime, computer hacking, phishing, botnets, computer-facilitated crime, and cyber intrusion directed at private and national infrastructure.

Advances in technology have offered new opportunities for serious and organised crime groups, which use increasingly sophisticated methods to counter law enforcement efforts. Cybercriminal groups can target thousands of Australians simultaneously from anywhere in the world. They enhance their capability through dark web forums and marketplaces in which they share tools, techniques and information.

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (Cybercrime) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses information and intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime's involvement in cyber-related crime. The Cybercrime 2022 special operation is focused on offences directed at computers or other information communications technologies and offending facilitated by computer.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- investigate and collect intelligence on cyber-related crime activities
- identify persons and entities committing cyber-related crime offences
- understand the dynamic and changing environment in which cybercrime offences are committed
- understand the scale of impacts of cybercrime offences, such as the numbers and types of victims, the financial impacts, and the extent of cyber security vulnerabilities
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes and to assist in the development of government policy and law reforms.

Drugs

The illicit drug trade poses significant socioeconomic and health risks to the Australian public. The social burden that illicit drugs place on the community, along with the long-term health consequences of their use, led to the development of the Australian Government's National Drug Strategy.

The ACIC provides leading-edge national research and intelligence on illicit drugs and licit drugs that can be abused, through the National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program.

The ACIC also produces the Illicit Drug Data Report, which provides governments, law enforcement agencies and interested stakeholders with a national picture of illicit drug data. The report provides an important evidence base to assess current and future illicit drug trends, and assists decision-makers in the development of strategies to combat the threat posed by illicit drugs.

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (Drugs) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses information and intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime relating to drug offences. Drug offences that fall within the scope of the special operation include trafficking, manufacturing, possessing, and importing and exporting illicit drugs.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- monitor, investigate and collect evidence on the illicit drug markets, both domestically and internationally, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the serious and organised criminal threats that impact Australia
- identify persons and entities committing drug offences, and the relationships between different persons and entities
- identify emerging techniques, equipment and materials in the manufacture of illicit and licit drugs that may be exploited by serious and organised crime groups
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes and to assist in the development of government policy and law reforms.

The special operation also examines and investigates offences against the *Therapeutic Goods Act 1989*, which sets out the legal requirements for the importation, supply and manufacture of therapeutic goods in Australia.

Firearms

Firearms are used by serious and organised crime groups to protect criminal interests and commit acts of violence. The use and possession of firearms by serious and organised crime groups and the trafficking and importation of illicit firearms are serious concerns for Australia.

Illicit firearms are a desirable commodity for serious and organised crime groups and an enabler of criminal activity. Traffickers supply illicit firearms to organised crime networks, either by illegally obtaining them from the licit market or by facilitating their illegal manufacture or importation.

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (Firearms) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses information and intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime's involvement in illicit firearms.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- investigate and collect intelligence on the illicit firearms market
- identify persons and entities involved in committing firearm-related offences and identify the relationships between the persons and entities involved
- understand the methods and techniques by which serious and organised crime groups source and supply firearms
- identify vulnerabilities in the industries and processes involved in the importation or distribution of firearms
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes and to assist in the development of government policy and law reforms.

Illicit Tobacco

Illicit tobacco is the importation and exportation of tobacco and the selling or manufacturing of tobacco where the required customs/excise duty has not been paid.

The illicit tobacco market in Australia is viewed as a low-risk, high-reward venture for serious and organised crime groups. Illicit tobacco generates significant profits, allowing criminal groups to absorb losses from detection and disruption. Criminal groups will continue to adapt their methodologies in response to enforcement strategies.

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (Illicit Tobacco) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime's involvement relating to illicit tobacco.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- investigate and collect intelligence on the illicit tobacco market
- identify persons and entities involved in committing offences related to illicit tobacco, and identify the relationships between those persons and entities
- understand the methods and techniques by which serious and organised crime groups conduct this offending
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes and to assist in the development of government policy and law reforms.

National Security Threats

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (National Security Threats) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised threats impacting Australia's national security.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- investigate and collect evidence of national security threats
- identify and investigate security-related risks to Australia's economy, institutions and governments
- identify persons and entities involved in committing offences related to national security and identify the relationships between those persons and entities
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes to address vulnerabilities and combat national security threats.

Serious Financial Crime

Serious financial crime encompasses financial offending: fraud, money laundering, financial information offences, superannuation and investment fraud, foreign acquisitions, sanctions, sophisticated tax evasion, and serious company violation offences.

Almost all organised crime is motivated by profit. The ACIC helps to remove the financial motivation to engage in criminal activity by investigating financial crime, and developing and disseminating intelligence that better informs the response to financially motivated criminal activity.

The ACIC's investigations incorporate the work of multi-agency national task forces, including:

- the Fraud Fusion Taskforce, to detect, disrupt and prevent fraud and serious and organised crime in the National Disability Insurance Scheme and other government programs
- the Serious Financial Crime Taskforce, to facilitate the coordinated identification of, and response to, financially motivated criminal activity
- the Phoenix Taskforce, the Black Economy Standing Taskforce and the Fintel Alliance, to enhance the integrity of the financial system in Australia.

The ACIC Board-approved Task Force Reston facilitates the sharing of criminal information within the Fraud Fusion Taskforce and supports the development of enhanced national responses to detect, disrupt and prevent fraud and related criminal activity within Australian Government payments and programs.

The Fraud Fusion Centre leads the ACIC's contribution of mission critical intelligence to the Fraud Fusion Taskforce and Task Force Reston. The Fraud Fusion Centre brings together a multi-disciplinary team of investigators, intelligence analysts and data specialists to identify and target serious and organised crime networks and other fraud actors exploiting Australian Government programs and payments designed to help the most vulnerable members of society.

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (Serious Financial Crime) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses information and intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime relating to financially motivated criminal activity.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- investigate and collect intelligence on financially motivated criminal activities
- identify persons and entities committing financially motivated criminal activities
- understand the dynamic environment of financial crime, such as new and emerging methodologies to launder money, including cryptocurrency
- identify vulnerabilities in Australia's financial systems
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes and to assist in the development of government policy and law reforms.

Supply Chains (Imports and Exports)

Supply chains are used by serious and organised crime groups to facilitate the importation and exportation of drugs, illicit tobacco and regulated commodities.

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (Supply Chains (Imports and Exports)) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised threats impacting Australian supply chains.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- investigate and collect evidence of threats impacting Australian supply chains
- identify persons and entities involved in committing criminal activity both domestically and internationally, and identify the relationships between those persons and entities
- understand the new and emerging methodologies used by serious and organised crime groups to import and export illicit commodities or goods that bypass law enforcement actions
- identify vulnerabilities in the industries that are involved in the importation and exportation of goods, including the logistics, maritime, aviation and storage industries
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes and to assist in the development of government policy and law reforms.

Victim-Based Crime

Victim-based criminal activities include exploitation of child material, child sex offending, human trafficking, and slavery.

Child sexual abuse and exploitation transcend international borders, and networking between child sex offenders underpins access to child abuse material, facilitators, methodologies and victims.

Technology is enabling access to victims and driving more complex child abuse and exploitation activities. It is a vector for organised criminal networks to exploit, and will lead to industrial-scale opportunities for serious and organised crime and increase the risk to children and the volume of child sexual abuse.

Human trafficking exploits vulnerable populations. Australia is a destination country of victims of human trafficking. Victims of human trafficking are exploited as a commodity to generate profit for serious and organised crime groups.

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (Victim-Based Crime) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime's involvement in victim-based offending.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- investigate and collect evidence of victim-based criminal offences
- identify persons and entities involved in committing criminal activity, and systems that are used by serious and organised crime groups to enable the exploitation of vulnerable persons
- identify opportunities to prevent organised abuse of children
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes and to assist in the development of government policy and law reforms.

Visa and Migration Fraud

Through the Special Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Operation Determination (Visa and Migration Fraud) 2022, the ACIC collects and analyses intelligence to identify, investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime's involvement in people smuggling and offences against the *Migration Act 1958*, such as visa fraud and passport forgery.

The aim of the special operation is for the ACIC to:

- investigate and collect intelligence on how visa and migration fraud is facilitated for serious and organised crime groups by professional facilitators
- understand the methods and techniques by which criminals conduct visa and migration fraud
- understand the scale of visa and migration fraud and its impact on the Australian community
- identify vulnerabilities in industries involved in Australia's migration program and disseminate intelligence to partner agencies to address those vulnerabilities
- disseminate intelligence to its partners to enable enforcement, disruption and prevention outcomes and to assist in the development of government policy and law reforms.

Intelligence products

In 2024–25, the ACIC delivered 2,002 unique intelligence products, including 96 strategic and operational assessments and insights, for its partners.

Strategic assessments

The ACIC's strategic assessments provide partners with assessments of crime types and markets or criminal issues of national importance. These assessments support and influence a range of intelligence, operational and response decisions, and inform government consideration of future strategies, including policy development and legislative reform.

In 2024–25, the ACIC produced strategic assessments on a range of themes, including:

- the serious and organised crime network landscape and threat
- the money laundering environment
- serious and organised crime exploitation of Australia's migration system
- technical assessments concerning
  - insights from wastewater analysis
  - various drug manufacturing processes
- drugs impacting Australia – including fentanyl, fentanyl-type substances, nitazenes, xylazine, methylamphetamine, amphetamine and cocaine – and drug precursors.

Strategic and operational insights

The ACIC's strategic and operational insights provide new insights into serious and organised crime threats, groups, vulnerabilities, methodologies and markets. These insights reflect key strategic observations and learnings from ACIC and partner intelligence and investigations, often gathered using coercive powers, covert capabilities and engagement with key agencies.

Intended for stakeholders with an in-depth understanding of the organised crime environment, strategic and operational insights provide decision-makers with a concise understanding of changing or emerging issues or threats. They inform and influence appropriate operational, regulatory and policy responses.

In 2024–25, the ACIC's strategic and operational insights covered a range of themes, including:

- the ACIC's National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program and bespoke wastewater projects
- illicit drugs, including trends in drug markets and contemporary and potential threats posed by specific drugs
- illicit tobacco market dynamics
- the threat posed by serious and organised crime's involvement with 3D-printed and privately manufactured firearms
- National Disability Insurance Scheme fraud and vulnerabilities
- threats posed by outlaw motorcycle gangs
- new methods and trends in money laundering, including the use of financial technology
- criminal communication.

Disseminations

The ACIC made 12,500 disseminations of intelligence products to 291 partners in 2024–25.

Three types of partners receive intelligence products from the ACIC: ACIC Board member agencies; other Australian partners; and certain law enforcement and intelligence agencies outside Australia, such as the United Kingdom National Crime Agency and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.

The ACIC's non-board Australian partners include stakeholders not involved in traditional law enforcement – such as policy and regulatory agencies, and bodies involved in the social services, health, forensic services, aviation, and sports integrity sectors – who benefit from intelligence around vulnerabilities and potential criminal threats.

In 2024–25, 63% of all disseminations were to ACIC Board member agencies, 20% were to non-board Australian partners, and 17% were to international partners.

The ACIC disclosed information to 2 private sector bodies, on a total of 2 occasions, in accordance with the circumstances defined in section 59AB of the ACC Act. Information or intelligence products were disclosed to sporting and betting entities.

Quantitative results

Quantitative details of all special ACIC operations conducted in 2024–25 are presented in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 does not include results from ACIC activities that were not related to special ACIC operations.

Table 3.1: Quantitative results of special ACIC operations 2024–25

Authorised activities		Historical[a]	Special ACIC operation								
			Cybercrime	Drugs	Firearms	Illicit Tobacco	National Security Threats	Serious Financial Crime	Supply Chains	Victim-Based Crime	Visa and Migration Fraud
Coercive powers	Exams	0	3	41	0	2	0	20	3	0	0
	Notices	0	0	55	0	0	0	37	1	0	1
	Products[b]	2	6	212	0	7	0	220	35	0	0
Intelligence products	Analytical	0	4	40	2	0	0	42	1	3	0
	Tactical	27	14	690	159	25	4	626	52	1	1
Disseminations	Analytical	5	105	950	23	6	0	638	38	69	0
	Tactical	135	92	3,395	1,468	185	28	3,470	288	4	6
	Stakeholders[c]	40	48	151	24	21	11	138	40	36	6
Identified criminality	Unknown[d]	0	0	16	0	0	0	31	31	0	0
	Known[e]	0	0	4	0	0	0	19	0	0	0
Disruptions	Severe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Significant	0	0	8	0	0	0	4	2	0	0
Seizures ($m)	Cash/assets	0	0	1.16	0	0	0	6.16	0	0	0
	Drugs[f]	0	0	55.60	0	0	0	1.01	1.79	0	0
	Tobacco[g]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.17	0	0	0

a Outcomes that occurred after an operation/investigation closed, to which intelligence collected, produced and disseminated during the active period of the operation/investigation materially contributed.
b Intelligence products derived from use of coercive powers.
c Stakeholders that received a dissemination.
d Previously unknown criminal.
e Known criminal operating in a previously unknown area of criminality.
f Estimated street value.
g Estimated tax excise value.

SECTION 4:
SYSTEMS AND SERVICES

This section describes the ACIC's delivery of national policing information systems and services and checking services, to support law enforcement and community safety, in 2024–25.

National policing information systems and services

As law enforcement agencies, border protection agencies and intelligence partners continue to be challenged by serious and organised criminals moving between jurisdictions and diversifying their criminal activities, the ACIC has an important role in facilitating access to policing information and intelligence holdings across Australia.

The ACIC does this through IT systems and linked databases that deliver information-sharing solutions between Commonwealth, state and territory agencies, bringing together essential information from around the country and making it accessible to all Australian police and law enforcement agencies.

The ACIC's national policing information systems give police and other accredited users the ability to complete national searches on a range of criminal data holdings, offering services that support checks, investigations and general police work.

Performance against targets for national policing information systems availability, enhancement and stakeholder value is analysed in the ACIC's *Annual Report 2024–25*. Table 4.1 shows the availability of systems against board-agreed benchmarks for 2024–25.

Table 4.1: National policing information systems availability

System	2024–25 (%)	Board-agreed benchmark (%)	Benchmark met
Australian Ballistic Information Network	100.00	95.00	✓
Australian Firearms Information Network	100.00	98.50[a]	✓
Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network/ Australian Criminal Intelligence Database: Desk	100.00	98.50	✓
National Automated Fingerprint Identification System	99.95	99.50	✓
National Child Offender System	99.86	99.50	✓
National Criminal Intelligence System	99.93	99.90	✓
National Criminal Investigation DNA Database	99.96	99.00	✓
National Firearms Identification Database	100.00	96.00	✓
National Missing Persons and Victim System	100.00	96.00	✓
National Police Reference System	99.99	99.50	✓
National Vehicles of Interest System	99.95	99.00	✓
Working with Children Checks National Reference System	99.97	98.70	✓

a This benchmark was incorrectly shown as 99.00% in Table 2.3 of the 2023–24 Board of the ACIC Chair Annual Report.

Australian Ballistic Information Network

The Australian Ballistic Information Network assists police across Australia to identify ballistics data to link crimes, firearms and suspects. It helps police to electronically match crime scene ballistic evidence to the firearm used, or to link crimes where the same firearm or its components have been used at multiple scenes.

This system builds on ballistic libraries that operate in several states and territories.

During 2024–25, the Australian Ballistic Information Network had 163 registered users. The system was used to conduct 3,142 searches and provided 64 positive data matches.

Australian Firearms Information Network

The Australian Firearms Information Network helps police and other law enforcement agencies to manage the registration, licensing and movement of firearms. The historical data in the system allows users to contribute to and share national records of the life cycles of all registered firearms in Australia. All police partners, the Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force are integrated with the network.

During 2024–25, the Australian Firearms Information Network had 537 registered users and was used to conduct 393,854 searches.

Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network

The Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network is the secure extranet that provides a gateway for partners to access the ACIC's intelligence databases and services. It is also a secure messaging channel for sharing criminal information and intelligence between Commonwealth, state and territory partners.

During 2024–25, the Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network had 3,954 registered users.

Court Portal

The ACIC's Court Portal provides magistrates courts and family courts in all Australian states and territories with read-only access to information from the National Police Reference System that relates to protection orders and domestic violence orders. The information is provided by the courts and provisioned into the National Police Reference System by police agencies.

The Court Portal provides a national information-sharing capability in support of the National Domestic Violence Order Scheme. By ensuring that local courts and police can collaborate to manage domestic violence orders effectively, the portal contributes to the increased safety of victims of domestic violence and the wider community.

In 2024–25, the system was used by the courts to conduct 3,482 searches for information related to protection orders and domestic violence orders.

National Automated Fingerprint Identification System

Australian police use the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System to identify individuals from their fingerprints or palm prints. The system helps police to solve crimes by matching crime scene evidence to persons of interest. It enables near real-time uploads of prints from crime scenes, helping police to identify suspects in minutes.

The Department of Home Affairs also uses information from the system, via an interface to its biometrics identification system, to support Australia's migration program.

During 2024–25, the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System had 476 registered users. The system was used to conduct 2,221,186 searches, and provided 405,378 positive data matches.

National Child Offender System

The National Child Offender System helps police to protect the community by enabling them to uphold child protection legislation in their state or territory.

The system allows Australian police to record and share child offender information and directly enables police to manage key information to meet the requirements of the relevant child protection legislation in each state and territory. It includes the Australian National Child Offender Register and the Managed Person System.

During 2024–25, the National Child Offender System had 1,432 registered users.

National Criminal Intelligence System

NCIS is the core system for sharing national policing information and intelligence in Australia. The system provides law enforcement and intelligence agencies with a comprehensive, unified picture of criminal activity, and enables them to work more collaboratively.

NCIS contributes to a safer Australia by arming agencies with the cross-border information they need, when they need it, to address and prevent criminal activity. By sharing a national view of crime from multiple agencies, and delivering targeted, timely, relevant and prioritised national policing information, NCIS ensures that law enforcement officers are informed about risks to themselves and the community and can respond accordingly.

In 2024–25, enhanced operational policing data from Tasmania Police and additional historical international movements data were added to NCIS, along with significant uplifts to functions, security and integrity.

Police partner agencies have progressively integrated with NCIS via system-to-system provisioning and consumption. This integration reduces reliance on the National Police Reference System as a source for police partners' operational systems. In line with the nationally agreed implementation sequence and resourcing arrangements, the Northern Territory Police Force is scheduled to complete NCIS integration for both provisioning of data and consumption by October 2026.

Working with partner agencies in 2024–25, the ACIC progressed towards the future addition of enhanced operational policing data from South Australia Police, Australian Federal Police and Northern Territory Police Force to NCIS, along with a project to uplift national criminal intelligence and information sharing through NCIS.

During 2024–25, the NCIS had 41,707 system-to-system registered users and 52,530 user interface users, and was used to conduct 50,421,114 searches.

National Criminal Investigation DNA Database

The NCIDD holds samples of DNA profiles collected by Australian police from crime scenes, convicted offenders, suspects and volunteers. The database and its Integrated Forensic Analysis tool help police to solve crimes and eliminate innocent people as suspects, by linking DNA profiles from crime scenes with DNA profiles from persons of interest and other crime scenes.

The database also holds DNA profiles from missing persons, family members of missing persons, and unknown human remains. It has the capability to use DNA to link family relationships, to facilitate quick identification of disaster victims and help resolve missing persons cases. The software is configured to manage the complex policy and legislative differences between Australian jurisdictions.

During 2024–25, the NCIDD had 123 registered users and now has approximately 2 million DNA profiles.

National Firearms Identification Database

The National Firearms Identification Database sets uniform national standards for the identification of firearms registered within Australia.

The database is a reference tool that enables police to identify and characterise a firearm using descriptors such as make, model, calibre and magazine capacity. It assists police to ensure that firearms are recorded consistently during registration, importation or transfer of ownership and movement across state and territory borders. The database is also available for the public and can be accessed via nfid.acic.gov.au.

During 2024–25, the National Firearms Identification Database had 363 registered users and was used to conduct 115,192 searches.

National Missing Persons and Victim System

The National Missing Persons and Victim System provides Australian state and territory police with the ability to share information on long-term missing persons and unidentified human remains. The system can match ante-mortem and post-mortem dental records and perform other advanced searches.

The system is also used by Australian and New Zealand police to identify victims of disasters. Interpol uses the same software for disaster victim identification, and Australian teams are familiar with the Interpol system and processes. This approach makes it easier for countries to assist each other in the aftermath of a regional or global disaster.

During 2024–25, the National Missing Persons and Victim System had 436 registered users.

National Police Reference System

The National Police Reference System equips police with the knowledge they need to make on-the-spot decisions when dealing with persons of interest. It is available to more than 72,000 police officers, investigators and analysts across Australia, enabling them to share critical intelligence.

The system provides key national reference data such as names, photographs, identity information, criminal history (charges and convictions), and information on warnings, warrants, wanted persons, and firearms. The data is accessible from handheld devices, in car terminals and desktop computers.

The implementation of NCIS continued to result in decreases in the numbers of users and searches of the National Police Reference System in 2024–25, due to National Police Reference System data being made available through NCIS.

During 2024–25, the National Police Reference System had 30,730 registered users and was used to conduct 11,833,241 searches.

National Vehicles of Interest System

The National Vehicles of Interest System enables police to record and search for local or interstate vehicles that may be stolen or suspicious. System users can also enquire about vehicle component information, national vehicle registration and description information, and national driver licence information provided by the National Exchange of Vehicle and Driver Information System hosted by Austroads (the peak organisation of Australasian road transport and traffic agencies).

During 2024–25, the National Vehicles of Interest System had 40,353 registered users and was used to conduct 9,545,855 searches.

Checking services

The ACIC works with Commonwealth, state and territory police agencies to deliver checking services which enhance the safety of the community by providing timely and accurate offence history information that helps decision-makers to determine the suitability of applicants for a range of employment, volunteering, registration, licensing and other entitlements.

National Police Checking Service

The National Police Checking Service helps to protect the safety of the community by minimising the risk that unsuitable people will be appointed to positions of trust. To deliver the service, the ACIC works with accredited bodies that submit requests for nationally coordinated criminal history checks, and with police agencies that vet requests when a potential match with criminal records has been identified.

Accredited bodies are allowed controlled access to the National Police Checking Service Support System so that they can submit requests for checks. They include certain government agencies, private sector businesses and brokers, not-for-profit organisations, and screening units responsible for the assessment of people who apply to work with children or vulnerable people. As the regulator of the accredited bodies, the ACIC provides education and conducts audits to ensure that they comply with the agreement that gives them access to the system.

Demand for nationally coordinated criminal history checks is high and continues to rise. In 2024–25, the National Police Checking Service processed more than 7.26 million requests for checks, the highest number processed since the system was implemented in 2012.

Table 4.2 summarises key statistics for the service in 2024–25.

Table 4.2: National Police Checking Service statistics

Measure	2024–25 result	Board-agreed benchmark	Result ≥ benchmark/ average
Availability[a]	99.96%	99.00%	✓
Timeliness – non-urgent checks completed within 10 business days	98.94%	95.00%	✓
Timeliness – urgent checks completed within 5 business days	99.52%	95.00%	✓
Checks processed	7.26 million	n.a.	✓

n.a. = not applicable

a Availability of the National Police Checking Service Support System.

Working with Children Checks National Reference System

The Working with Children Checks National Reference System provides a centralised database for the sharing of 'negative notice' decisions for Working with Children Check applicants between state and territory screening agencies.

After the 2024–25 reporting period, the Northern Territory introduced legislation to facilitate the provisioning of negative notices to the national reference system. Implementation activities to operationalise these legislative amendments are planned to progress in 2026.

Once implementation is complete, all jurisdictions will be integrated with the system, enabling screening agencies to view information on persons who have been denied a Working with Children Check in other jurisdictions. Agencies can use this information, supported by criminal history and risk assessment material, to vet applicants and monitor current Working with Children Check holders.

The system permits a screening agency to search for key negative decisions of interstate screening agencies when deciding upon a new application. The system also permits a screening agency to undertake batch searches of all current cardholders against the national dataset, to establish whether negative notices for cardholders exist in a particular state or territory.

During 2024–25, the Working with Children Checks National Reference System was available 99.97% of the time, against a board-agreed benchmark of 98.70%. The system was used to conduct 198,728,065 searches.

SECTION 5:
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND LEGAL ACTIONS

This section describes an independent review that may lead to changes in the ACIC's legislative framework, and legal actions involving the ACIC in 2024–25.

Legislative changes

In 2023, the Australian Government commissioned the 'first principles' *Independent Review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements*. Stephen Merchant PSM and Greg Wilson were appointed to undertake the review.

The review assessed the operations and effectiveness of the ACIC as Australia's national criminal intelligence agency within the context of Commonwealth law enforcement and intelligence more broadly.

On 14 November 2024, the Attorney-General published the unclassified report of the review and the government's response. The government has considered the review's 29 recommendations and agreed or agreed in principle with 27 of the recommendations.

The recommendations set out the blueprint for comprehensive reform to provide the strongest foundation for the ACIC's critical national criminal intelligence role. The recommendations directly drive legislative reform, including repealing and replacing the ACC Act, to clarify the ACIC's role, strengthen its powers, and modernise oversight and information sharing.

These reforms will uplift the ACIC's legal framework and allow the agency to undertake its functions outlined in the review as Australia's national criminal intelligence agency and provider of critical policing information and criminal intelligence systems. The reforms will support the ACIC to analyse, evaluate and communicate intelligence relating to serious and organised crime to Commonwealth and state and territory law enforcement partners. Maximising the use and sharing of this intelligence information enables police partners to build operational strategies and coordinate disruption activities.

Charges and convictions

In 2024–25, ACIC intelligence contributed to operational activities that led to law enforcement partners charging 36 people with criminal offences, laying a total of 143 charges.

As a result of law enforcement partners' prosecutions arising from ACIC intelligence, 2 convictions were secured in 2024–25, for offences related to illicit drugs and money laundering. The convictions related to charges laid in a previous financial year. The convicted persons appeared before a court for sentencing in 2024–25, resulting in a custodial sentence of 10 or more years for one person, and a custodial sentence of less than 3 years with community work on release for the other.

Offences against the ACC Act can be dealt with by way of prosecution, or through contempt proceedings. The appropriate approach is determined by the unique context of each matter.

In 2024–25, one prosecution was commenced in relation to offences against the ACC Act. The matter was concluded with the court imposing a sentence of 18 months imprisonment, with the defendant to be released after 9 months on entering into a recognisance in the amount of $5,000 and undertaking to be of good behaviour for 18 months.

Proceeds of crime actions

The *Proceeds of Crime Act 2002* provides for the proceeds of crime to be controlled, confiscated and potentially forfeited to the Commonwealth to discourage criminal activity and prevent reinvestment in further criminal activity. In addition, under equivalent state or territory legislation, state and territory partners may control, confiscate and recover proceeds of crime, based on ACIC intelligence.

In conjunction with its partners, the ACIC works to undermine the profitability of criminal enterprises. Table 5.1 summarises the outcomes of law enforcement partners' proceeds of crime activities that resulted from ACIC intelligence.

Table 5.1: Proceeds of crime outcomes arising from ACIC referrals 2024–25

Type	Amount ($m)
Restrained[a]	21.0
Confiscated[b]	0.1
Recovered[c]	0.0

a Assets are frozen or restrained due to a suspicion of criminal activity.

b Criminal involvement is confirmed and the court orders a defendant to pay money to the government or forfeit assets. This can be in the form of a forfeiture order, a pecuniary penalty order or a conviction-based forfeiture.

c Money obtained from the transfer of money or the sale of assets is paid to the government.

Judicial reviews

The ACIC is subject to legal challenge as a normal part of its operations. This usually occurs in the context of applications in the Federal Court of Australia (Federal Court) for judicial review under the *Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977* (ADJR Act) or section 39B of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Judiciary Act), or as part of the criminal justice process, such as in contested subpoenas or applications for a stay of criminal proceedings.

In 2024–25, 4 judicial review applications involving the ACIC were made to the Federal Court and were determined or otherwise disposed of, as reported below.

VII v Purcell [2025] FCA 202

On 21 February 2024, VII (a court-ordered pseudonym) filed an application in the Federal Court for relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The applicant sought to challenge the decision of the examiner to issue a summons pursuant to section 28 of the ACC Act, as well as the validity of the relevant special ACIC operation.

The applicant also challenged the constitutional validity of the provisions in the ACC Act which empower the ACIC Board to authorise a special ACIC operation or special ACIC investigation.

The matter was heard on 7 June and 18 June 2024. On 14 March 2025, the court dismissed the application on all grounds and ordered the applicant to pay the ACIC's costs. On 8 April 2025, the applicant filed an appeal to the Full Federal Court against the decision. On 7 October 2025, the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the ACIC's costs.

Elfar v The Commonwealth and Ors [2024] FCA 245

On 4 April 2023, the applicant filed an application in the Federal Court seeking an extension of time to apply for a review under the ADJR Act and/or relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The applicant sought to challenge the basis of his compulsory examination in 2010, including his removal from a corrective services facility for the purpose of the examination.

On 26 March 2025, the court dismissed the application on all grounds and ordered the applicant to pay the ACIC's costs.

DMT24 v Durr and Anor

On 8 May 2024, DMT24 (a court-ordered pseudonym) filed an application in the Federal Court for relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The applicant sought to challenge (including seeking an injunctive relief) the decision of the examiner to issue a notice and summons pursuant to sections 21A and 28 of the ACC Act, as well as the validity of the relevant special ACIC operation.

On 21 June 2024, the applicant sought to discontinue the proceedings on the basis that the parties bear their own costs. A notice of discontinuance was filed by the applicant on 20 August 2024.

HYF24 v Commonwealth of Australia

On 4 October 2024, HYF24 (a court-ordered pseudonym) filed an application in the Federal Court for relief under section 16(1)(a) of the ADJR Act and section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The applicant sought to challenge the decision of the examiner to issue a notice and summons pursuant to sections 21A and 28 of the ACC Act.

On 22 October 2024, the examiner withdrew the summons requiring HYF24 to appear before an ACIC examiner. On 30 October 2024, the examiner withdrew the notice in relation to HYF24. The proceedings were discontinued by consent with the ACIC to pay the applicant's costs to be assessed.

Contempt proceedings

In certain circumstances, ACIC examiners have the power to apply for a witness to be dealt with for contempt of the ACIC, under section 34B of the ACC Act. Such applications are heard in the Federal Court or the relevant state or territory court.

Three contempt proceedings were finalised in 2024–25.

Purcell v IDN24 [2025] FCA 215

IDN24 (a court-ordered pseudonym) appeared before an ACIC examiner in answer to a summons issued pursuant to section 28 of the ACC Act. On 31 July 2024, contempt proceedings were commenced in the Federal Court on the basis that the ACIC considered IDN24's answers to questions were false.

On 19 March 2025, the court dismissed the application on the basis that the ACIC had not met the burden of proof required for the court to conclude that IDN24's answers were false. The ACIC was ordered to pay IDN24's costs.

Lusty (Examiner) v ITT24 [2025] FCA 141

ITT24 (a court-ordered pseudonym) appeared before an ACIC examiner in answer to a summons issued pursuant to section 28 of the ACC Act. ITT24 refused or failed to take an oath or affirmation, and refused or failed to answer questions an ACIC examiner required ITT24 to answer. On 15 October 2024, contempt proceedings were commenced in the Federal Court.

ITT24 entered a plea of guilty to both contempt charges and was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment on each charge, and ordered to pay the ACIC's costs.

Purcell (Examiner) v LAZ24 [2025] FCA 413

LAZ24 (a court-ordered pseudonym) appeared before an ACIC examiner in answer to a summons pursuant to section 28 of the ACC Act. LAZ24 refused to answer 6 questions that an ACIC examiner required LAZ24 to answer. On 9 December 2024, contempt proceedings were commenced in the Federal Court.

LAZ24 entered a plea of guilty to contempt and was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, and ordered to pay the ACIC's costs.

On 28 May 2025, LAZ24 filed an appeal against sentence on a number of grounds. The appeal was dismissed on 19 September 2025.

List of abbreviations

ACC Act	*Australian Crime Commission Act 2002*
ACIC	Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
ADJR Act	*Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977*
AI	artificial intelligence
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
Federal Court	Federal Court of Australia
Judiciary Act	*Judiciary Act 1903*
NCIDD	National Criminal Investigation DNA Database
NCIS	National Criminal Intelligence System
Special Account	National Policing Information Systems and Services Special Account

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The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission acknowledges the traditional owners and custodians of country throughout Australia and acknowledges their connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to the people, the cultures and the elders past, present and emerging.

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